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Chief William's Ghost: The Problematic
Persistence of the Duty to Sit
JEFFREY W. STEMPELt
DearBillI'm inclined to agree with [Justice] Byron [White] on this. Your
issuance of such a memorandum [explaining your decision to
participatein Laird v. Tatum despite criticism] would, I think, put
no pressure on others, now or in the future, to give reasons for their
disqualification....Certainly, I will feel no such obligation.And I
think publication of the memo would be basically healthy-it is
informative, thoughtful, persuasive, and educational. On the other
hand, I am sure you are not so sanguine as to think that the memo
will satisfy the N.Y. Times, Washington Post, or other critics. It
will probably just further irritate them, and they do have the last

t Doris S. & Theodore B. Lee Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law,
University of Nevada Las Vegas. Thanks to Bill Boyd, Justice Michael Douglas,
Steve Johnson, Doris and Ted Lee, Judge Peggy Leen, Ann McGinley, Jim
Rogers, Tuan Samahon and John White for ideas, information, or support.
Special thanks to ABA Ethics Counsel George Kuhlman and the Nevada
Supreme Court's Judicial Code Revision Commission (particularly Reporter
Janette Bloom, Chair Justice A. William Maupin, and Laura FitzSimmons) for
focusing my interest in this issue. Thanks also to Jeanne Price, Jennifer Gross,
Diana Gleason, Annette Mann, Shannon Rowe, Chad Schatzle, and Lee
Warthen for valuable research assistance. The opinions in this article, of course,
are mine alone, as are any errors or umbrage created. Thanks as well to the
Hoover Institution, which provided copies of the Rehnquist Papers related to
Laird v. Tatum, including the note from Justice Stewart to then-Justice
Rehnquist quoted above and other materials discussed in Section II.C., infra.
The article's title, of course, borrows from Adam Hochschild, KING LEOPOLD'S
GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR AND HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA (1998)

(describing Belgian monarch's decisions that continue to cause ill effect in Africa
some hundred years later). Although even Justice Rehnquist's most vigorous
critics, including me, of course do not literally equate his reign with King
Leopold's, the Chief Justice's forays into judicial ethics have generally been
negative and unfortunately remain a prominent part of his posthumous legacy.
See infra pp. 27-34 and 65-66. Justice Rehnquist's memorandum defending his
decision to participate in Laird v. Tatum (see infra Part II.C) had more far
reaching consequences than Justice Stewart envisioned. Whether it was
"basically healthy" to the law remains open to discussion. The "last word" on the
issue also remains to be rendered (see infra Part III).
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word. I suppose it comes down to your own instinctive feeling. If
you would feel more comfortable publishing,I'd do so if I were you.
Hand-written note from Justice Potter Stewart to Justice William
Rehnquist, August 14, 1972.
INTRODUCTION

The duty to sit concept or "doctrine"--or at least what I
term the "pernicious" version of the concept'--emphasizes a
judge's obligation to hear and decide cases unless there is a
compelling ground for disqualification and creates a
situation in which judges are erroneously pushed to resolve
close disqualification issues against recusal2 when the
1.
See infra notes 20-29 and accompanying text. The duty to sit concept
also exists in a "benign" form that simply emphasizes a judge's responsibility
not to recuse where the asserted basis for disqualification is weak, and cautions
that the judge should not recuse simply to avoid difficult, politically charged, or
inconvenient cases.
Perhaps the term "pernicious" is a little strong as the term is ordinarily
defined as "highly injurious or destructive" and "implies irreparable harm done
through evil or insidious corrupting or undermining." MERRIAM WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 866 (10th ed. 1996). As is apparent in this article, I

regard the version of the duty to sit concept that resists recusal in close cases as
injurious to fairness, justice, and public confidence in the courts, although
perhaps the harm is not "highly" injurious or "irreparable." Certainly, the term
"pernicious" has been used to describe situations that are not heinously awful.
See Lawrence M. Solan, PerniciousAmbiguity in Contracts and Statutes, 79
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 859 (2004).
On the term "benign," see MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY,
supra, at 106 (defining benign as "favorable" or "wholesome" and of a "character
that does not threaten health or life," although also suggesting that benign
things have "no significant effect"). On the contrary, I think the benign version
of the duty to sit concept as reflected in Rule 2.7 of the 2007 ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct (see infra text accompanying notes 58-64) does have a
significant positive effect in encouraging judges not to avoid cases for reasons of
personal convenience. Unfortunately, however, the ABA Code and the courts
have not sufficiently distinguished between the benign and pernicious versions
of the duty to sit and have been insufficiently ruthless in eradicating the
pernicious version of the doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 375-82
(recommending clarifying commentary to ABA Model Code).
2.
This article treats the terms "disqualification" and "recusal" as
synonyms. Some courts and commentators have traditionally attempted to
distinguish the two, suggesting that disqualification is a judge's mandatory
obligation to avoid participation in a case while recusal is a more voluntary,
discretionary act informed by the judge's own preferences as well as the
prevailing law. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431,
460 (2004) ("Disqualification, based on relatively precise criteria, is
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presumption should run in exactly the opposite direction?
In close cases, judges should err on the side of recusal in
order to enhance public confidence in the judiciary and to
ensure that subtle, subconscious, or hard-to-prove bias,
prejudice, or partiality does not influence decision-making.'
The pernicious version of the duty to sit concept pushes
judges in exactly the wrong direction, suggesting that they
should decline to preside only if the grounds for
disqualification are undeniably clear.' And, unfortunately,
some judges appear capable of denying even a compelling
case for disqualification.6 In some cases, the doctrine has
been used to justify continued participation in cases where
nondiscretionary and, in general, cannot be waived by the parties. Recusal is a
more generalized obligation or power of a judge to remove herself for a specified
reason or even for no reason at all.") (footnote omitted). Most modern judicial
and scholarly authority treat the terms as synonymous. A judge who is
disqualified recuses him or herself just as a disqualified judge must recuse
himself. See RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES § 20.8, at 604 (2d ed. 2007) (noting traditional
connotative distinction but using terms interchangeably throughout treatise);
Debra Lyn Bassett, JudicialDisqualificationin the FederalAppellate Courts, 87
IOWA L. REV. 1213 (2002) (same); Randall J. Litteneker, Comment,
Disqualificationof FederalJudges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 236,
237 n.5 (1978) (same); see also JAMES J. ALFINI, STEVEN LUBET, JEFFREY SHAMAN
& CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 4.04, at 4-11 (4th
ed. 2007) (tending to use "disqualification" as preferred term but also using
"recusal" as synonym).
See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8, at 607-11; Bassett, supra note 2, at
3.
1227 n.68 (noting that duty to sit doctrine "required judges to decide borderline
questions of recusal in favor of presiding over the case") (citing H.R. REP. No. 931453, at 2 (1974), as reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355); infra Part II.C.
Whether the duty to sit qualifies as a formal "doctrine" is unclear, although it is
a powerful concept that has been used for decades to resist disqualification
motions. This article will use both the doctrine and concept nomenclature in
describing invocation of duty to sit reasoning because the concept has been
labeled a doctrine by many courts. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 2, at 1227 n.68,
1243 n. 146) (referring to duty to sit "doctrine").
4.
See infra Part II.C (criticizing duty to sit concept and application).
See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8, at 604 (describing duty to sit as
5.
"generally construed in such a way as to oblige the assigned judge to hear a case
unless and until an unambiguous demonstration of extrajudicial bias was
made.") (citing United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987)
(per curiam), cert. denied sub nom. Board of Trustees v. Auburn Univ., 108 S.
Ct. 2857 (1988);United States v. Jaramillo, 745 F.2d 1245, 1249 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2142; Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217, 1220 (1st Cir.
1979); Parish v. Bd. of Commrs. of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 103 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied sub nom. Davis v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
6.

See infra text accompanying notes 288-374.
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disqualification was required.7 In other cases, the doctrine
has encouraged judges to continue to preside in cases where
disqualification would have been the better course.8
More than three decades ago, both the American Bar
Association (ABA) and the U.S. Congress acknowledged the
error of elevating an overwrought sense of judicial
obligation above a litigant's right to a judge whose
impartiality was beyond reasonable question. But despite
this, at least a half-dozen (and perhaps as many as twenty)
state judiciaries continue to invoke the duty to sit concept,
with occasional federal courts joining in despite the clear
mandate of federal law." Although in many cases continued
endorsement of the duty to sit may be primarily rhetorical,
with perhaps only modest impact on the actual outcome of a
recusal motion, the duty to sit concept appears to continue
to exert hydraulic pressure against disqualification,
creating a situation where too many cases are presided over
or decided by judges whose detachment and neutrality is
subject to question."
How could this happen when the pernicious version of
the duty to sit has long been abolished in federal law and
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct and disapproved
by the bulk of judicial ethics scholars? The continuing
endurance of the duty to sit concept suggests that courts are
more self-protective and resistant to change than commonly
supposed."2 In addition, it may reflect simple sloppy legal
7.
See infra Part II.C (discussing cases of clear error in failure to recuse
and in which the court invokes the duty to sit concept).
8.
See infra text accompanying note 155 (discussing cases where duty to
sit was invoked and judge ordered to preside when better exercise of discretion
would have been to recuse).
9.
See infra Part I.D (reviewing federal statutory elimination of duty to sit
and its rejection in 1972 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 191-221 (reviewing current status of
duty to sit in the states).
11. See infra Part II.B (reviewing state court cases invoking duty to sit,
finding much invocation to be dicta, but also finding that states continuing to
adhere to duty to sit concept are more resistant to recusal motions).
12. See ALFINI, ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.01, at 4-3 ("Judges are also only
human, and as such, some face difficulty with the issue of impartiality. It is only
natural for judges to have confidence in their own impartiality and
professionalism. . . . But partiality influences unconscious thought processes
more than a judge may realize."); JEFFREY M. SHAMAN & JONA GOLDSCHMIDT,
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL PRACTICES AND
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work in which judges and their law clerks are excessively
drawn to outdated or erroneously reasoned judicial opinions
rather than other sources of law and where too much
credence is given to even highly problematic writings of a
U.S. Supreme Court Justice." Whatever the explanation, it
now seems beyond dispute that the duty to sit concept is at
best unhelpful to courts deciding recusal motions and
appears at the margin to result in more erroneous
disqualification decisions undermining public confidence in
the judiciary. 4 The ABA's recently revised Code of Judicial
Conduct is now before the various state courts and
legislatures, providing an opportunity to clarify the precise
contours and status of the duty to sit and to eradicate the
pernicious version of the doctrine with certainty and
finality. 5
Part I of this Article describes the duty to sit conceptcum-doctrine, its history, and modern backlash against the
doctrine resulting in its supposed abolition during the
1970s. 6 An important catalyst in the process was thenJustice William Rehnquist's memorandum invoking the
ATTITUDES 1 (1995) (finding that although judges were quite willing to recognize

even modest financial interest in case as ground for required recusal, they were
resistant to disqualification where the asserted grounds were of non-monetary
bias or prejudice or questions as to impartiality, with one-third exhibiting
inclination not to disqualify); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Introduction, in LESLIE W.
ABRAMSON, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT xi (2d ed. 1992) ('2Most judges genuinely believe that, despite their
connections to a lawsuit, they can put aside their bias or interest, and decide the
suit justly. What this ignores, unfortunately, is that partiality is more likely to
affect the unconscious thought processes of a judge, with the result that he or
she has little conscious knowledge of being swayed by improper influences.
Furthermore, even if a judge were able to put aside bias and self-interest in a
particular case, the appearance of impropriety remains, and is itself a serious
problem that cases disrepute upon the judiciary."); Bassett, supra note 2, at
1242 ("[J]udges, like all human beings, are susceptible to the phenomenon of
believing that they can be fair and unbiased."); accord John Leubsdorf, Theories
of Judging and Judicial Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237, 245 (1987)
("Mhe most biased judges [may be] the least willing to withdraw."), Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79
OR. L. REV. 61 (2000).
13. See infra Part ILA (discussing instances in which federal courts
continue to refer to duty to sit approvingly even though it has not been the law
of federal courts since 1974).
14.

See infra Part II.C.

15.

See infra Part III.

16.

See infra Part I.
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doctrine to resist recusal in a case in which he clearly
should have stepped aside. In response to criticism, he
wrote a memorandum explaining this refusal to recuse,
seeking counsel from three other Justices before issuing the
memorandum. 7 Part II describes the continued endurance
of the flawed concept in some federal courts and in many
states notwithstanding the problematic nature of the
Rehnquist memorandum, which continues to be cited
favorably by some courts and also provides impetus for
continued Supreme Court recalcitrance regarding recusal
reform.'" Part III discusses the new ABA Model Code, which
provides an opportunity to more clearly and expressly
disavow the pernicious version of the doctrine. 9
I. THE RISE AND INCOMPLETE FALL OF THE
DUTY TO SIT CONCEPT

A. Defining Terms: The PerniciousDuty to Sit Concept
DistinguishedFrom the Judge's Benign Responsibility to
Hear and Decide Cases
It has long been accepted that judges shoulder the heavy
responsibility of deciding cases even under unpleasant
circumstances. Some of the burdens of judging are simply
elevated examples of annoying impositions faced by anyone
in the workplace: Friday afternoon or holiday eve injunction
requests, lengthy trials spilling into vacation periods,
emergency arraignments conflicting with a child's
graduation ceremony. For the most part, these sorts of
annoyances do not spur voluntary disqualification by even
the least industrious judges, although the prospect cannot
be completely discounted."
17. See infra Part I.C. Justice Stewart's note to Justice Rehnquist, quoted
at the outset of this article, was in response to this request for collegial advice.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8, at 604 (discussing duty to sit
generally, both as emblematic of general obligation to discharge assigned tasks
and with more specialized meaning that assigned judge has obligation "to hear a
case unless and until an unambiguous demonstration of extrajudicial bias [is]
made"). Regarding occasional apparent slacking by some courts see, for
example, Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976)
(discussing judge who remanded case to state court because of crowded docket);
LaBuy v. Howes Leather Corp., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (discussing judge who
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More threatening to judicial participation are the cases
where the court is asked to adjudicate controversial matters
that may lead to criticism in the press no matter what
decision is made. Where judges are elected rather than
appointed, controversial, high-profile cases can be
particularly threatening in that a decision may become
campaign fodder for a future opponent, may alienate
current or potential donors, or may attract sustained
criticism from local media outlets. Alone or in combination,
these factors can be fatal to the judge's continued tenure on
the bench. 1 In addition, even in states with an appointed
appointed special master to determine issues of fact because of crowded docket).
During the holiday season of 1981, an antitrust case seeking immediate
preliminary injunctive relief was filed against a major gasoline retailer. The
judge initially assigned the matter voluntarily recused himself because he
regularly purchased that brand of gasoline, resulting in reassignment of the
matter to the judge for whom I was clerking. This second judge literally rolled
his eyes when the case came to him on this basis, conveying to me his
impression that the first judge had been too quick to recuse and that this
probably had to do with the prospect of hearing an involved case on short notice
during the holiday season. My own view is that recusal based on a judge's retail
habits may be overkill but can be justified in order to eliminate a potential
ground for concern over the court's neutrality. I relate this story because it
reflects the degree to which judicial culture frowns upon a judge turning away a
case when the ground for recusal is weak or when recusal appears to further the
judge's personal convenience. See also infra text accompanying note 225
(discussing judicial resistance to disqualification).
21. Former California Supreme Court Chief Justice Rose Bird and former
Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White lost re-election campaigns
because some perceived them as insufficiently tough on crime because they
disapproved of the application of the death penalty under the facts and
circumstances of cases before them. See, e.g., Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme
Court and the Politics of Death, 94 VA. L. REV. 283, 329 n.161 (2008) (defeat of
Rose Bird); Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of
Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 625, 627 (defeat of Penny White); see
also Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43,
52-55 (2003) (noting low voter participation in judicial elections and low voter
knowledge about candidates make outcomes more vulnerable to special interest
politics and media dollars spent on last-minute character assassination or name
recognition); Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint:A Judge's
Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1980 (1988)
(discussing 1986 retention election that resulted in defeat of Chief Justice Bird,
Justice Cruz Reynoso, and Justice Joseph Grodin and role of special interest
politics in their defeats). See generally Penny J. White, A Matter of Perspective, 3
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 5 (2004) (discussing, as a professor at the University of
Tennessee College of Law, concept of judicial neutrality, free speech, and
judicial elections in the aftermath of Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,
536 U.S. 765 (2002) (invalidating state rule prohibiting judge from announcing
positions on particular issues that might come before court)).
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judiciary, judges seldom enjoy the life tenure of the federal
bench.22 A controversial decision may prompt political
authorities not to re-appoint the offending judge or result in
a judge losing a retention election, elections that should in
theory be lost only if the judge is incompetent or corrupt.23
Whatever the reason for recusal, it is thought to create
significant capacity issues for the judicial system and to
constitute a threat to the efficiency of the system. There are
at any juncture only a finite number of available judges.
The recusal of one judge puts greater pressure on judges
that are not disqualified, particularly in smaller districts
with fewer sitting judges. To a degree, the duty to sit, at
least in its benign form, is in large part a duty not to

More recently, a controversial decision essentially requiring the legislature
to raise taxes appears to have caused the re-election defeat of one Nevada
Supreme Court Justice (Nancy Becker) and forced another (Deborah Agosti) into
retirement. See Editorial, Last Justice Standing, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Jan. 9,
2008, at 6B; Jane Ann Morrison, Critic of Supreme Court Justice Sees Good
Reason for Appointing Judges, LAS VEGAS REV.-J, Dec. 10, 2007, at 7B; Editorial,
Nancy Becker Must Be Removed, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov. 5, 2006, at 2D. Both
were in the majority, and Agosti had authored Guinn v. Legislature, 71 P.3d
1269 (Nev. 2003), which held that a state constitutional provision requiring
adequate funding of education bound the legislature to provide funding in a case
where the Governor had effectively maneuvered the legislature into passing the
non-education budget and was then unwilling to appropriate additional funds
for elementary and secondary education. The Court's decision in effect forced the
legislature to raise taxes when it appeared that cuts to the educational budget
would violate the state constitution.
Although the Guinn decision is more defensible than many of its critics will
admit, see Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Most Rational Branch, 4 NEV. L.J. 518
(2004), critics were many and vociferous and their chorus of criticism is widely
regarded as instrumental in Justice Becker's defeat and Justice Agosti's sudden
decision to retire. Editorial, Voters Can Finally Vent on Tax Ruling, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., May 24, 2006, at 3D. In addition, Justices Miriam Shearing and Robert
Rose, who were also in the majority, did not seek re-election at the end of their
terms but their retirements were not as unexpected as that of Agosti. See
Editorial, supra;see also Symposium, Guinn v. Nevada, 4 NEV. L.J. 1 (2004).
22. See James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary'sIndependence
Myth, 27 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 53, 68 (2007) (even appointed state
judges lack life tenure and are consequently less independent than federal
judges with life tenure); see also New York State Senate, About the Senate,
Branches
of
Government
in
New
York
State,
available at
www.senate.state.ny.us/sws/aboutsenatelbranches-gov.html
(last visited Apr.
15, 2009) (New York Court of Appeals judges appointed for fourteen-year
terms).
23.

See Norman Krivosha, In Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of Merit

Selection, 74 JUDICATURE 128 (1990).
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unreasonably burden fellow judges by recusing in response
to a weak argument for disqualification.24
To combat a judge's potential urge to avoid demanding,
time-consuming, or controversial cases, the legal profession
has long taken the view that the nature of a judgeship
implies that the judge has a responsibility to hear and
decide cases, one that should not be shirked for political or
personal reasons. To the extent one views the duty to sit as
a general and rebuttable obligation to preside over a case
unless disqualified, it is unobjectionable.
However, the case for disqualification may not be clear,
particularly when the ground asserted does not involve
traceable financial interest but rather issues of bias,
prejudice, or insufficient impartiality. 6
Reasonable
24. See JudicialDisqualification:Hearing on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 19-21 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Legislative Hearing]
(testimony of California Chief Justice Roger Traynor and prominent Phoenix
attorney John P. Frank) (observing tension between strong disqualification law
protective of public confidence and efficiency of judicial system which, all things
being equal, would prefer to have more judicial capacity rather than less); see
also Jake Garn & Lincoln C. Oliphant, Disqualificationof FederalJudges Under
28 U.S.C. § 455(a): Some Observations on and Objections to an Attempt by the
United States Department of Justice to Disqualify a Judge on the Basis of His
Religion and Church Position, 4 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 45 (1981) (stating
that abolition of pernicious duty to sit is "not telling judges to go off and take
vacations just because cases are uncomfortable").
25.

See FLAMM, supranote 2, § 20.8, at 608-09.

[W]hile courts have sometimes acknowledged the pressures that may
be brought to bear on a judge who has been confronted with a motion
seeking his disqualification-and while some judges have indicated
that they would not mind stepping away from a case in which their
ability to be impartial has been questioned-it has generally been held
that, in the absence of a compelling reason for disqualification, a
challenged judge must retain a case without regard to any personal
burdens that retaining the case may impose on him. Thus, a judge
should ordinarily not recuse himself merely in order to avoid
embarrassment or uneasiness; or because he would prefer to be trying
some other type of case.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
26. See Christopher R. Carton, Comment, DisqualifyingFederalJudges for
Bias: A Considerationof the ExtrajudicialBias Limitation for Disqualification
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 2057 (1994) ("[Most
commentators agree that while the standards for judicial disqualification have
been textually broadened [over time], they are anything but 'clear' and that,
consequently, public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial process is
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opinions may differ on whether one would have reasonable
doubts about a judge's impartiality. Is a judge "disqualified"
when a substantial number of observers question the
judge's neutrality? How substantial must the throng of
concerned persons become? Is a majority required? Is
unanimity or near-unanimity required? The locus of case
law on disqualification adopts an objective reasonably
informed lay observer test mandating disqualification when
this mythical reasonable viewer would harbor serious
doubts regarding a judge's impartiality.27
Logically, the goal of public confidence in the judiciary
mandates that something less than a majority of adequately
informed and educated concerned observers is sufficient.
The notion of public confidence in the courts implies that
substantially more than fifty-one percent of the public is
satisfied that a judge's handling of a matter was not tainted
by partiality or its more invidious cousins bias and
prejudice. Something like a supermajority of satisfaction is
implicit in the notion of public confidence in the fairness of
the courts. Conversely, this means that if a critical mass of
lay observers could reasonably doubt a judge's impartiality,
the case, although perhaps close, becomes one where the
judge is logically disqualified or where, at the very least,
doubts should be resolved in favor of disqualification.
Although the size of the concerned critical mass may be
open to debate (and probably requires something like
twenty to thirty percent of the viewing public to harbor
legitimate concerns over a judge's neutrality), the very
notion of a justice system above reproach implies that a
judge should not be presiding in situations where his or her
participation engenders non-frivolous debate.28
threatened." (citing Seth E. Bloom, Judicial Bias and Financial Interest as
Grounds for Disqualification of Federal Judges, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 662,
663 (1985))); see also Edward G. Burg, Comment, Meeting the Challenge:
Rethinking Judicial Disqualification, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1445, 1481-82 (1981);
Mark T. Coberly, Note, Caesar's Wife Revisited-Judicial Disqualification
Under the 1974 Amendments, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1977); Susan
B. Hoekema, Comment, Questioning the Impartiality of Judges: Disqualifying
FederalDistrict Court Judges Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 60 TEMP. L.Q. 697, 69798 (1987); Ellen M. Martin, Comment, Disqualificationof Federal Judges for
Bias Under 28 U.S.C. Section 144 and Revised Section 455, 45 FORDHAM L. REV.
139, 139-40 (1976).
27. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 5.6.3, at 129-48.
28. Of course, one can argue that the public, like a heavy duty piece of
equipment, may be able to withstand substantial "punishment" in that it does
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not rise up in arms when a controversial decision is rendered by judges whose
neutrality is less than assured. For example, the Court in Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98 (2000), by a 5-4 majority that divided uncomfortably along partisan as
well as ideological lines, effectively placed George W. Bush in the presidency.
The dissenters were the two Justices appointed by Democrats (Stephen Breyer
and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, appointed by Bill Clinton) and a justice appointed by
a Republican not named Bush (John Paul Stevens, appointed by Gerald Ford).
Justice Souter, who provided the fourth dissenting vote, was the justice who
most defied partisan typecasting in that he was appointed by President George
H.W. Bush but nonetheless did not provide legal support to the candidacy of
George W. Bush.
During the course of proceedings, Justice Scalia issued an opinion related to
the Court's grant of certiorari that suggested he was quite interested in
protecting the Bush candidacy. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, cert. granted, 531
U.S. 1046, 1046 (Scalia, J., concurring in petition for certiorari) ('The counting
of votes that are of questionable legality does in my view threaten irreparable
harm to petitioner Bush, and to the country, by casting a cloud upon what he
claims to be the legitimacy of his election."). In addition, the five-member Court
majority elevated Bush to the White House through a theory of equal protection
that the majority had never supported in prior cases and was not willing to
incorporate into the general fabric of constitutional law. See 531 U.S. at 106-10.
See also Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionality
of Bush v. Gore, 82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 610-12 (2002) (arguing that Court exceeded
its constitutional power by using case to effectively decide election outcome).
In addition, the "popular press identified three Justices whom some believed
had conflicts that should have resulted in their disqualification." See STEPHEN
GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS 496-97 (7th ed. 2005) [hereinafter GILLERS,
REGULATION] (noting questions raised about Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
O'Connor and citing news articles); Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?
Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, 61 MD. L. REV.
606, 607-10 (2002). The Justices were not asked to step aside on these grounds
by Gore's counsel and Gillers has concluded that the case for disqualification
was

weak. See

STEPHEN GILLERS,

TEACHER'S MANUAL FOR REGULATION OF

LAWYERS 153-54 (2008) [hereinafter GILLERS, MANUAL] (reviewing issues
presented in casebook and concluding disqualification not necessary). Other
scholars, however, disagree or are less certain. See, e.g., Ifill, supra (concluding
that "several Justices could and should have taken a variety of measuresincluding but not limited to recusal-that would have diminished the
appearance of judicial bias in that case"); Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding
the Henhouse? Recusal and the Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57
RUTGERS L. REv. 107, 127-28 (2004) Regarding the view of laypersons, one need
not look hard to find people who still regard the 2000 election as "stolen," a view
essentially embraced in the HBO movie Recount, starring A-list actors like
Kevin Spacey, Tom Wilkinson, and Dennis Leary, which aired repeatedly in
2008 to reasonably large viewing audiences.
One can regard Bush v. Gore as a controversial and important case that at
least had a modest cloud over the impartiality of the bench-yet the world did
not fall apart and there was not undue political turmoil in its aftermath. Does
this mean my assertions about the importance of public confidence in the courts
is mistaken? Perhaps. But I prefer to view Bush v. Gore, despite its problematic
jurisprudence and result, as a sufficiently rare example that the public's overall
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This view is perfectly consistent with the benign notion
of a duty to sit as cautioning against recusal simply to avoid
a difficult, time-consuming, or politically charged case. As
discussed below, the legal profession has long embraced this
benign notion of judicial responsibility even if its precise
contours were not well articulated. Senator Birch Bayh, the
primary author of the 1974 legislation strengthening federal
disqualification standards, spoke of "relaxing" the duty to
sit, by which he surely meant retaining the benign version
of the doctrine even as his then-proposed legislation began
to sound a death knell for the pernicious version of the
concept, which was officially excised from federal
disqualification law in the 1974 legislation.29
goodwill toward courts could absorb. In addition, the case had a certain "rule of
necessity" character because of the impending need to inaugurate one of the two
litigants as president coupled with the perceived need for judicial resolution to
avoid what may have been an unacceptable wait for a definitive ballot count.
See infra note 75 and accompanying text (regarding the rule of necessity). For
example, as this is written in May 2009, the November 2008 U.S. Senate
election in Minnesota between incumbent Republican Sen. Norm Coleman and
Democratic Challenger Al Franken (the comedian best known for his work on
the original Saturday Night Live) remains incomplete six months after the
election despite a recount, review, certification by the governor, and legal
challenge, with some predicting that it may be summer 2009 or later before all
legal challenges are exhausted. Franken has been certified as the winner but
Coleman's legal challenge remains pending. This delay is not considered
unbearable by most observers but a similar delay in replacing outgoing
President Bill Clinton was considered unacceptable or even illegal. In addition,
losing litigant Al Gore quickly accepted the adverse decision in his case and did
not question the neutrality of the Justices in the majority. In addition, the Court
deciding Bush v. Gore had metaphorical nonpartisan wind at its back in that it
had famously required President Richard Nixon to produced tape recordings on
which he claimed executive privilege, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974), and required President Clinton to submit to civil discovery in sexual
harassment case, Jones v. Clinton, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). All this combined to
make Bush v. Gore palatable despite concerns that Justices owing their lofty
position to a litigant's father essentially made the litigant President. But would
the public stomach a steady diet of such cases? I think not.
29. See Birch Bayh, On Judicial Ethics, 14 ST. LouIs U. L.J. 667, 669
(1969).
The revision [proposed in amendments to 28 U.S.C. 455] also requires
the judge to disqualify for appearance of impropriety, thereby codifying
the requirement of [ABA] Canon 4. Finally, the bill relaxes the so-called
"duty to sit" in cases where the judge is not disqualified by the
provisions of the statute, and gives him fair latitude to disqualify
himself in other instances where "in his opinion, it would be improper
for him to sit."
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Unfortunately, however, the term "duty to sit" acquired
not only the benign connotation of judicial courage and
dedication but also the pernicious connotation of resisting
recusal unless the facts of the case force the judge to step
aside. This version of the duty to sit-which was never
adopted in the ABA Codes or the federal statutes but arose
through caselaw--came to embody the view that judges
should not recuse in close cases and should resist
disqualification unless the case for disqualification is
strong. This more problematic and controversial version of
judicial obligation is this Article's focus and the Article's
suggestion that states seize upon the 2007 ABA Code, which
is being reviewed for possible adoption, as an occasion for
clarifying that the pernicious, recusal-resistant version of
the duty to sit is dead.
The first official ABA pronouncement on judicial
behavior was the 1924 Canons of Judicial Ethics.3 ° "The
See also infra notes 30-49, discussing the legislative history of the 1974
changes to the federal disqualification statute, which adopted the approach of
the 1972 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct and reflects the consensus that
the benign version of the duty to sit was to be retained but that the pernicious
strain of the concept was to be abolished. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1453 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6355-56 [hereinafter House Report]; S.
REP. No. 93-419, at 5 (1973) [hereinafter Senate Report]; 1974 Legislative
Hearing, supra note 24, at 14-16.
The legislation revising federal disqualification law passed the Senate Oct. 4,
1973, the House on Nov. 18, 1974 with modest amendment, and passed the
Senate again on Nov. 21, 1974, and was later signed by President Gerald R.
Ford. See House Report, supra, at 6351.
30. Like many useful developments, the Canons were born of scandal. The
original spur for judicial canons came from Judge Kennesaw Mountain Landis,
a federal judge who was appointed as the first Commissioner of Baseball after
the infamous "Black Sox" scandal of 1919. Despite demands that he resign his
federal judgeship after he began serving as Commissioner, he refused to step
down. The ABA promptly began drafting Canons of Judicial Ethics. With
occasional amendments, the Canons of Judicial Ethics served the profession
well for nearly fifty years and were adopted by most states. See STEPHEN
GILLERS & ROy SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 687
(2008). The 1924 Canons contained a requirement that a judge not have other
obligations that "will in any way interfere or appear to interfere with his
devotion to the expeditious and proper administration of his official [judicial]
functions" (Canon 24) as well as a requirement that judges not maintain a
private law practice (Canon 31). As the Landis episode shows, judges can on
occasion be exceedingly blind to ethical issues. See JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE
APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 180-82 (1974) (summarizing scandal, noting that Landis
came to attention of major league baseball because of "his friendly handling of
one of the earliest attacks on the game as a violation of the federal antitrust
laws" and was also known for anti-German xenophobia stemming from World
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Canons remained essentially unchanged until 1972 when,
after undergoing a comprehensive review, the ABA House of
Delegates replaced them with the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In 1990, that Code was again significantly revised and
renamed the Model Code of Judicial Conduct." Like their
counterparts aimed at practicing lawyers, the ABA Canons
and Model Code are not binding unless adopted by the
relevant state supreme court or legislature. In practice,
however, the ABA model templates of legal and judicial
ethics have become a de facto national set of standards for
lawyer and judge behavior. Every state adopts the Model
Rules and Model Code in large part,32 although some states
(notably California and New York) utilize different formats
and states may vary in their adoption of particular
provisions.33
The 1924 Canons did not specifically address the duty
to sit concept as a weight against recusal but did stress the
judge's responsibility to discharge his or her duties
faithfully and diligently. As discussed below, the duty to sit
doctrine stemmed not so much from a reading of the Canons
as from common law with roots in Blackstonian England.
War I hostilities). While serving as both judge and commissioner, Landis drew
salaries of $7,500 and $42,500 (totaling more than $500,000 in 2007 dollars),
respectively. Unsurprisingly, when forced to choose between the occupations, he
chose the commissionership. See also Peter W. Bowie, The Last 100 Years: An
Era of ExpandingAppearances, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 911, 915-17 (2007) (describing
Landis episode and role in bringing about the Canons, noting that resolutions to
impeach Landis were introduced in Congress and that "the ABA was angered by
Judge Landis' conduct"). But see J.G. TAYLOR SPINK, JUDGE LANDIS AND 25 YEARS
OF BASEBALL 74 (1947) ("[Ihe entire country felt pleased and gratified with the
selection of Landis as ruler of the game.").

31.

See ABA CENTER

FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL

3 (2004) [hereinafter ABA ANNOTATED] (annotating 1990
Model Code); see also LISA L. MILFORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICAL
CODE (1992).
32. The Judicial Code has generally experienced less state variance than
the attorney's Code or Model Rules. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 30, at 687
('The 1972 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct proved widely influential.
Nearly all states (plus the District of Columbia) eventually adopted codes of
judicial conduct closely modeled on the 1972 ABA Code.").
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT

33. For example, some states require an attorney to depart from the
normal rule of protecting a client confidence if necessary to avoid death or
serious bodily injury to a third person while the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct merely give the attorney the discretion to reveal ethically
protected information in order to save live or limb. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra
note 30 at 75-99 (providing commentary on state variance with ABA Model Rule
1.6).
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The 1972 Code also contained no specific discussion of the
duty to sit concept. The 1990 Judicial Code added Canon
3(B)(1), which provided that a "judge shall hear and decide
matters assigned to the judge except those in which
disqualification is required." Like Rule 2.7 of the 2007 Code,
Canon 3(B)(1) is properly seen as endorsement of the benign
duty to sit and an admonition that judges not avoid difficult
or controversial cases. Rule 2.7, the successor to Canon
3(B)(1), was not intended to require resistance to otherwise
valid disqualification motions and did not establish a
presumption against disqualification in close cases.34
Nonetheless, as discussed below, the pernicious version of
the duty to sit doctrine continued to enjoy substantial
support by those interpreting the 1972 and 1990 Judicial
Codes even though both versions of the Code, like federal
law, required disqualification "in a proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
The benign notion of judicial responsibility but not
judicial resistance to serious disqualification motions is
reflected in the 1924 Canons, which required that judges be
studious and diligent,35 industrious,36 prompt,37 and "fearlessly
observe and apply" the Constitution.3 The judge also
34. The relatively little case law that exists construing Section 3B(1)
suggests that it imposes an "affirmative duty not to avoid justiciable issues." See
ABA ANNOTATED, supra note 31, at 88 (quoting In re Respondent U (Cal. Bar
Ct., Review Dep't July 1995) and citing Parker v. Priest, 932 S.W.2d 320 (Ark.
1996) (holding judge must remain on case in absence of grounds for
disqualification)); Peterson v. Borst, 784 N.E.2d 934, 936 (Ind. 2003) (explaining
judge's resignation from commission creating conflict rather than disqualifying
self from case); Hi-Country Estates Homeowner's Ass'n v. Bagley & Co., 996
P.2d 534, 538 (Utah 2000) ("[U]nless a justification for reassignment exists, a
judge has a duty to retain a case until it is completed"); N.Y. Advisory Comm. on
Judicial Ethics, Op. 92-75 (1992) (advising a village justice not to disqualify
himself from cases where the village attorney appears as private counsel unless
there is some other basis for the disqualification because the "duty to sit where
not disqualified . . . is as strong as the duty not to sit where disqualified")
(quoting Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3B(1)).
35. See CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 4 (1924) (Avoidance of
Impropriety).
36.

See id. Canon 6 (Industry).

37. See id. Canon 7 (Promptness). In the same vein, the Canons also
emphasized that a judge must be courteous and civil (Canon 10: Courtesy and
Civility), considerate (Canon 9: Consideration of Jurors and Others); and
"temperate, attentive, patient" (Canon 5: Essential Conduct).
38.

See id. Canon 3 (Constitutional Obligations).
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"should not be swayed by partisan demands, public clamor
or considerations of personal popularity or notoriety, nor be
apprehensive of unjust criticism."39 These admonitions all
counsel the judge to be diligent and unafraid in
decisionmaking but in no way suggest that the judge should
hear cases posing even a close question as to the judge's
impartiality. To the contrary, the Canons famously stated
that a judge's "official conduct should be free from
impropriety or the appearance of impropriety"4 and that the
judge not only should avoid cases involving relatives but
also "should not suffer his conduct to justify the impression
that any person can improperly influence him or unduly
enjoy his favor, or that he is affected by the kinship, rank,
position or influence of any party or person."4 The Canons
also barred improper ex parte communication,42 required
the judge to act with "due regard to the integrity of the
system of the law itself'43 and to avoid partisan politics."
As discussed below, The 1972 ABA Code of Judicial
Conduct, which replaced the Canons, struck an even
39.

Id. Canon 14 (Independence).

40.

Id. Canon 4 (Avoidance of Impropriety).

41. Id. Canon 13 (Kinship or Influence); see also id. Canon 32 (Gifts and
Favors) (forbidding "presents or favors" from litigants or lawyers).
42. See id. Canon 16 (Ex Parte Applications); Canon 17 (Ex Parte
Communications).
43. Id. Canon 20 (Influence of Decisions Upon the Development of the
Law).
A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of
general law to particular instances, that ours is a government
of law and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a
minister of justice under such a system if he seeks to do what
he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular
case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be
binding on him. Such action may become a precedent
unsettling accepted principles and may have detrimental
consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should
administer his office with a due regard to the integrity of the
system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a
depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction
of law.
Id. Prior to a 1957 Amendment to the Canons, the words "a judge" had read "he"
in many of the Canons. Despite this change, the pronoun "he" continued to be
used in the body of the Canons. See MILFORD, supranote 31 at 133.
44. See CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS, supra note 35, at Canon 28 (Partisan
Politics), Canon 30: (Candidacy for Office).
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stronger pose in favor of judicial impartiality but said
relatively little regarding judicial obligation to hear cases.
For example, Canon 1 of the 1972 Code emphasizes that a
judge "should uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary,"4 while Canon 2 states that a judge "should avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his
activities."6 Canon 3, the primary disqualification provision
of the Code, stresses the need for impartiality, setting forth
in Canon 3C the situations requiring disqualification,
criteria that effectively abolished the duty to sit as a
counterweight to recusal, and that influenced congressional
thinking to abolish the duty in the 1974 amendments to 28
U.S.C. § 455.47 Reading Canon 3 as a whole, one cannot help
but characterize it as emphasizing judicial neutrality and
impartiality more than it stresses any perceived need to
preside. However, in a nod at the benign form of duty to sit
thinking, the 1972 Code required that the judge "perform
the duties of his office. . . diligently" as well. 8 Like the 1924
Canons, Canon 3 of the 1972 Code requires that the judge
"be unswayed by partisan interests, public clamor, or fear of
criticism"4 but stops well short of suggesting that a judge

45. See CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 1 (1972) (A Judge Should
Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary).
46. See id. Canon 2 (A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the
Appearance of Impropriety in All His Activities).
47. Id. Canon 3(C) (A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office
Impartially and Diligently). This part states that a judge should recuse "in a
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably questioned," and lists
circumstances that include "personal bias or prejudice concering a party,"
service "as a lawyer in the matter in controversy," "financial interest in the
subject matter in controversy," or the participation or interest in the case of a
close relation.
In addition, the judge is required to "inform himself about his personal and
fiduciary and financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself
about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing
in his household." Id. Canon 3(C)(2). Canon 3(C)(3)(a) also provided that the
degree of relationship was to be calculated "according to the civil system." Id. In
practical terms, this means any blood or in-law family relationship closer than
first cousins invokes the disqualification requirements of Canon 3(C), an
approach also adopted in Section 455 and continued in the 1990 and 2007 ABA
Judicial Codes.
48. See id. Canon 3 (A Judge Should Perform the Duties of His Office
Impartially and Diligently).
49.

Id. Canon 3(A)(1).
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should resist disqualification in any particular case because
the general nature of the judicial task is to hear cases.
The 1990 ABA Judicial Code continued in the tradition
of the 1972 Code regarding disqualification (renumbered as
Canon 3(E) in the 1990 Code), reiterating the grounds for
recusal set forth in the 1972 Code and Section 455 of the
federal code5" but also adding the language of Canon 3(B)(1)
codifying the benign notion of the duty to sit by stating that
"a judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge
except those in which disqualification is required."'"
Unfortunately, this language is susceptible to an
interpretation echoing the more pernicious idea of a duty to
sit as impeding recusal, in that one can argue that
disqualification is not "required" within the meaning of the
Code unless the case for recusal is sufficiently clear to
overcome a presumption against recusal established by the
general duty to sit. Regarding the new 1990 language, the
ABA Reporter stated that Canon 3(B)(1) of the 1990 Code
adds a requirement to hear and decide matters assigned to a judge
except those in which there is a bona fide disqualification of the
judge. Although the "duty to sit" was implicit in the Canon's
general admonition to perform the duties of judicial office diligently,
it ought to be stated affirmatively, the Committee believed, in order
52
to minimize potential abuse of the disqualification alternative.

Properly read, the 1990 Code's language that a judge
has the responsibility to hear and decide cases should not be
seen as reviving the pre-1970s notion of a duty to sit that
required disqualification only in compelling cases. This is
abundantly clear in the context of the 1990 Code's adoption
in that the 1990 Code and its background reflect no
regarding
disapproval
of the
1972
Code's work
disqualification. The legislative history surrounding the
1972 Code emphasizes the ABA's concern that judicial
recusal practice was insufficiently rigorous. The scandal
surrounding former Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas was
particularly salient to the ABA Committee,53 as were other
50. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon
(Disqualification).
51. Id. Canon 3(B)(1) (Adjudicative Responsibilities).
52. See MILFORD, supra note 31, at 17.

3(E)

(1990)

53. George Edwards, Commentary on JudicialEthics, 38 FORDHAM L. REV.
259, 259-60 (1969) ("No episode in history has done more damage to public
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controversies involving disqualification or, more precisely,
judges who did not disqualify themselves. 4 Against this
backdrop, it was clear the 1972 Code was designed both to
avoid financial ties that might compromise a judge and the
appearance of impropriety.5 Like the 1974 federal

confidence in the federal judiciary than the Fortas matter."). As Edwards, a
sitting Sixth Circuit judge at the time put it with pith,
Fortas was a Supreme Court Justice and within a hairsbreadth of being
its Chief Justice. Then came the revelation that he had signed a
contract for services (for his and his wife's lifetimes) for $20,000 a year
with the Wolfson Family Foundation controlled and financed by a man
who was (but obviously then hoped he wouldn't be) on his way to the
federal penitentiary. The stipulated quid for the $20,000 per year quo
was to be service to laudable public purposes.
Id. at 250. Although Fortas "voided the contract and returned the first $20,000"
when "indictment of Wolfson became certain," the damage was more than done.
Id. As bad as the Wolfson episode was for Fortas, arguably more disturbing was
his inappropriately close relationship with then-President Lyndon Johnson, who
appointed him to the Court and wanted to elevate him to the Chief Justice
position. Fortas appears to have been a regular confidant and advisor to
President Johnson while Fortas was on the Court notwithstanding that many
Court cases have direct bearing on the Executive Branch. See Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 589, 625-26 (1987).

See generally

LAURA

KALmAN,

ABE FORTAS:

A

BIOGRAPHY

319-78 (1990)

(describing episode and its importance); 1974 Legislative Hearing, supra note
24, at 14 (colloquy between Subcommittee Chair Rep. Robert Kastenmeier (DWis.) and attorney John Frank) (regarding 1922 ABA Model Code as having
implicitly adopted the "reasonable question as to impartiality" standard that
was expressly stated in the 1972 Code in the 1922 Code's admonition that judge
should avoid even the "appearance of impropriety").
54. See Bowie, supra note 30, at 925-31; see also id. at 926 (noting, in
addition to Fortas matter, the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council's order
"prohibiting District Judge Stephen Chandler from taking any action in any
case pending in that district [and also] ordered that all cases then assigned be
reassigned to other judges, and further ordered that no new cases were to be
assigned"); id. at 930-31 (noting controversy over Fourth Circuit Judge Clement
Haynsworth's participation in case involving company in which he held stock, a
debatable matter under the then-controlling law but a factor used to derail his
nomination to the Supreme Court by President Richard Nixon).
55. See 1974 Legislative Hearing, supra note 24, at 9 (testimony of attorney
John P. Frank) ("[There is also] the matter of the so-called appearance of
impropriety [where] we have a conflict in the Federal system, at least since
about 1920, the ABA standard has been that a judge should disqualify if it was
going to look bad if he sat. Now I do not mean that as loose talk. Clearly you
cannot womp up an imagined impropriety."); id. at 14-15 (noting that
appearance of impropriety/reasonable question as to judge's impartiality is the
implicit standard in the 1922 ABA Canons and is the approach followed in
majority of states).
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legislation, the 1972 ABA Code sought to abolish the
pernicious version of the duty to sit. 6
However, the 1990 Code's new provision on judicial
responsiblity and use of the "duty to sit" terminology
without differentiating between the benign general duty
and the pernicious connotation of a duty to strenuously
resist disqualification may have helped fuel the continuing
inappropriate and even pernicious use of the concept despite
its supposed abolition during the 1972-1974 time period. In
any event, cases both before and after the 1990 Code
continued to invoke the pernicious version of the duty to sit
doctrine.
The 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
expresses the benign concept in Model Rule 2.7 and, like its
predecessor, can also be misread as supporting the
pernicious version of the duty to sit concept. 7 Rule 2.7
states that "[a] judge shall hear and decide matters
assigned to the judge, except when disqualification is
required by Rule 2.11 or other law.""8 Rule 2.11, like the
1990 and 1972 Model Codes, sets forth stringent criteria for
disqualification, requiring it in cases where the judge or a
family member is financially tied to a party, where there is
bias or prejudice, or where the judge's impartiality may be

Federal disqualification law prior to the 1974 Amendment required bias or
prejudice and found appearance of impropriety or lack of neutrality insufficient
as a basis for recusal. Frank and fellow witness California Chief Justice Roger
Traynor were both arguing that the federal law should be changed to accord
with the ABA Code, which they read as long requiring recusal if there was an
appearance of impropriety, something made express in the 1972 Code, which
stated that disqualification was required where a judge's impartiality could be
reasonably questioned.
56. See 1974 Legislation Hearings, supra note 24, at 11-13 (testimony of
attorney John P. Frank) (noting that 1972 ABA Code abolished duty to sit and
recommending that federal law do the same, a position that prevailed in the
enactment of the 1974 legislation).
57. One significant change in the 2007 ABA Code is stylistic. The format of
having Canons is replaced by a format of having numbered rules with subparts
in the manner found since 1983 in the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. Consequently, portions of the sometimes lengthy Canons are replaced
by more specific rules such as Rule 2.7 regarding the judge's responsibilities and
Rule 2.11 regarding disqualification.
58.
See MODEL RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.7 (Responsibility to
Decide) (2007).
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reasonably questioned. 9 Expanding on the concept, the
Comment to Model Rule 2.7 explains:
Judges must be available to decide the matters that come before
the court. Although there are times when disqualification is
necessary to protect the rights of litigants and preserve public
confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
judiciary, judges must be available to decide matters that come
before the courts. Unwarranted disqualification may bring public
disfavor to the court and to the judge personally. The dignity of
the court, the judge's respect for fulfillment of judicial duties, and
a proper concern for the burdens that may be imposed upon the
judge's colleagues require that a judge not use disqualification to
avoid 6cases that present difficult, controversial, or unpopular
issues. 0

The Reporter's explanation of Comment 1 is that it
essentially restates 1990 Code Canon 3(B)(1) but with a
"slight modification to cross-reference the disqualification
rule [Rule 2.11] explicitly and to acknowledge that in some
instances disqualification may be required by other law.'
The Comment was
added to emphasize that although disqualification remains an
important and at times essential option for a judge, it should not
be misused as a tool to avoid deciding cases that the judge may
regard as unpleasant or unpopular. The effective administration
of justice depends on judges remaining available to hear the cases
that parties file, and this Comment is intended to remind judges
62
of that concern when they approach issues of disqualification.

As with earlier versions of the Code, there is obviously
at least some tension between Rule 2.7's admonition that
judges must not be too quick to recuse and the
disqualification provisions of Model Rule 2.11.63 Comment 1
59.
60.
61.

See id. at R. 2.11 (Disqualification).
See id at R. 2.7 cmt. 1 (Responsibility to Decide).
Charles Gardner Geyh, Reporter's Notes Explanation of Changes, in
ABA ANNOTATED, supranote 31, at 87-88.
62. Id.
63. Cf. Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A Process-Oriented
Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 541 (2005).
Theoretically, the "duty to sit" does not conflict with the statutory
requirement that judges recuse themselves under certain specific
circumstances. But the statutory standard for disqualification is vague,
leading to ambiguous situations in which reasonable people can differ
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to Rule 2.7 and the Reporter's Explanation make clear that,
as has been the case for more than thirty years, the correct
resolution of this tension was to require judges to recuse
when presented with valid grounds (the command currently
in Rule 2.11) but to caution against unwarranted recusal
due to unsupported assertion, baseless suspicion, frivolous
arguments, or manufactured grounds (the command
currently in Rule 2.7).' To the extent that the concepts and
rules collide on occasion, the duty of impartiality and
mandatory disqualification trumps the more generalized
"Responsibility to Decide" found in the Code.
In other words, the ABA has never suggested that
judicial responsibility cautions against recusal in close
cases. To the contrary, as discussed in Part D below, both
the ABA and Congress desired that serious recusal
questions be resolved in favor of enhancing public
confidence through disqualification where the case for
recusal was serious even if falling short of clear-cut. To this
end, the pernicious duty to sit doctrine resistant to strong
recusal claims was formally abolished but the benign
concept of a duty to sit in the ordinary, non-problematic
discharge of judicial duties was retained. Unfortunately, the
Model Codes could have been clearer on this point. The door
was thus left ajar to continuing invocation of the pernicious
form of the duty to sit.

about whether the judge has a disqualifying interest. Because the legal
obligation to recuse is not always clear, the "duty to sit" doctrine
encouraged judges to remain on cases from which they arguably should
have recused themselves.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 717 (D.
Idaho 1981) (holding that duty to sit doctrine tended to push judges in direction
of refusing to disqualify themselves in close cases); Litteneker, supra note 2, at
239 (same).
64. See House Report, supra note 29, at 6355 (regarding disqualification of
judges; enacted Nov. 21, 1974 and now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 455).
Disqualification for lack of impartiality must have a reasonable basis.
Nothing in this proposed legislation should be read to warrant the
transformation of a litigant's fear that a judge may decide a question
against him into a "reasonable fear" that the judge will not be
impartial. Litigants ought not have to face a judge where there is a
reasonable question of impartiality, but they are not entitled to judges
of their own choice.
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B. The Development of the Duty to Sit as Resistance to
Recusal
The development of the more pernicious version of the
duty to sit as embodying an unwarranted judicial resistance
to recusal is both ancient and relatively recent in origin:
ancient in that it stems in part from the historical but now
largely abandoned notion of judges as immune to bias
unless having a direct financial stake in a case65 and recent
in that the duty was not fully articulated and enshrined in
its most problematic form until relatively shortly before it
was abandoned by the ABA and Congress. The most
prominent use of the by then-receding concept was Justice
Rehnquist's memorandum inappropriately invoking it to
explain his failure to recuse in Laird v. Tatum.66 The
65. See Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 237-38 (noting movement away from
traditional view of judges as omniscient logic machines to modern view that
judges, like other social actors, may be unable to be impartial under many
circumstances that do not involve direct pecuniary interest). "Educated by the
Legal Realists and their successors, lawyers fear that the values and
experiences of judges ultimately shape their decisions." Id. at 245.
The list of disqualifying factors has expanded since the eighteenth
century, when financial interest was the sole ground for recusal.
Legislation played an important part of this evolution. Congress has
supplemented its original disqualification statute of 1792 five times, in
each instance expanding the scope of disqualification. The Supreme
Court has read the Constitution to forbid decision makers to hear cases
when they have a personal stake in the result, become personally
embroiled with a party, or were involved in the litigated incidents. The
organized bar has similarly expanded its standards.
Except for Chief Justice Rehnquist, every commentator who has
critically analyzed disqualification in the federal courts has supported
its expansion. ...
The obvious explanation for these developments is a shift in
society's view of judicial psychology, and psychology in general: from
the eighteenth century's economic man, susceptible only to the tug of
financial interest, to today's Freudian person, awash in a sea of
conscious and unconscious motives ....
Today, disqualification law is
clearly directed at the likelihood of warped judgment, with a judge's
financial or familial stake in the case as just one circumstance from
which to infer such a likelihood.
Id. at 246-47 (citations omitted).
66. At least I (and most scholars and commentators) regard the Rehnquist
Memorandum's use of the duty to sit concept as inappropriate in that case for
disqualification was not a close one (although Justice Rehnquist privately
acknowledged at least this much), but was clear and compelling in that he had a
significant role in the development of the Nixon Administration's domestic
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leading case regarding the doctrine in the United States,
Edwards v. United States,67 was decided in 1964 and the
majority of federal appellate precedent endorsing the
concept, including the cases cited in Justice Rehnquist's
Laird v. Tatum memorandum, were issued after 1950.

surveillance program and because his own conduct was relevant to the dispute.
See infra Part I.C.
67. 334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965).
See Coberly, supra note 26, at 1205 n.25 ('The case most often cited as an
example of the 'duty to sit' rule is Edwards v. United States."). The perhaps
now-dated and mildly sexist expression invoking the nameless "Caesar's wife"
stems from the notion that any significant doubts about the fidelity of the
emperor's wife would bring political turmoil and that "[c]ourts, like Caesar's
wife, must be not only virtuous but above suspicion." U'Ren v. Bagley, 245 P.
1074, 1075 (Or. 1926).
In Edwards, Judge Rives, a widely respected jurist whose participation in
the case probably helped to account for its prominence, regarded the duty to sit
as overcoming and forbidding the exercise of any "personal preference or
individual view" that might auger in favor of recusal. 334 F.2d at 362. But in the
actual Edwards case itself, Judge Rives invoked the concept of a legal
compulsion to sit "[i]n the absence of a valid legal reason" and that without at
least a valid legal reason, he had "no choice in this case" and "no right to
disqualify" himself. 334 F.2d at 362-63 n.2 (5th Cir. 1964). In other words,
although Edwards is cited as the poster child for both benign and pernicious
duty to sit thinking, the Edwards Court was invoking only the benign version of
the doctrine. Thus, the leading duty to sit case helps demonstrate that the
pernicious version of the doctrine is unnecessary. If the claimed ground for
recusal is weak, the disqualification motion can be easily denied without any
need to invoke the concept of a duty to sit. In Edwards, the potential ground for
recusal (raised by Judge Rives sua sponte and not by the parties), was the
absence of the other two members of the original appellate panel from the en
banc court rehearing the case, an odd and perhaps uncomfortable situation
(since the other two panel judges would not be available to counter any
influence Judge Rives as a member of the panel might have on the en banc
court) that did not create a close question.
68. In addition to Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360, 362 n.2 (5th Cir.
1964), the Rehnquist memorandum defending his decision to participate in
Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972) (mem.) (Rehnquist, J.), cited the
following as the universe of "[t]hose federal courts of appeals that have
considered the matter [that] have unanimously concluded that a federal judge
has a duty to sit where not disqualified which is equally as strong as the duty to
not sit where disqualified." Rehnquist goes on to list the cases: Walker v.
Bishop, 408 F.2d 1378 (8th Cir. 1968); Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.
1968); Tynan v. United States, 376 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v.
Hoffa, 382 F.2d 856 (6th Cir. 1967); Simmons v. United States, 302 F.2d 71 (3d
Cir. 1962); In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1961); and Tucker v.
Kerner, 186 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1950). Although these cases of course relied on
earlier precedent, one can make a strong case that the pernicious form of the
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But although perhaps only fully defined in the
twentieth century, the duty to sit as commonly discussed
and focused upon in this article has its roots in English
common law from a time when notions of disqualification
were far less stringent than today. The English approach
was a bit of a step backward in the development of judicial
impartiality.
Under medieval Jewish law, judges were barred from
participating in any case in which a litigant was a friend,
kinsman, or someone they disliked. The Roman Code of
Justinian went further, permitting parties to remove judges
for mere "suspicion" of bias. While the civil law ultimately
incorporated the Justinian template into its system of
"recusation" still operative in many countries today, the
common law took a much more constricted approach.69
In the Anglo-American system prior to the twentieth
century and particularly prior to the nineteenth century,
judges were allowed to preside in situations that today
would almost universally be considered improper.7" For
example, Chief Justice John Marshall arguably violated
even the most narrow disqualification norms of his time by
acting as a judge in his own case, albeit one in which his
involvement was personal and ideological, rather than
financial. Marbury v. Madison arose out of the failure to
deliver William Marbury's commission to serve as a justice
of the peace. Marshall was the acting Secretary of State who
had refused to deliver the commission."
As one
duty to sit, although perhaps logically related to older, now outdated attitudes
toward judicial recusal, was not in full bloom until the mid-twentieth century.
There were, however, precursor traces of the duty to sit concept in some
early twentieth century cases. See, e.g., Exparte N.K. Fairbank Co., 194 F. 978,
993 (D. Ala. 1912) ("I feel it my imperative duty to sit [in the absence of a
showing of bias by the movant]. To do otherwise would set the evil precedent of
weakly betraying a trust, because a litigant retailed on information and belief
anonymous slanders of a judge."); see also id. at 994 (contending that judge must
not accept as true, baseless allegations of bias, in an effort to disqualify judge
via affidavit as then provided in 28 U.S.C. § 144). The phrase first cropped up in
the nineteenth century but was not widely invoked. See infra note 97 and
accompanying text.
69. Deborah Goldberg, James Sample & David E. Pozen, The Best Defense:
Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 512
(2007).
70.

See Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 246-47.

71. See MACKENZIE, supra note 30, at 1. In similar fashion, Oliver Wendell
Holmes sat with the Supreme Court in reviewing cases on which Holmes had
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commentator said with understatement, "Early standards
for recusal were far more lax than they are today.""
In thirteenth century England, notions of impartiality
were even less vigorous. This extended to ideas regarding
juror impartiality as well. For example, prior to the time of
Edward Coke (1552-1634), 73 jurors were generally persons
familiar with either the dispute at issue or the parties,
something forbidden today under the modern view that
jurors should generally have no prior knowledge of or
involvement with litigation or litigants.74 In similar fashion,
voted as a Justice of the Massachusetts high court, Justice Hugo Black
participated in cases involving the constitutionality and interpretation of
legislation he had drafted and reviewed as a U.S. Senator, and Abe Fortas voted
on cases involving President Lyndon Johnson's executive branch even though
Fortas continued to act as an informal adviser to LBJ during Fortas's time on
the court. See id. at 2; Stempel, supra note 53, at 608-28 (detailing other
examples of questionable or clearly improper failure to recuse by Justices).
Defenders of such behavior may argue that the "shall not be a judge in his own
case" criterion applied only to a judge's financial interests and not political,
ideological or professional interests. While this was perhaps correct as applied
to Justices Marshall and Holmes, it seems insufficient justification for the more
recent actions of Justices Black and Fortas.
72.

See Frost, supra note 63, at 539 n.31.

73. Edward Coke was Solicitor General, Speaker of the House of Commons,
Attorney General, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas Bench, and Chief Justice
of the King's Bench, to which he was appointed in 1613. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 832 (4th ed. 2004). Coke's judicial writings generally stress
impartiality and detachment of jurors, but, as noted in the following footnote,
there are late seventeenth century cases permitting jurors to sit and utilize
personal knowledge regarding a case. Id.

74. See STEVEN N. SUBRIN, MARTHA L. MINOW, MARK S. BRODIN & THOMAS 0.
MAIN, CIVIL PROCEDURE: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE & CONTEXT 389 (2d ed. 2004)
(stating that early English juries were local committees established by Norman
Conquerors to determine land ownership). From 1066 until roughly the
sixteenth or seventeenth Century,
[j]urors were selected from the local community where the dispute
arose and were required to have some familiarity with the facts of the
case. In a sense, then, the earliest juries were groups of witnesses who
discussed the case among themselves and arrived at a verdict .... In
the centuries that followed, the distinction between juror and witness
became more pronounced.

Id. See also FLEMING

JAMES, GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.

& JOHN

LEUBSDORF, CIVIL

PROCEDURE §3.2, at 182 (5th ed. 2001) ("Jurors originally were fact-reporters or
witnesses, rather than neutral and previously uninformed adjudicators."); John
Marshall Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witness to Judge of Proofs: The
Transformationof the English Civil Juror,32 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 201 (1988).
At the time of the founding of the American colonies, the transition was still
in flux. "As late as 1670, in Bushell's Case, an English judge declared that jurors
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it was not generally considered improper for a presiding
judge to be familiar with the disputants, the dispute,
counsel or land in question, even if the familiarity was close,
and even if the judge was friendly or antagonistic to counsel
or the parties.
[A] judge was disqualified for direct pecuniary interest [in the
outcome of a case] and for nothing else. Although Bracton tried
unsuccessfully to incorporate into English law the view that mere
"suspicion" by a party was a basis for disqualification, it was Coke
who, with reference to cases in which the judge's pocketbook was
involved, set the standards for his time in his injunction that "no
man shall be a judge in his own case." Blackstone rejected
might be disqualified for
absolutely the possibility that a judge
75
bias as distinguished from interest.

had the right to use their personal knowledge to decide the verdict." SUBRIN, ET
AL., supra, at 389.
75. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609-10
(1947) (citing 4 BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINBUS ANGLIAE 281 (George
E. Woodbine ed. 1942)); accord WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES 361
(1769); FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.2 (noting broader view of disqualifying
circumstances applied to judges under Jewish and Roman law and Bracton's
unsuccessful advocacy of Roman view); Harrington Putnam, Recusation, 9
CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1924). See, e.g., Dr. Bonham's Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 638
(K.B.) (disqualifying a judge from hearing a case in which he would receive a the
amount of any fine he inflicted upon a party); Aon., per Holt, C.J., (1698) 1 Salk.
396, 91 Eng. Rep. 343 (K.B.) (Mayor of Hertford sanctioned for presiding in an
ejectment case in which mayor was lessor of plaintiff and stood to profit from
plaintiffs financial success) Earl of Derby's Case, 12 Co. 114, (1614) 77 Eng.
Rep. 1390 (K.B.): Sir Nicholas Bacon's Case, 2 Dyer 220b, (1563) 73 Eng. Rep.
487 (K.B.) (holding a judge may not preside in case determining judge's own
qualifications to be bondsman.) Note also that English law of the time seemed
not to find any conflict in judge also working as bondsman, a type of
moonlighting banned today.
Although English disqualification law did not extend beyond cases in which
the judge had a personal financial stake in the case at bar, it occasionally took a
very attenuated view of financial interest and causation of influence. See, e.g.,
Between the Parishes of Great Charte and Kennington, 2 Strange 1173, (1726)
93 Eng. Rep. 1107 (K.B.) (disqualifying judge in case where pauper was a party
on ground that decision in favor of pauper could cause some increase in judge's
taxes); Case of Foxham Tithing, 2 Salk. 607, (1705) 91 Eng. Rep. 514 (K.B.)
(same). Today, we regard this type of alleged financial interest as too attenuated
to impair impartiality, and further deploy the "rule of necessity" which provides
that a ground for disqualification applicable, if at all, to the entire bench, does
not disqualify the particular judge to which the case is currently assigned
because of the need to have the case adjudicated. See Switzer v. Berry, 198 F.3d
1255, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating judge able to preside even if otherwise
subject to recusal where "case cannot be heard otherwise" by any judge not
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Henry de Bracton argued that a judge should disqualify
himself if related to a party, hostile toward a party, or
previously involved in the case as counsel,76 all are
precursors to today's attitudes toward disqualification.
During the thirteenth century, the Devonshire-born,
Oxford-educated Bracton sat on King's Bench, an experience
that made him, depending on one's perspective, realistic or
cynical about the ability of judges to decide cases on the
merits. He came to see his colleagues as easily swayed and
lacking any special ability to rise above natural human
favoritism, which prompted his view that judges should
recuse themselves when subject to personal ties or emotions
that might further cloud their judgment."
But Bracton's perspective, despite its prescient
modernity, lost out to Blackstone's view, (now regarded
almost as comical after the Legal Realism revolution of the
twentieth century) that "the law will not suppose the
possibility of bias or favour in a judge.""8 The prevailing

subject to similar ground for disqualification (citation omitted)); FLAMM, supra
note 2, § 20.2; Frank, supra, at 611.
76. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 1.2; BRACTON, supra note 75, at 281;
Coberly, supranote 26, at 1202 n.8.
77.

See Justice T.L. Yang, Henry de Bracton: The Fatherof Case Law, 1987

LAW LECTURES FOR PRAC.

211, 211-12.

78. BLACKSTONE, supra, note 75 at 361. See, e.g., Brookes v. Rivers, 1
Hardres 503, (1668) 115 Eng. Rep. 569 (Ex.) (holding judge not disqualified in
case involving brother-in-law because "favour shall not be presumed in a
judge"). But see Becquet v. Lempriere, 1 Knapp 376, (1830) 12 Eng. Rep. 362
(P.C.) (reaching opposite result on similar facts 150 years later, reflecting
evolution of English attitudes). As Frank notes, even prior to Blackstone,
English attitudes on the dangers of partiality were not always consistent. For
example, an entire jury could be disqualified if the sheriff who called its
members was related to a party. See Vernon v. Manners, 2 Plowden 425, (1572)
75 Eng. Rep. 639 (K.B.); Frank, Disqualification,supra note 75, at 611 n.22
("[O]ddly enough, the English courts, over-influenced by Coke, early held that a
judge was not disqualified by relationship, but that a jury was.").
Some American courts appear to have harbored a view similar to
Blackstone's regarding the supposedly divine abilities of judges. See, e.g.,
Benedict v. Seiberling, 17 F.2d 831, 832 (N.D. Ohio 1926) (noting judge has duty
to immediately decide whether to continue to sit when presented with affidavit
of bias); Montgomery County v. Cochran, 116 F. 985 (M.D. Ala. 1902) ("ITihe
judge of the city court of Montgomery is a man of highest character for integrity,
a judge profoundly learned in the law, without prejudice against the defendants
or either of them, and incapable of being influenced by any local sentiment, if
such existed, which could tend to bias his judicial opinion.").
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Blackstonian view also posited that "challenges to judicial
impartiality would undermine public respect for the legal
system" resulting in a "common law [that] made it very
difficult to disqualify a judge." 9 English law regarding
disqualification was narrow and "simple in the extreme,
which perhaps explains its emphasis on continued
adjudication of a case without much reflection and few cases
requiring recusal. In any event, disqualification of judges
for bias was rare"' but there was at least support for Sir
Edward Coke's core principle that no man should be a judge
in his own case."2 Coke, and the English bench generally,
appear to be of the view that in all other cases there was a
duty to sit, 3 although these precise words were not used
and the concept was not well developed at English common
law.
The English view, albeit one already in some evolution,
was largely incorporated by the colonial and subsequent
American legal system of the eighteenth century. By the
nineteenth century, however, the grounds for recusal on the
basis of monetary interest were expanding so that direct
financial interest was not necessarily required. In addition,
a judge's bias toward or prejudice against a party was on
occasion found so substantial and undeniable as to require
recusal. And to be sure, the less class and status conscious
United States was clearly less willing to put judges on a

The Legal Realism movement of the 1930s and beyond posited the notion of
judges as immune to the human frailties of favoritism, ideology, social pressure,
and the like was absurd. See Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 245-46. Although
some of the more iconoclastic views of hard-core legal realists were rejected by
the legal establishment, the core insights of legal realism-that law is affected
by history, sociology, philosophy, politics, and personality-is widely accepted,
as is the notion that the legal profession is now in an extended "post-realist" era,
albeit one in which formalist doctrine continues to be important in resolving
disputes. See BAiLEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW
183-85 (1994); Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 93 VA. L. REV.
1, 2, 49-50 (2007).
79. JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note 74, at 394.
80. See Frank, supra note 75, at 611-12 ("[B]ias, today the
controversial ground for disqualification, was rejected entirely.").
81. See JAMES, HAZARD & LEUBSDORF, supra note 74, at 321.

most

See Dr. Bonham's Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B.).
83. See Goldberg, supra note 69, at 512-13. See generally FLAMM, supra
note 2, at 613-21.
82.
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pedestal than was Blackstone. 4 But notwithstanding this,
the American attitude toward recusal arguably became
more protective of judges than even the narrow British
approach, in that by the late nineteenth or early twentieth
centuries the
common law [held that] the slightest pecuniary interest would
disqualify a judge and with logical consistency the English courts
hold that a judge is rendered incompetent upon a showing of a
real possibility of bias. Accordingly, it has been held that a
personal animosity between a judge and a party or membership of
a judge in a class which will be interested in the outcome is
sufficient for recusation....

[But] in the United States, however, the courts have drawn an
irrational distinction. While it is commonly held that interest is a
sufficient ground for disqualification, prejudice is not. There are
numerous decisions to the effect that a judge is competent
although he has expressed a premature opinion of the merits of
the case and is hostile to one party; and yet he is not competent if
he is indirectly interested as a taxpayer or a city litigant. A
situation is thereby created in which certain facts will disqualify
merely because they raise a presumption of bias while an actual
showing of bias will not.8 5

Consequently, a good deal of U.S. case law on
disqualification during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries was as protective of judges as the English law of
the Blackstonian era even though England had moved
toward taking a more aggressive view of judicial
disqualification. But in both England and the U.S., the
general tide, which accelerated during the twentieth
century, was in favor of less confidence in judicial
omniscience and more willingness to demand recusal.86 The
84. See Sanborn v. Fellows, 22 N.H. 473, 481 (1851) (criticizing
Blackstone's view that judges by nature of their office were incapable of being
biased or prejudiced).
85. See Note, Disqualificationof a Judge on the Ground of Bias, 41 HARV.
L. REV. 78, 79-80 (1927) (citations omitted).
86. See Bowie, supra note 30, at 914-15 (attributing much of the
momentum for greater attention to disqualification to public dissatisfaction with
judges, courts, and legal system in general) (citing Roscoe Pound, The Causes of
PopularDissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729
(1906), as indicative of public perception). Peter W. Bowie, Chief Bankruptcy
Judge for Southern District of California, who was significantly involved in the
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course of expanding notions of judicial disqualification
began in the U.S. with the common law, followed by the first
federal disqualification statute in 1792,87 as amended in
1821, 1911, and 1948.8 In addition to the basic grounds for
federal judicial disqualification found in 28 U.S.C. § 455,
Section 144 of the judicial code also provides for challenge to
a federal district judge based on an affidavit of bias.89

development of the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, regarded this
public dissatisfaction-cum-backlash as also based on disagreement with the
substance of judicial decisions rather than concerns about judicial corruption,
although both fueled the trend toward tougher disqualification laws. He noted:
The Supreme Court rendered its infamous decision in Lochner
v. New York in 1905, invalidating a state law regulating the
maximum workday and workweek of bakery and confectionery
workers... in 1908, two years after Pound spoke, Oregon and
California adopted provisions for the recall of their judges and
the movement for recall measures then became nationwide.
That gives us some flavor of the dissatisfaction that existed at
the time.
See id. at 914 (internal citations omitted).
87. The Act of May 8, 1792 provided for disqualification where the judge
had a monetary interest in a lawsuit before him or had served as counsel for
either party in the case. See Frost, supra note 63, at 539 (citing to statute). See
also Bowie, supra note 30, at 913 (quoting statute).
88.

See Frost, supra note 63, at 540.
[Tihe statue was altered in 1821 to mandate more generally
that a judge recuse himself if he is "so related to, or connected
with, either party, as to render it improper for him, in his
opinion to sit on the trial of such suit or action." Congress
altered the statute again in 1911, adding that a judge should
recuse himself if, "in his opinion," his relationship with any
attorney made it improper for the judge to sit on the case. In
1948, the provision was recodified at 28 U.S.C. § 455, where it
remains today. The 1948 amendments eliminated the
requirement that a party first seek a judge's disqualification,
transforming the statute from a challenge-for-cause provision
to a self-enforcing disqualification provision that places the
onus on the judge to determine whether he should recuse
himself.

Id. at 540-41 (footnotes omitted); accord, Bowie, supra note 30, at 913. The
statute was also amended in 1809 to provide a basis for removing a judge if the
judge was disabled and could not continue to preside over a case. See id. at 913.
89. See Frost, supra note 63, at 541-43 (describing operation of 28 U.S.C. §
144). This provision of the statute might have operated as near-equivalent of
right to peremptory challenge to initial trial judge but has been defanged by
judicial interpretation to essentially provide for disqualification only when the
party seeking recusal has the evidentiary foundation permitting it to give sworn
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By the twentieth century, it was becoming common
practice for judges to disqualify themselves if they held
stock in a company involved in a case before them. °° The
Supreme Court struck a blow for greater impartiality in
Tumey v. Ohio,9 which found a violation of due process
when the mayor, who stood to gain from any fine imposed,
presided over trial for unlawful possession of alcoholic
beverages. Tumey observed a "general rule" that judicial
officers were disqualified by such financial interest.92 But
common practice was not universal practice. Some judges
and reviewing courts found ownership of stock too
attenuated to require recusal.93 Further, all grounds for
disqualification were generally regarded as waivable.
Notoriously, judicial icon Learned Hand, in what came to be
termed the "velvet blackjack," routinely disclosed his
investments in litigant companies and then asked the
parties and counsel whether this posed a problem,
effectively coercing their consent to his continued
participation in the case.94 In the main, however,
disqualification based on pecuniary interest generally
expanded and was widely accepted by the early or middle
twentieth century. In addition to Tumey, the Supreme
Court issued other decisions recognizing that a presiding
judge's pecuniary interest in a case could rise to the level of
testimony demonstrating clear actual bias. See Berger v. United States, 255
U.S. 22, 27 (1921); Frost, supra note 63, at 543-44.
90. See Frank, supra note 75, at 613. Prior to the twentieth century, there
continued to be examples of judges continuing to sit on cases presenting rather
blatant impartiality problems based on their financial interests. See, e.g., In re
Sime, 22 F. Cas. 145, 146 (C.C.D. Cal. 1872) (No. 12,861) (noting that judge sits
in bankruptcy cases in spite of being creditor of the debtor).
91. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
92.

See id. at 522.

93. The black letter disqualification law at the time required
disqualification only if a judge's financial stake in a matter was significant. See
28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970); U.S. v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1205 (2d Cir. 1970);

Canons of Judicial Ethics,

REPORT OF THE FORTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF

THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 917 (1925). This was changed in ABA MODEL
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(C)(1)(c) (1972) and 88 Stat. 1609. See also
John P. Frank, Disqualificationof Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 (1970) (noting that Fourth Circuit Judge Clement
Haynesworth did not disqualify in case of de minimus amount of stock held in
litigant and that this was proper under law at the time which predated the
1970s changes, but his nonrecusal was nonetheless controversial and effectively
used by political opponents).
94.

See MACKENZIE, supranote 30, at 95-118.
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violating a litigant's right to due process of law because due
process presupposed a sufficiently neutral judge.95
Disqualification on non-pecuniary grounds was another
matter, however. Well into the twentieth century, judges
were routinely sitting on cases involving legislation they
had drafted, issues with which they had been involved prior
to coming to the bench, and counsel or entities with close
relations with the judge. Supreme Court Justices seemed
often to present the most extreme cases, perhaps because
each Justice made his own recusal decisions that were not
subject to review. For example, Justice Holmes participated
in the review of four cases on which he had sat while on the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Justice Hugo
Black sat on cases involving legislation he had drafted.
Justice Felix Frankfurter participated in cases involving
issues on which he had attempted to spur Court review for
ideological reasons. Justice Frank Murphy participated in
cases involving the Justice Department he headed as
Attorney General before coming to the Court; Justice Robert
Jackson acted as Nuremberg prosecutor while still on the
Court. Chief Justice Earl Warren headed the Commission
named after him examining the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy. 6

95. See, e.g., Aetna v. LaVoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (holding due process
violated where state supreme court justice participates in cases that may have
directly precedential benefit to his similar suit against insurance company);
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968)
(continuing in this vein, holding that due process violated when arbitrator had
close business relationship with disputant and failed to disclose this to other
party, requiring arbitration award to be set aside; federal Arbitration Act
requires same impartiality for arbitrators as is expected by judges); In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (due process violated when judge took witness
testimony as "one-man grand jury" and also convicted same witnesses of
contempt for conduct in secret hearings); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); cf.
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, 2008 WL 918444, at *1 (W. Va.
Apr. 3, 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3292 (U.S. Nov. 1, 2008) (No. 08-22)
(agreeing to review on due process grounds case in which crucial state court
justice received more than three million dollars in campaign contributions
related to prevailing litigant); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.,
2008 W. Va. LEXIS 123 (July 28, 2008) (Acting Chief Justice Benjamin, the
target of criticism for his financial and political links to the defendant
company's CEO, defends conduct now under review by the U.S. Supreme Court).
96. See Stempel, supra note 53, at 608-28. Although the extracurricular
activities of Justices Jackson and Warren did not technically present acute and
direct recusal problems, they were problematic in that there seems at least a
non-trivial possibility that the Court may have been presented with cases
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Aiding and abetting these arguable failings of judicial
restraint was the evolving pernicious version of the duty to
sit. The implicit premise of the Blackstonian view was that
judicial bias for non-financial reasons was not a serious
problem, that judges stepping aside for any other reason
were shirking their duties or imposing impermissible
collateral costs on the legal system, and that expansive
notions of disqualification tended to undermine public
confidence by conceding, at least indirectly, that judges
were not the incorruptible, consistent, objective logic
machines merely declaring the law (rather than
determining it) posited by Blackstonian jurisprudence.
Although the roots of the doctrine can be traced to
Blackstone and the pre-1800 English attitude that only
direct financial stake in a case disqualified a judge, neither
the 1924 Canons nor the 1972 Code embraced the duty to sit
in their texts, although the 1990 Code, like the 2007 Code,
notes that judges have an obligation to discharge their
responsibilities as judges. The first reported American case
to use the term appears in 1824, one of approximately
twenty cases using the term in the nineteenth century, most
after 1880." 7 The duty to sit as a basis for declining to recuse
calling into question the legality of the Nuremberg tribunals or the soundness of
the Commission Report concerning the Kennedy assassination. In ironic
addition, the Jackson and Warren actions were of course inconsistent with the
benign duty to sit concept. By prosecuting war criminals and investigating a
president's assassination, these Justices were providing valuable public service
(although many question the quality of the Warren Commission investigation
and findings) but were also spending considerably less time on their day jobs as
part of an important court with limited membership and a heavy workload.
Surely, distinguished attorneys from government or private practice could have
been given leaves of absence to do this work, leaving Justices Jackson and
Warren to spend more time toiling in the vineyards of the High Court's cases.
97. See Waterhouse v. Martin, 7 Tenn. 374, 385 (1824); see also EWA
Plantation Co. v. Holt, 18 Haw. 509, 509 (1907); Notely v. Brown, 17 Haw. 393,
394 (1906); Ex parte Ala. State Bar Ass'n, 8 So. 768 (Ala. 1891) ([If judge is] "not
disqualified under the constitution, it is his duty to sit, a duty which he cannot
delegate or repudiate, and which no consent can devolve upon another."); Lane
v. Harris, 16 Ga. 217, 250 (1854) (Benning, J., dissenting); Graves v. Fisher, 5
Me. 69, 72 (1827). (A Lexis search for "duty w/2 sit," prior to 1900, produced
twenty-five cases, four or five of which appear to use the term to mean
something other than either a judge's responsibility not to avoid difficult or
inconvenient cases (the benign version of the duty to sit) or an obligation to
decide close questions against recusal (the pernicious version of the duty to sit).
In some states, the duty to sit terminology may have an additional meaning.
For example, in Alabama, the phrase duty to sit is also used to describe an
appellate court's less deferential attitude toward reviewing a documentary
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in non-compelling cases began appearing with more
frequency in reported opinions during the 1950s and
1960s. 98 Perhaps the most prominent duty to sit case,
Edwards v. United States99 was decided in 1964, less than a
decade before Justice Rehnquist's memorandum invoking
the concept in defense of his failure to recuse in Laird v.
Tatum.
Edwards involved prosecution of two defendants for
failing to pay gambling taxes on the proceeds of their lottery
operation. They were convicted at trial."° The case was
record below as opposed to a record based on oral testimony. See infra note 344.
This article obviously focuses on the duty to sit as a bulwark discouraging
disqualification.
98. See, e.g., Walker v. Bishop, 408 F.2d 1378, 1382 (8th Cir. 1969); Wolfson
v. Palmieri, 396 F.2d 121, 124 (2d Cir. 1968) (quoting Rosen v. Sugarman, 357
F.2d 794, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1966)); United States v. Hoffa, 382 F.2d 856, 859 (6th
Cir. 1967); Tynan v. United States, 376 F.2d 761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Rosen v.
Sugerman, 357 F.2d 794, 797-98 (2d Cir. 1966) (quoting In re Union Leader
Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 391 (1st Cir. 1961)); Simmons v. United States, 302 F.2d
71, 75 (3d Cir. 1962); In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 391 (1st Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961).
As this list of exemplary cases reflects, a large percentage of cases
favorably invoking the duty to sit are criminal cases in which the courts' concern
about effective and speedy justice may be at their apogee. Further, many
disqualification motions brought by criminal defendants are, if this sample is
indicative, particularly weak and fairly obviously designed to attempt to avoid a
disliked judge or to lengthen the proceedings and stave off eventual
incarceration. In nearly all of these cases, it appears that recusal was not
warranted and that the arguments for disqualification were weak to the point of
being frivolous. Consequently, in addition to creating the mischief discussed
infra Part II.D.3, the duty to sit doctrine appears not to provide any useful
assistance to judicial decisionmaking.
99. Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964).
100. See Edwards, 334 F.2d at 362-65. The merits of the criminal case turned
on whether the defendants' admitted failure to pay had been "knowing" within
the meaning of the statute. Id. at 363. The en banc Fifth Circuit, in a decision
authored by Judge Rives, found sufficient circumstantial evidence of knowledge
in view of defendants' prior record of violation and familiarity with the tax and
criminal justice system. Id. at 364-66.
Three of the seven en banc judges dissented, but the dissent of Judges Jones
and Bell was more like a concurrence in that it found the convictions "properly
disposed of when they were before the panel of this Court," in a case where the
en banc Court affirmed the panel's judgments of conviction. Id. at 368 (Jones &
Bell, JJ., dissenting). Judge Brown's dissent was more substantive in that he
not only rejected a presumption of knowledge of the law but also asserted that
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initially heard by the standard three-judge appellate panel,
which affirmed but in fractured form on the legal issue of
whether knowledge of the law was presumed.'" The panel's
composition later became problematic when the Fifth
Circuit granted en banc review. One of the panel judges
(Judge Paul Hays of the Sixth Circuit) had been from
another circuit and was ineligible to participate in the en
banc proceeding. Another judge (Judge Ben Cameron) on
the panel died prior to the en banc argument, leaving Fifth
Circuit Judge Joel Rives the sole member of the original
panel able to participate in the en banc proceeding. While
on the panel, Judge Rives had also been the lone dissenter
to the panel ruling, differing from Judges Hays and
Cameron over whether knowledge of the law could be
presumed.' 2 This awkward position initially led him to the
view that he should not participate in the en banc review,
reasoning that it would appear unfair to the litigants to
have him as the sole representative of the original panel.
Consulting other members of the full Circuit Court, who
the government had failed to meet its burden of proving a "willful" failure to pay
and disagreeing with the majority's broad use of a "pedagogical dispute over
inference versus presumption" regarding treatment of the circumstantial
evidence. Id. at 368 (Brown, J., dissenting).
Reading the Brown dissent forty-five years later is almost like reading the
diary of a Puritan found in a time capsule. Modern judges simply lack the great
solicitude for criminal defendants concerning regulatory crimes that is reflected
in the Brown dissent. Modern lawyers (and most lawyers in the 1960s, judging
by the majority in the case) would have little difficulty with the majority's
presumption that people making money on a furtive enterprise for which they
had been previously charged with non-payment of taxes probably knew that
they owed taxes on the money they made. Judge Brown conceded that "Congress
can, of course, prescribe that the failure to pay the tax is a crime and thus
eliminate the element of a knowing duty to pay," but thought it unconstitutional
for a court to convict based on "a so-called presumption, rebuttable or otherwise,
that an accused knows the law and knowing the law knows he had a duty to
pay." See id. at 368-69. Criminal defendants have not enjoyed such friendly
judicial treatment since the heyday of the Warren Court.
101. United States v. Edwards, 321 F.2d 324, 325-27 (5th Cir. 1963). The
panel majority proceeded from the position that the government had the burden
of proving knowing failure to pay taxes without any presumption that the
defendants knew of their duty to pay tax. Id. at 324. Dissenting, Judge Rives
contended that such a presumption of knowledge of the law was correct even for
regulatory crimes and even though the presumption is in some tension with the
traditional "rule of lenity" in statutory interpretation which argues for strict
construction of criminal laws against the government and in favor of
defendants. Id. at 329 (Rives, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 329-30.
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were divided on the matter, Judge Rives ultimately resolved
the issue in favor of his continued participation because of a
judge's general duty to sit."3
It is a judge's duty to refuse to sit when he is disqualified but it is
equally his duty to sit when there is no valid reason for
recusation.
Judges sit as a matter of course on rehearings of their own
decisions. If either or both of the other judges who participated in
the original decision could sit on the en banc rehearing there could
be no question that I must also sit. While their absence makes me
prefer not to sit, I have not found that it furnished me any legal
excuse.
A court en banc consists of all active circuit judges of the circuit,
28 U.S.C. 46(c). In the absence of a valid
°4 legal reason, I have no
right to disqualify myself and must sit.

Ironically, although Edwards is often cited in support of
what this Article terms the pernicious version of the duty to
sit (a doctrine disfavoring recusal in close cases and even
resisting it in all but the clearest and most compelling of
cases), Judge Rives in Edwards was employing only the
benign version of the duty to sit. Not surprisingly, Judge
Rives, although he preferred not to sit in the absence of his
original fellow panel members who had differed with him
not find
over an important legal issue in the case, could
"any legal excuse" to justify disqualification." 5 He was
correct. Being the only eligible surviving panel member is
not a ground for disqualification and the recusal issue was
not close in any legal sense even if it made Judge Rives
personally uncomfortable to be able to voice his opinion in
the case a second time while the other panel judges could
not. There were, after all, lawyers who would argue both
sides of the issue before the full appellate court. Since Judge
Rives was not disqualified, he of course had a duty to
participate in his appellate court's en banc proceedings. He
was using the benign duty to sit simply as a reminder to
103. Edwards, 334 F.2d at 362, n.2; see also Frank, supra note 93, at 59
(discussing Edwards).
104. Edwards, 334 F.2d at 362 n.2 (internal citations omitted).
105. Id. at 362 n.2. see also Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217, 1221 (1st

Cir. 1979) (invoking benign version of duty to sit despite fact that pernicious
version was abolished in 1974 legislation).
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work through cases presenting awkward or difficult
circumstances. He was not invoking the pernicious duty to
sit concept as a substantive rule for refusing to recuse in a
close or meritorious disqualification motion.
Edwards was therefore not a manifesto in favor of an
aggressive, pernicious version of the duty to sit and
probably became prominent simply because it was one of
the few instances in which a judge so self-consciously
wrestled with possible disqualification even in the absence
of any real question as to the judge's impartiality. Not only
was there no legal basis for recusal in Edwards, but neither
was there any suggestion that Judge Rives was not neutral
regarding the parties and the case. He may have had a legal
opinion different than Judge Hays or Judge Cameron but
not even the criminal defendants had suggested he was not
able to be fair in forming his legal views in the matter.
Edwards is also interesting in that Judge Rives, in invoking
the duty to sit, referred to cases of recent vintage,
underscoring the degree to which the doctrine, although
perhaps based on ancient views of judging, had 0not
been
16
clearly articulated until the mid-twentieth century.
Many of the other cases invoking duty to sit rhetoric,
including some of those cited in Justice Rehnquist's Laird v.
Tatum manifesto against refusal (discussed below) also
dealt more in dicta than in holding, involving cases where
the case for recusal was so weak that the duty to sit
tiebreaker was not realistically called into play.0 7 In such
cases, courts were, as in Edwards, really only applying the

106. Edwards, 334 F.2d at 362 n.2 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 860 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) and
United States v. Valenti, 120 F. Supp. 80, 92 (D.N.J. 1954)). Sabbatino, of
course, was later reversed on the merits by the Supreme Court, which rendered
an important opinion regarding international law comity. See Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398.
107. But see Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d 794, 797-98, 800 (2d Cir. 1966)
("Application of [recusal] principles, not easy in any case, is peculiarly difficult
when the bias and prejudice are alleged to have stemmed not from any history
antecedent to the litigation or from the judge's contacts outside the courtroom,
but from conflicts arising in the course of the very proceeding in which his
impartial decision must be made.") (invoking duty to sit and ruling that
disqualification unnecessary in case that appellate court acknowledged was
difficult because record reflected incidents from which reasonable person might
infer judge's hostility to counsel but where source of purported hostility was
court proceedings rather than extrajudicial source).
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benign version of the duty to sit rather than its more
pernicious cousin.' 8
C. Justice Rehnquist's ControversialDecision to Participate
in Laird v. Tatum
William Rehnquist was nominated by President Richard
Nixon in 1971 and joined the Court after Senate
confirmation in early 1972.09 Prior to his appointment, he
had been a successful Phoenix, Arizona attorney active in
the local bar and a politically active Republican, siding with
Richard Nixon's candidacy in the battle against New York
Governor Nelson Rockefeller for the party's nomination in
1968."1 After Nixon defeated Democrat Hubert Humphrey
108. Although Edwards also continued to be cited, it was usually in
conjunction with discussion of the abolition of the pernicious version of the duty
to sit by the 1974 federal legislation and in cases where the case for recusal was
weak or on a collateral point. See, e.g., Cheeves v. Southern Clays, Inc., 797 F.
Supp. 1570, 1582-83 (court notes abolition of pernicious duty to sit but
continued viability of benign duty to sit and rejects party's attempt to depose
judge as part of effort to build case for recusal).
109. See White, supra note 21, at 14 n.30; see also Cornell Legal Information
Institute,
Supreme
Court
Collection:
William
Hubbs
Rehnquist,
http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct/justices/rehnquist.bio.html;
Christina
E.
Coleman, Note, The Future of the FederalismRevolution: Gonzales v. Raich and
the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court, 37 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 803, 803 n.1 (2006). In
addition to serving as Associate Justice for 15 years, Rehnquist became Chief
Justice in 1986 after nomination by President Ronald Regan and served as
Chief Justice until shortly before his death in 2005. See Linda Greenhouse,
Chief Justice Rehnquist Dies at 80: Forged Conservative Imprint-Leaves 2nd
Vacancy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at 1. He was replaced as Chief Justice by
John Roberts. See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing at the Crossroads:The Roberts
Court in HistoricalPerspective, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 875, 877 (2008).
110. See COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF WILLIAM

H. REHNQUIST

TO

BE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, S. REP. No. 99-18, at 2 (1986)
(reviewing career in private practice, including presidency of Maricopa County
Bar Association and membership in National Conference of Commissioners of
Uniform State Laws, and other activities prior to appointment as Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, in 1969).
Regarding Rehnquist's support of Nixon in pursuit of the Republican
nomination in 1968, see STEPHEN C. SHADEGG, WINNING'S A LOT MORE FUN
(1969) (describing Richard Nixon's comeback after losing 1960 presidential
contest and 1962 California governor's race to obtain 1968 Republican
nomination and presidency. Rehnquist and fellow Arizonan Richard
Kleindienst, who later as Assistant Attorney General became embroiled in the
Watergate matter, were important Arizona supporters of Nixon in his quest for
the nomination). See also David Stout, Richard G. Kleindienst, Figure in
Watergate Era, Dies at 76, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2000, at A27 (Kleindienst
sentenced to $100 fine and thirty-day suspended sentence for minor offenses but
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and third-party candidate George Wallace, Rehnquist was
appointed head of the Justice Department's Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC)."' The OLC is charged, among other things,
with advising the Administration regarding legal issues.
One issue during Rehnquist's OLC tenure was the
constitutionality of a Department of Defense program of
domestic surveillance, a program in which the Army
compiled substantial data on citizens seen as dissidents
critical of the Administration and, in particular, the nation's
Vietnam War involvement." 2 Because the OLC did not
interfere with the Army program, one presumes that
Rehnquist, as OLC head, approved the initiative as
constitutional. At least it seems more than plausible that
OLC was aware of the program and had either approved it
or declined to intervene."3 In addition, he publically spoke
acquitted of perjury charges, continuing to practice law in Arizona until his
death). Irrespective of his political ties to the White House, Justice Rehnquist
had an impressive educational and professional pedigree and his nomination for
the Chief Justice position was supported by luminaries such as the late Griffin
Bell, a former Fifth Circuit judge and Carter Administration Attorney General,
former Harvard Law Dean Erwin Griswold, former Reagan Attorney General
William French Smith, and then-University of Chicago, Law Dean (and later
Stanford President) Gerhard Casper.
Rehnquist had a history of Republican political activism for some years prior
to his support of Nixon, a matter that became a matter of some embarrassment
during his confirmation hearings as Chief Justice. Rehnquist was accused, while
acting as a GOP poll watcher, of having attempted to intimidate black voters,
charges corroborated by prominent San Francisco attorney James Brosnahan,
then an Assistant Attorney General in the Civil Rights Division of the Justice
Department, in Senate testimony. In the aftermath of the testimony, which
obviously did not derail Rehnquist's path to the Chief Justiceship, Rehnquist
regularly disqualified himself from any case in which Brosnahan was an
attorney of record. See Senate Report, supra note 29, at 31-32, 66, 83 (explaining
that the Republican majority of the Judiciary Committee is relatively dismissive
of the charges while Democratic Senators Kennedy and Metzenbaum clearly
view the allegations as credible, providing more detailed information on the
charges and the accusations of Brosnahan and other witnesses); Stempel, supra
note 53, at 590 n.3.
111. See Senate Report, supra note 29; see also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE
SUPREME COURT (2002) (providing some autobiographical history of his life and
path to the Supreme Court).
112. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 3-7 (1972) (describing Army's domestic
surveillance program).
113. The Office of Legal Counsel is an arm of the Justice Department
responsible for assessing the legality of executive branch actions and advising
the President. Although in a large country with a vast executive branch, it is of
course possible that a given department will embark on a program without
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in favor of such investigation and against the plaintiffs'
objections to the program." 4 When the legality of the
program had been raised during his confirmation hearings,
Rehnquist had expressed the view that the program was
proper.
All of these aspects of Rehnquist's involvement with the
subject matter of the Supreme Court case Laird v. Tatum
would appear to have disqualified Rehnquist from
participation in the case, in that he had a personal and
professional stake in the legality and continued operation of
the program, he formed views on this particular program's
constitutionality prior to ascending to the bench, and he
appeared to have partiality toward the government's view of
both the procedural and substantive merits of any challenge
to the surveillance program. This particular perspective
about a specific government program involving thenattorney Rehnquist's employer (the executive branch) is
something different than an attorney's generalized views
concerning the Constitution.
A number of plaintiffs, led by Arlo Tatum, challenged
the legality of the program, contending that the Justice
Department intrusions violated the plaintiffs' First
Amendment rights of association and expression as well as
Fourth and Ninth Amendment rights to privacy. The
government responded that the matter was not justiciable,
successfully moving to dismiss before the trial court." 5 A
D.C. Circuit appellate panel reversed, finding the matter
justiciable and that the plaintiffs had standing.1 '6 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari review." 7
vetting its legality with the OLC. However, because of the novel and potentially
cutting edge nature of the Department of Defense's domestic surveillance
program, it is hard to imagine that the OLC was not asked for an opinion on the
matter, or at least did not become aware of the program.
114. See William H. Rehnquist, Privacy, Surveillance, and the Law,
Remarks Before the National Conference of Law Reviews in Williamsburg, Va.
(Mar. 19, 1971), reprinted in FEDERAL DATA BANKS, COMPUTERS AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 92 Cong. 1590-96) ("I believe that no legitimate

interest of any segment of our population would be served by permitting
individuals or groups of individuals to prevent by judicial action the
governments gathering [ofi information .... ").
115. See Tatum v. Laird, No. 459-70 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 1970).
116. See Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
117. See 404 U.S. 955 (1971).
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By the time the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court,
Rehnquist had been appointed and confirmed as an
Associate Justice. To the surprise and dismay of observers,
he participated in the case"' and cast his deciding vote in a
5-4 decision in favor of the federal government's defense
that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the federal
government's approval of the challenged surveillance
program."9 The Court's finding of no standing and that the
118. According to folklore surrounding the case, counsel for the plaintiffs
discussed making a formal disqualification motion regarding Rehnquist but
elected against it, with those disfavoring the motion contending that it was not
necessary because Rehnquist would act voluntarily and that it would look
unduly aggressive to the other Justices if a formal motion was filed. See
Stempel, supra note 53, at 592 ('The Tatum plaintiffs had assumed that the
Justice would disqualify himself from any participation in the case because of
his service as head of [OLC] during the time in which the Administration,
presumably with the approval of that office, instituted the domestic surveillance
program.'); see also John P. MacKenzie, Editorial, Mr. Rehnquist's Opinion,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1986, at A24 (saying Tatum plaintiffs "said they feared
offending the Court needlessly when it seemed possible he would not participate
without having to be asked [to step aside]").
[I]t was a shock to see [Justice Rehnquist] there when the
Branzburg [v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)] and Tatum cases
were called for oral argument . . . Rehnquist was considered
disqualified because of his role as principal administration
defender and witness at extensive hearings on military
surveillance
held
before
Ervin's
Subcommittee
on
Constitutional Rights. There Rehnquist stated that the
Pentagon program, however unwise or regrettable, did not
violate anyone's constitutional rights. Specifically and
crucially, he had testified that the Tatum lawsuit, which was
pending in lower courts while the Ervin hearings were under
way, was not "justiciable"; that is, it was the kind of lawsuit
that courts should and would dismiss as judicially
unmanageable. This was the very issue in the case when it
reached the Supreme Court.
MACKENZIE, supra note 30, at 211-13; see also id. at 213-17 (detailing further
information regarding Justice Rehnquist's Justice Department role touching on
the surveillance program and his pre-decision on both procedural and
substantive issues presented by the Tatum case).
119. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1972); see also id. at 16 (Douglas
& Marshall, JJ., dissenting); 408 U.S. at 38 (Brennan, J., Stewart, J., and
Marshall, J., dissenting). In this politically charged case, the Laird v. Tatum
majority opinion rejecting plaintiffs' claim was authored by Chief Justice
Warren Burger, a Nixon appointee, see 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT 117 (Thomas T. Lewis & Richard L. Wilson eds., 2001), and joined by
Nixon appointees Harry Blackmun, id., at 82, Lewis Powell, see 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 730, William Rehnquist, id. at 777, and Kennedy
appointee Byron White, see 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 1020.
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case was non-justiciable, ended inquiry into the program
and avoided scrutiny of Justice Rehnquist's activities
related to the issues presented in Laird v. Tatum.
After the decision, plaintiffs belatedly raised the issue,
seeking rehearing of the case due to the alleged error of
Rehnquist's participation. 2 ' The Court denied the petition
for rehearing and Rehnquist wrote separately in defense of
his decision to not be disqualified from the case 2 ' even
though his own performance as head of OLC would be under
scrutiny if the Court were to find that the Laird v. Tatum
plaintiffs had standing to challenge the Defense
Department's domestic surveillance program.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion was distinguished by its
feisty rhetoric and unbowed attitude.'22 The Justice
Dissenters Thurgood Marshall, see 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
593, and William 0. Douglas, see 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
289, had been appointed by Democratic Presidents Johnson and Roosevelt,
respectively, while dissenters Brennan, id. at 97, and Stewart, see 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 911, were appointed by Republican
President Dwight Eisenhower.
120. See

MACKENZIE,

supra note 30, at 215-17.

121. See 408 U.S. 1 (1972). Justice Rehnquist's Memorandum announcing
and explaining his decision to continue to sit is found at 409 U.S. 824 (1972).
122. For example, when discussing perhaps his strongest argument-that a
judge's general judicial philosophy or political ideology should not be a basis for
recusal-Rehnquist wrote:
Since most Justices come to this bench no earlier than their middle
years, it would be unusual if they had not by that time formulated at
least some tentative notions that would influence them in their
interpretation of the sweeping clauses of the Constitution and their
interaction with one another. It would be not merely unusual, but
extraordinary, if they had not at least given opinions as to
constitutional issues in their previous legal careers. Proof that a
Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete tabula
rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be evidence of lack
of qualification, not lack of bias.
409 U.S. at 835 (italics in original). Unfortunately, this memorable turn of
phrase misleads the reader. The Tatum plaintiffs were not challenging Justice
Rehnquist based on his having an opinion but because he had expressed those
opinions as the public face of an Executive whose conduct was at issue in the
case at bar. Committing oneself to a position as part of the very activities under
scrutiny in the lawsuit is quite different than developing even complex and longstanding views regarding the Constitution. Even in the absence of public
comment suggesting prejudgment, Justice Rehnquist's connection to the
program as head of OLC was alone ground for disqualification. See Stempel,
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contended that there was no valid ground for his recusal
although he conceded "that fair-minded judges might
disagree about the matter,"'23 a concession that itself
supra note 53, at 596-607 (criticizing Rehnquist's analysis on several grounds
and noting in particular that plaintiffs grounds for disqualification centered on
Rehnquist's personal participation in the underlying dispute rather than upon
his generally conservative constitutional
views regarding standing,
justiciability, and national security).
Commenting on the problems of excessively common recusal of Justices,
Rehnquist wrote: "[A]ffirmance of... conflicting results by an equally divided
Court would lay down 'one rule in Athens, and another rule in Rome' with a
vengeance." 409 U.S. at 838. Here, Justice Rehnquist neglects to balance the
difficulties presented by a Court lacking a Justice with the problems created
when Justices subject to strong disqualification arguments refuse to step aside.
See Stempel, supra note 53, at 651-53 (criticizing Rehnquist memorandum for
inflating purported problems created by recusal and ignoring advantages of
having case heard only by Justices with impartiality not subject to reasonable
question).
123. See 409 U.S. at 836. Most commentators regard Justice Rehnquist's
analysis as flawed and his determination erroneous. E.g., MACKENZIE, supra
note 30, at 209 ("[Rehnquist sat] in judgment on matters deeply affecting his
former client [President Nixon]. The sad conclusion-sad because it must be
made of a jurist with brains, ability, and dedication to the Court-is that
Rehnquist's performance was one of the most serious ethical lapses in the
Court's history." Rehnquist memorandum defending failure to recuse was "a
monument both to Rehnquist's technical ability and to his ethical
shortsightedness."); See Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 657, 682-97 (2005) (criticizing Rehnquist's approach in Laird v.
Tatum and generally criticizing the Court for its lax attitude toward
disqualification, suggesting procedural reform); see also Stempel, supra note 53,
at 596-607 (finding that memorandum mis-stated the underlying facts, the
asserted ground for recusal, the applicable disqualification law, and the evolving
standards regarding recusal, and generally displayed insensitivity toward the
issue and undue defensiveness regarding Justice Rehnquist's own conduct in
failing to recuse himself); Senate Report, supra note 29, at 13-25 (majority
views), and id. at 69, 77-81 (minority view of Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.)).
As might depressingly be expected in an era of relatively partisan politics, the
majority section of the Senate Report, which consists largely of merely
reproducing the Rehnquist memorandum, minimizes the flaws of Justice
Rehnquist's recusal analysis. Compare id. at 25 ("This was a forthright
statement by Justice Rehnquist concerning his views on the controlling statute
in effect at the time . . . [and] the issue raised was one of legal analysis upon
which reasonable jurists could differ; however, in no way should Justice
Rehnquist's actions be construed as being improper."), with id. at 81 ("[In Laird
v.Tatum, Justice Rehnquist] was a committed advocate, not an impartial judge.
He did not have an open mind, but a closed mind."). With the perspective of
thirty-five years' hindsight, Sen. Kennedy and the others in the Judiciary
Committee minority appear to have the better of the argument. For example,

2009]

DUTY TO SIT

857

implicitly demonstrates that the pernicious duty to sit made
a tiebreaking difference in prompting him to continue on
the case. In addition to disputing the magnitude of his
alleged conflicts undermining his impartiality, Justice
Rehnquist also specifically invoked the pernicious strain of
the duty to sit doctrine, arguing that it required judges and
justices to remain on a case unless the grounds for recusal
were compellingly clear and essentially beyond dispute. 24'
If all doubts were to be resolved in favor of disqualification, it may
be that I should disqualify myself simply because I do regard the
question as a fairly debatable one, even though upon analysis I
would resolve it in favor of sitting.
Here again, one's course of action may well depend upon the view
he takes of the process of disqualification. Those federal courts of
appeals that have considered the matter have unanimously
concluded that a federal judge has a duty to sit where not
disqualified which is equally as strong as the duty to not sit where
disqualified... These cases dealt with disqualification on the part
of judges of the district courts and of the courts of appeals. I think
that the policy in favor of the "equal duty" concept is even stronger

the majority is clearly wrong to characterize the Rehnquist memorandum as
forthright when it in fact obfuscates his personal involvement in the case in an
attempt to mischaracterize the recusal motion as a broad attack on his general
constitutional views.
In particular, Justice Rehnquist erred in characterizing the disqualification
as sufficiently close so as to implicate the pernicious version of the duty to sit
doctrine counseling against recusal in close cases. Because of Justice
Rehnquist's personal involvement in the case and his prior pronouncements on
the merits of the case itself, he was clearly disqualified. Consequently, it was
inappropriate for him to invoke the anti-recusal "tiebreaker" of the pernicious
version of the duty to sit. Further, as the Judiciary Committee majority noted,
"Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that subsequent amendments to the law could
possibly require a different conclusion." Id. at 25; accord Letter from Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. to Sen. Charles Mathias, reprinted in ROBERT M. COVER, OWEN M.
FIss & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE 1274 (1988) (submitting letter in connection
with 1986 confirmation hearings regarding nomination to Chief Justiceship:
In a matter of such substance and complexity as the surveillance policy,
it is implausible that the head of the government law office responsible
for development of its legal aspects would not be personally involved in
considerable detail concerning the facts and issues going into the policy
and its formulation. On that basis, Mr. Rehnquist was the responsible
counsel in the matter in question, as well as a potential witness
concerning any factual issues regarding the policy. Each of these two
relationships is independently a ground for disqualification.).
124. See 409 U.S. at 837-38.
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in the case of a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
There is no way of substituting Justices on this Court as one judge
may be substituted for another in the district courts. There is no
higher court of appeal that may review an equally divided decision
of this Court and thereby establish the law for our jurisdiction...
[For these reasons, a Justice should not bet "bending over
backwards" in order to deem oneself disqualified. 5

Having framed the issue this way, Rehnquist concluded
that there was no such compellingly clear case for his
disqualification and that any doubts should be resolved
against recusal and in favor of his continued participation
in the case.'26
125. See id. at 837-38 (citing Edwards and other cases, supra note 68 and
accompanying text) (italics in original).
126. See id. at 837-38. Further evidence of the impact of the pernicious
version of the duty to sit doctrine on Justice Rehnquist's decision is provided in
his personal papers on file with the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and
Peace at Stanford University. In the aftermath of the Court's ruling on the
substance of the justiciability issue on which he would cast a crucial vote,
Justice Rehnquist faced plaintiffs' motion for rehearing and his disqualification
from participating in reconsideration of the case. He drafted what would
eventually become his now-famous explanatory memorandum on judicial
disqualification, and then wondered whether to publish it or simply let the
matter drop. He separately asked Chief Justice Burger and Justice White for
"any comment you have with respect to either the substance of this draft or
whether any opinion at all should issue in connection with the denial" of
plaintiffs belated motion for recusal. See Letter from Justice William H.
Rehnquist to Justice Byron R. White (July 28, 1972) (on file with author); Letter
from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger (July 28,
1972) (on file with author). He then sought Justice Stewart's opinion and
received in reply the letter excerpted at the beginning of this article. See Letter
from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Potter Stewart (Aug. 8, 1972) (on
file with author). Even though the inquiry ended with "no hurry," Justice
Stewart replied in less than a week despite being on vacation at the time. See
Letter from "Potter" to "Bill" (Aug. 14, 1972) (copy on file with author)
(suggesting additional examples of past situations in which Justices did not
recuse despite having expressed opinions on general legal issues presented in
pending case).
The first draft of the Rehnquist recusal memorandum received from the
Supreme Court printer was, notwithstanding the July 28 letter to Justices
Burger and White, dated August 1, 1972. See Memorandum from Mr. Justice
Rehnquist in Laird v. Tatum (Aug. 1, 1972) (on file with author). It was not
substantially changed prior to its publication. However, one change made in the
second draft, while continuing to agree that fair-minded judges ("men" in the
first draft) might disagree about recusal in the case, eliminated the words "the
question is probably a fairly close one." See Papers of William Rehnquist,
Hoover Institution Archives, Box 29, folder 71-288 (on file with author). The
change in tone makes it less obvious that the pernicious version of the duty to
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sit doctrine played a role in Justice Rehnquist's fateful decision to remain on the
case. But it seems clear that he indeed viewed the issue as more than colorable
and sufficiently close that he might have recused, had he not subscribed to the
pernicious version of the duty to sit doctrine. In late September, Justice
Rehnquist circulated his final version of the memorandum to the full court,
announcing his intention to publish it. See Memorandum of Justice William H.
Rehnquist to Supreme Court Conference (Sept. 27, 1972) (copy on file with
author). After the memorandum was filed, he sent a copy to Phoenix attorney
John Frank "[s]ince I relied heavily on your acknowledged expertise in the field
of disqualification to prepare the enclosed memorandum .

. . ."

See Letter from

Justice William H. Rehnquist to John P. Frank (Oct. 6, 1972) (on file with
author).
The August 8, 1972, letter to Justice Stewart also reflects the degree to
which Justice Rehnquist viewed the disqualification question as sufficiently
close that the pernicious duty to sit likely placed a significant role in his
ultimate decision.
As you may know from press accounts or from your own
perusal of moving papers before the Court, the respondents in
Laird v. Tatum addressed a motion to me individually to
disqualify myself from consideration of that case. Senator
Gravel's motion for rehearing in this case likewise requires the
Court (not me individually) to disqualify me from participating
in the case. The Gravel motion, I thought, was quite snide, and
insofar as it might ultimately depend on my personal
judgment, I would have no hesitation in denying it without
opinion. The Laird motion, however, seemed to me to be a
fairly serious, responsible presentation; because of this, and
because the New York Times and Washington post tend to
feature the matter at every opportunity, I drafted a chambers
opinion in connection with the Laird motion to accompany my
denial of it....
Because the Chief and Byron were the only two Justices here
at the time I drafted it, I sent a copy of it to each of them, with
a request for their comments. The Chief feels that I ought not
to issue it, since the issue will inevitably become
unnewsworthy if nothing is done, and because issuing it might
create some sort of a precedent whereby in the future others to
whom such motions were addressed would feel obligated to
give a statement of their reasons for denial. Byron, on the
other hand, felt that since these matters are individual ones,
the practice of any one Justice would not place others under
compulsion, and he thought it was a good idea to state reasons
in a case such as this.
I definitely do not want to circulate the opinion to all
members of the Court, because I think that ties each of them
in too much with what is and must remain my own
responsibility. On the other hand, having received conflicting
advice, I would greatly value your opinion as to whether a
memorandum of this nature should be issued by me to
accompany the denial of the motion addressed to me as an
individual Justice.
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Reaction in political circles and the popular press to the
Rehnquist memorandum and his refusal to step aside in
Laird v. Tatum was largely negative,127 providing impetus to
See Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Potter Stewart (Aug. 8,
1972) (on file with author).
After the memorandum was published, Justice Powell wrote to say that he
thought "your splendid memorandum on 'disqualification' constitutes a
conclusive answer to the motion." See Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to
Justice William H. Rehnquist (Oct. 6, 1972) (on file with author). Ninth Circuit
Judge Eugene Wright sent a longer, more effusive letter stating that Justice
Rehnquist deserved "commendation for issuing a statement of explanation on
the disqualification question. I believe you have set a good example for others to
follow" and that "[t]his kind of well thought out statement delivered by a judge,
in the interest of clarifying an issue, as you have done, would do much to restore
the public's confidence in the judicial system." See Letter from Judge Eugene A.
Wright to Justice William H. Rehnquist (Oct. 12, 1972) (on file with author). A
New York attorney also wrote praising the opinion, while another lawyer wrote
in criticism, as did a Catholic University law student. A Columbia Law student
on Law Review had previously written attempting to obtain an interview to
discuss the nature of Justice Rehnquist's actions concerning the case while at
OLC. The Justice responded by sending the student a copy of his memorandum.
See generally Papers of William Rehnquist, Hoover Institution Archives, Box 29,
folder 71-288 (on file with author).
127. See Adam Liptak & Jonathan D. Glater, Papers Offer a Close-Up of
Rehnquist and the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at A12 ("[Justice
Rehnquist] faced stinging criticism for participating in a decision dismissing a
challenge to Army surveillance of domestic political groups in the Vietnam War
era."). It appears from his recently released papers that Justice Rehnquist was
painfully aware of the criticism and during the summer of 1972, in the
aftermath of the Court's Laird v. Tatum opinion, "struggled with whether he
should publicly explain his decision to remain on the case." Id. (characterizing
Rehnquist materials on Laird v. Tatum as "filled with emotion, calculation and
even anguish"). My own view of the materials is less dramatic, but there is no
denying that Justice Rehnquist felt a desire to attempt to vindicate himself in
the court of public opinion. However, he was also concerned about making the
controversy larger and more enduring if he published his recusal memorandum.
Notwithstanding Justice Rehnquist's reaction to the controversy created by
his decision to participate in Laird v. Tatum, he continued to resist the modern
trend toward expanded grounds for disqualification of judges. See Leubsdorf,
supra note 12, at 246. Further, he continued to regard the Supreme Court as a
particularly inappropriate tribunal for application of the new standards set
forth in the 1974 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 455. See Microsoft Corp. v. United
States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2000) (mem.) (Rehnquist, J.) (it is "important to
note the negative impact that the unnecessary disqualification of even one
Justice may have upon our Court" and reiterating his argument made in the
Laird v. Tatum memorandum). And, somewhat famously, Justice Rehnquist
was still smarting enough from the Tatum episode to continue pressing the
argument that he had done nothing wrong. See William H. Rehnquist, Sense
and Nonsense About Judicial Ethics, 28 THE REC. OF THE ASS'N OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF N.Y. 694 (Nov. 1973).
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those wishing to revise the federal judicial code to expand
disqualification in federal courts.'"8 Although there was
comparatively little commentary about the issue in legal
periodicals, the weight of scholarly opinion came to be
uniformly critical of Rehnquist's non- disqualification."2 9 In
As reflected in his refusal to recuse in Microsoft, even the twenty-first
century Rehnquist held Eighteenth Century views concerning disqualification.
Microsoft was represented locally in antitrust matters by the Boston firm
Goodwin, Proctor & Hoar, where James C. Rehnquist, son of the then-Chief
Justice, was a partner working on matters for his (and the firm's) client
Microsoft. Under the clear command of 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(5)(ii) (judge's relation
to counsel for a litigant), § 455(b)(5)(iii) (member of judge's immediate family
with financial interest in case before judge) and § 455(a) (judge's impartiality
subject to reasonable question), Justice Rehnquist was required to step aside in
Microsoft but did just the opposite, invoking a duty to sit rationale. See infra
note 132 and accompanying text, elaborating on the Rehnquist nonrecusal in
U.S. v. Microsoft; see also Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S.
847, 870 (1988) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (objecting to Court majority's decision
in favor of retrial due to judge's failure to recuse under what most would regard
as egregious circumstances).
128. See, e.g., Glen Elsasser, Foes Won't Get Off Rehnquist Case, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 7, 1986, at 4; John P. MacKenzie, The EditorialNotebook; Mr. Rehnquist's
Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1986, at A24; Rehnquist Doesn't Recall DomesticSpying Memo, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 1986, at 4; Larry Margasak, Memo Indicates
Rehnquist Helped Plan Surveillance, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER, Aug. 15, 1986,
at A15.
129. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 53, at 596 (Justice Rehnquist's failure to
recuse is "perhaps the most glaring example in this [twentieth] century of the
deleterious effects of permitting Supreme Court Justices to be recusal law unto
themselves."). The main point of the article, however, was not that Justice
Rehnquist erred but rather to suggest that the U.S. Supreme Court should end
the practice of individual Justices making unreviewable disqualification
decisions and should instead have disqualification motions decided by the entire
Court. See generally Jeremy M. Miller, Judicial Recusal and Disqualification:
The Need For a Per Se Rule on Friendship(Not Acquaintance), 33 PEPP. L. REV.
575 (2006); Bassett, supra note 2, at 1217 n.16. After reading the Rehnquist
paper connect to Laird v. Tatum, I'm less sanguine that review by the full Court
would be much of an improvement. Justices Burger, White, Stewart, and Powell
all appear to have supported the Rehnquist decision not to recuse despite the
clear substantive flaws in its rationale. Perhaps the clubby isolation of the
Court too greatly interferes with the Justices' normal powers of perception and
legal analysis.
See generally Frank, supra note 93 (criticizing duty to sit concept prior to its
abolition in 1972 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct and 1974 amendments to 28
U.S.C. § 455). However, the force of the duty to sit doctrine, when it was in force
in federal courts, was sufficiently strong that the only two law journal
commentaries at the time of Justice Rehnquist's decision did not criticize his
failure to recuse. See Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the
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1986, nearly fifteen years later, Rehnquist's elevation to
Chief Justice brought renewed attention to the issue,
resulting in further criticism from the scholarly community.
Perhaps most prominently, Professors Geoffrey Hazard and
Stephen Gillers both provided critical evaluations to
Congress,'3 ° concluding that in addition to being a "judge in
his own case" because of his Justice Department
involvement in the surveillance program at issue in the
case, Justice Rehnquist's participation raised a reasonable
question as to his impartiality.
Notwithstanding the criticism, Justice Rehnquist
remained largely unrepentant on the subject, both at the
time of the original controversy, and during hearings
concerning his nomination for the Chief Justices post. He
continued to argue the matter in the public forum,' and
refused to admit error even when it was clear that the
episode was becoming a major stumbling block on his path
to Chief Justice. He was eventually confirmed as Chief
Justice by one of the closest Senate votes in history,
although this relatively narrow victory appeared not to have
increased his sensitivity to disqualification issues.'32
Federal Courts, 86 HARv. L. REV. 736 (1973); Note, Justice Rehnquist's Decision
to Participatein Laird v. Tatum, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 106 (1973).
Although the major blow to the duty to sit concept was the 1974 federal
legislation, commentators continue to be critical of the doctrine. See, e.g.,
Bassett, supra note 2, at 1220 n.29; Bloom, supra note 26; Frost, supra note 63,
at 545-46; Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and
the Procedural Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107 (2004).
130. See 132 CONG. REC. 22,794, 22,829-30 (1986) (letters from Professor
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Yale Law School and Professor Stephen Gillers, New York
University School of Law); Stempel, supra note 53, at 596-608 (discussing
written opinions of Professors Hazard and Gillers in response to congressional
inquiry at the time of Justice Rehnquist's elevation to Chief Justice).
131. See generally Rehnquist, supra note 127. In the article, however,
Justice Rehnquist is less specifically defensive about his participation in Laird
v. Tatum and makes a broader criticism of the modern tide of public and judicial
opinion encouraging increased disqualification of judges generally due to
concerns about appearances of impropriety and reduced faith in the ability of
judges to be fair.
132. Justice Rehnquist continued to hold this strong presumption against
recusal throughout his time on the Court. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. United
States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2000) (refusing to disqualify himself due to family
member involvement as counsel because of "negative impact that the
unnecessary disqualification of even one Justice may have upon our Court"). In
a higher profile refusal to recuse, Justice Scalia took a similar stance in refusing
to step aside after his now-famous duck hunting trip with Vice-President
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Part of the Justice's rationale for his certitude was his
invocation of the "duty to sit" doctrine, which was in his
view good, controlling law at the time of Laird v. Tatum
notwithstanding the ABA Judicial Code's retreat from the
doctrine in its 1972 Model Judicial Code. Justice Rehnquist
took the position that the duty to sit concept strongly
counseled that he stay on case despite concerns that he
could not be impartial under the circumstances. As
discussed below, the concept continues to exert a hold on the
views of the Supreme Court regarding recusal and those of
lower courts as well. In federal court, however, the duty to
sit has not been the law for nearly thirty-five years.
D. CongressAbolishes the Duty to Sit in the 1974
Amendments to the FederalJudicial Code
Reaction to the Rehnquist refusal to recuse was
sufficiently strong that it, along with other perceived
judicial errors in failing to recuse, helped fuel revision of the
'
federal disqualification law, particularly 28 U.S.C. §455. 33
In addition to generally strengthening the grounds for
disqualification the legislation specifically sought to abolish
the duty to sit.' 4 As one treatise author explains:
Cheney was advanced as a ground for recusal. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court,
124 S. Ct. 1391 (2004) (Scalia, J. mem.).
133. See House Report, supra note 29, at 6353 (describing background
leading to revision of federal law on disqualification); id. at 6356 (noting Justice
Rehnquist's failure to recuse in Laird v. Tatum as problematic); FLAMM, supra
note 2, § 1.5; see generally E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1973) (describing background leading to ABA decision to
revise Code and strengthen disqualification provisions).
134. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1453, at 2 (1974), as reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6351, 6352; Duke v. Pfizer, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (E.D.
Mich. 1987); United States v. Conforte, 457 F. Supp. 641, 651 (D. Nev. 1978);
Kansas v. Logan, 678 P.2d 181, 184-85 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984); 13 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 3541-3553 (1975); Bassett,
supra note 123, at 673 (Congress "eliminated . . . the 'duty to sit' doctrine in
1974.'); Note, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias Under 28 U.S.C.
Section 144 and Revised Section 455, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 139 (1976).
Senator Birch Bayh (not to be confused with his son, current Senator Evan
Bayh (D-Ind.)) did not get everything he wanted concerning judicial recusal.
Prior to enactment of the 1974 legislation, he "twice proposed amending [28
U.S.C.] section 144 to provide litigants a peremptory challenge directed to
judicial disqualification. Congress, however, enacted only the revision of section
455 and left section 144 unaltered. Advocates of the peremptory challenge have
criticized that congressional decision, and have emphasized problems under pre-
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Prior to the 1974 amendments....

S. . federal judges often expressly relied on the "duty to sit rule" to
deny disqualification motions in all but the most blatant of
circumstances.
*

.

. With the enactment of the 1974 amendments..,

the duty to

sit rule was displaced by a "presumption of disqualification" such
that, [after those amendments went into effect,] whenever a judge
harbored any doubts as to whether his disqualification was
warranted, he 135was to resolve those doubts in favor of
disqualification.

Prior to this change, the doctrine was problematic to the
degree that it implied that judges should tenaciously cling
amendment law or ill considered decisions under the amendments, as evidence
of the present system's failure to assure an impartial tribunal." See Caesar's
Wife Revisited, supra note 26, at 1217. However, approximately half the states
'have peremptory challenge statutes or the equivalent." Id. at 1217 & n.109
(citing 19 states with peremptory challenge to initially assigned judge as of
1977) (Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon,
South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). In the intervening 30
years, no additional states have added this feature. See FLIAMM, supra note 2, at
Ch. 3; Report of the Judicial Disqualification Project 30-31 (ABA Standing
Committee
on
Judicial
Independence,
Working
Paper,
2008),
http://www.abanet.org/judind/pdf/JDPDRAFT_FOR_DISCUSSIONPURPOSES.
pdf. Under most such state systems, a party may disqualify the initially
assigned judge for any reason. Thereafter, if the party is upset with a second
judge (or third, etc.), the party bears the burden to demonstrate a need for
disqualification under the relevant state's version of the ABA Model Code. In
addition, states may limit the peremptory challenge in some way (e.g.,
applicable to trial judges only, not available in criminal cases, drug courts or
mental health cases; applicable only to visiting judges). See id. at 30; see also
Deborah Goldberg, et al., The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead
Recusal Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 526-27 (2007) (recommending
availability of peremptory disqualification to rectify perceived insufficient
disqualification of judges surrounded by reasonable questions as to
impartiality).
135. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8, at 604-05. Accord Patterson v. Mobil
Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476, 484-85 (5th Cir. 2003); Murray v. Scott, 253 F.3d
1308,1313 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir.
2000); United States v. Sciarra, 851 F. 2d 621, 634 n. 27 (3d Cir. 1988) (with
1974 amendments, Congress sought to eradicate duty to sit presumption against
recusal); United States v. Moskovits, 866 F. Supp. 178, 182 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(statutory changes in Section 455 created a presumption in favor of
disqualification in close cases as contrasted to the presumption against
disqualification in close cases created by the duty to sit); see also Stempel, supra
note 53, at 604; In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 784 (3d Cir. 1992)
(judge has no duty to sit whatsoever).
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to a case in spite of legitimate concerns about impartiality
or application of a per se ground for disqualification such as
financial interest in a litigant.136 Recounting the history of
the change, treatise author Richard Flamm noted that:
In 1973, the American Bar Association acted to resolve the conflict
between the duty of sua sponte disqualification and the duty to sit
by adopting former Canon 3C (now 3E) of the Code of Judicial
Conduct. This provision was expressly designed to do away with
the duty to sit concept as a restriction on a judge's proper exercise
137
of discretion when confronted by a disqualification motion.

The legislative history of the 1974 amendments to the
statute makes the legislative intent to abolish the duty to
sit beyond question.13 It also makes clear that the
pernicious version of the duty to sit, if it was ever justified
under the 1924 Canons, was eradicated by the 1972 Model
Code of Judicial Conduct.'39 Attorney John Frank, a key
figure in the creation of the 1972 ABA Model Code and the
push for federal legislative reform, stressed the goal of
harmonizing the ABA standards and federal law.14° He also
appeared to regard the pernicious version of the duty to sit
as not only inconsistent with the 1972 ABA Model Code but
136. See Bassett, supra note 123, at 672-73 ('"duty to sit' doctrine required
judges to decide borderline recusal questions in favor of participating in the
case" and "oblige[d] the assigned judge to hear a case unless and until an
unambiguous demonstration of extrajudicial bias was made." (quoting RICHARD
E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
JUDGES, § 20.10.1, at 613 (1996)).
137. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8, at 605.
138. See House Report, supra note 29, at 6355; Senate Report, supra note
29, at 5-6; 1974 Legislative Hearing, supra note 24, at 10-15 (Statement of
attorney John P. Frank) (New Section 455(a) "eliminates the so-called 'duty to
sit' rule of Edwards v. United States, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964) and numerous
other cases . . .instead giving judges a reasonable latitude to disqualify where

an appearance of unfairness may reasonably exist if they sit."). But see 1974
Legislative Hearings, supra note 24, at 15 (repeating colloquy between
Subcommittee Chair Robert Kastenmeier (D-Wis.) and attorney John Frank
agreeing that proposed legislation would not eliminate benign version of duty to
sit concept counseling judges not to recuse in the absence of a valid reason for
disqualification; legislation is "not telling judges to go off and take vacations just
because cases were uncomfortable").
139. See House Report, supra note 29, at 6355; Senate Report, supra note
29, at 5-6; 1974 Legislative Hearings, supra note 24, at 11.
140. See Senate Report, supra note 29, at 10-15; 1974 Legislation Hearings,
supra note 29, at 9-15.
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also with its predecessor, the 1924 Canons, as well. 442'
Secondary authority unanimously underscores this intent.
Commentators have consistently noted the degree to
which the duty to sit concept or doctrine restricts
disqualification by pushing courts in the direction of
refusing to recuse in close cases, 143 and that under modern
28 U.S.C. § 455, like the post-1972 ABA Judicial Code, close
cases should now be resolved in favor of disqualification.'"
141. See Senate Report, supranote 29, at 9 ("[W]e have had a conflict in the
Federal system, at least since about 1920. The ABA Standard has been that a
judge should disqualify if it was going to look bad if he sat [which is inconsistent
with the pernicious version of the duty to sit].")
142. See, e.g., MACKENZIE, supra note 30, at 81-84, 197-205, 221-23, 228
(describing that reporter covering Laird v. Tatum case and other legal issues
during the 1970s noted that Justice Rehnquist's participation was catalyst in
1974 legislative change and that amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 455 were intended,
like the 1972 ABA Model Code, to eliminate pernicious version of duty to sit
doctrine, which had fallen into disfavor among significant portion of legal
profession); Bowie, supra note 30, at 930-32 (describing changes in 1972 Model
Code, adoption by Judicial Conference of the United States in Code of Conduct
for United States Judges in 1973, and 1974 changes to Section 455); Jeremy S.
Brumbelow, Liteky v. United States: The ExtrajudicialSource Doctrine and Its
Implications for Judicial Disqualification, 48 ARK. L. REV. 1059, 1075 (1995)
(1974 amendments to federal law designed to harmonize ABA Model Code
provisions and federal statute); Carton, supra note 26, at 2067-70 ("In response
to growing criticism over § 455's subjectiveness and the 'duty to sit' rule,
Congress, following the lead of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
adopted the American Bar Association's Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3C"
with minor changes. "Congress's primary objectives in adopting Canon 3C were
to: (1) make § 455 conform to the ABA Code; (2) increase public confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary by replacing the subjective standard of the old § 455
with an objective one; and (3) remove the 'duty to sit' rule established in
Edwards [v. United States, 334 F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964)]); see also Christopher
J. Moell, Casenote, Liteky v. United States: Application of the Extrajudicial
Source Rule to Judicial DisqualificationUnder 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), 21 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 595, 606-07 (1994) ("In fact, abolishment of 'duty-to-sit' was of such
importance so as to warrant specific mention in the House Report."); Bloom,
supra note 26, at 673 ("The amended section 455 made another important
change in the law by removing the 'duty-to-sit' rule The prior rule was that a
judge had a duty to hear a case if the alleged statutory grounds for
disqualification, including bias, had not been proven. By providing that a judge
would be automatically disqualified whenever his 'impartiality might
reasonably be questioned,' the amendments effectively removed the duty-to-sit
concept.") (citation omitted).
143. See, e.g., Bassett, supra note 2, at 1220 n.29; Frank, supra note 93, at
59-60.
144. See, e.g., Steven Lubet, Disqualificationof Supreme Court Justices: The
CertiorariConundrum, 80 MINN. L. REV. 657, 660-61 (1996) ("[Tlhe once popular
concept of a 'duty to sit' was repudiated long ago by the American Bar
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Most federal courts have received this message as well,'45
although, as discussed below, a disturbingly high number
Association's [1972] Model Code of Judicial Conduct, since adopted by the
United States Judicial Conference and embraced by Congress.") (footnotes
omitted).
145. See, e.g., Barksdale v. Emerick, 853 F.2d 1359, 1360-61 (6th Cir. 1988)
(prior to 1974 amendment to federal disqualification statute, doubts concerning
recusal were required to be resolved in favor of continued participation because
of duty to sit concept); United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540-41 (11th
Cir. 1987) (describing prior to 1974 statutory change, courts "operated under the
so-called 'duty to sit' doctrine which required a judge to hear a case unless a
clear demonstration of extra-judicial bias or prejudice was made .... In passing
the amended 28 U.S.C. § 455, Congress broadened the grounds and loosened the
procedure for disqualification in the federal courts. .... The statute also did
away with the "duty to sit" so that the benefit of the doubt is now to be resolved
in favor of recusal. . . . Congress expressly intended the amended § 455 to
promote public confidence in the impartiality of the courts by eliminating even
the appearance of impropriety .... [T]he general effect of this statute was to
liberalize greatly the scope of disqualification in the federal courts.); Potashnick
v. Port City Const. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111-12 (5th Cir. 1980) ('The language of
the new statue eliminates the so-called 'duty to sit.' The use of 'might reasonably
be questioned' in section 455(a) ...clearly mandates that it would be preferable
for a judge to err on the side of caution and disqualify himself in a questionable
case.") (emphasis in original); United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 139 n.
360 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977) (noting that the purpose
of new Section 455 was in part to eliminate the duty to sit concept); Idaho v.
Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 721-23 (D. Idaho 1981) ('The legislative history of
the new section [28 U.S.C. § 455(a)] made it clear that the 'duty to sit' rule had
been done away with. By eliminating the 'duty to sit' rule Congress hoped to
'enhance public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial system."') (quoting
House Report, supra note 29). Accord Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition
Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 871-74 (1988) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting joined by White
and Scalia, JJ.) (conceding that 1974 legislation "had the effect of removing the
so-called 'duty to sit,' which had become an accepted gloss on the existing
statute," but opposing Court majority's decision to remand case for retrial due to
judge's failure to recuse in the face of ties to interested party).
See also Carton, supra note 26, at 2070-71 ("Congress appears to have ...
achieved its objectives [in amending Section 455]: § 455 and the ABA Code of
Judicial Conduct are virtually identical, most courts apply an objective test
when deciding if disqualification is warranted, and the concept that judges have
a duty to sit in close cases has been abandoned by most circuits.") Of course, the
legislative command was to eliminate the duty to sit in all federal courts.
However, "some courts have retained a limited version of the duty [to sit
doctrine].... by according the judge a presumption of impartiality and shifting
the burden of proof to the movant to overcome that presumption." Id. at 2071,
n.50 (citing Bloom, supra note 26, at 673 n.65 and Litteneker, supra note 2, at
241 n.26). On closer examination, these commentators are addressing the
benign version of the duty to sit concept rather than its pernicious version. It
appears that at the appellate level, the pernicious version of the duty to sit has
mostly been buried, but it continues to crop up at the trial level. See Part II.A,
infra.
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appear to be either unaware of the 1974 amendments or
confused about their impact. State courts, even in states
that have adopted the ABA Model Code, also sometimes
exhibit similar unawareness or confusion, although the
majority of decisions appear to be in accord with current
46
federal law that has extinguished the duty to sit concept.

II. ABOLISHED BUT NOT FORGOTTEN: THE TROUBLING
ENDURANCE OF THE DUTY TO SIT AND JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S
LAIRD v. TATUM MEMORANDUM
A.

Vestiges of the Past in Federal Court Decisions

Despite the elimination of the duty to sit in the 1974
amendments to Section 455, a surprising number of federal
Appellate courts seldom apply the pernicious version but frequently apply
the benign version, sometimes in apparent ignorance that the duty to sit
nomenclature also was to have been eliminated along with the pernicious
version of the doctrine via the 1974 federal legislation and the 1972 ABA Model
Judicial Code. See, e.g., United States v. Angelus, 258 Fed. Appx. 840, 842 (6th
Cir. 2007) ("Although a judge is obliged to disqualify himself when there is a
close question concerning his impartiality, he has an equally strong duty to sit
where disqualification is not required") (citing Rehnquist memorandum in Laird
v. Tatum); Clemens v. District Court, 428 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005) (judge
has duty to sit if no legitimate reason for recusal that is as strong as duty to
recuse when facts and law require); Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 352 (10th Cir.
1995) (discussing "settled principle that a judge has as strong an obligation not
to recuse when the situation does not require as he has to recuse when it is
necessary" and commending trial judge for "his integrity in upholding what he
sees as his clear judicial duty"). But see United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 46
(1st Cir. 2000) (judge has duty to recuse where impartiality can be reasonably
questioned "but otherwise, he has a duty to sit") ("[The 1974 amendment to]
Section 455(a) modified, but did not eliminate, the duty to sit doctrine. The duty
to sit doctrine originally not only required a judge to sit in the absence of any
reason to recuse, but also required a judge to resolve close cases in favor of
sitting rather than recusing. Section 455(a) eliminated the latter element of the
doctrine... but not the former") (citations omitted).
146. See, for example, Charles Bliel & Carol King, Focus on Judicial
Recusal: A Clearing Picture, 25 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 773, 802 (1994), describing
trend in Texas and noting that the
long-standing acceptance of the principle of judicial impartiality, for
many years it co-existed with a countervailing notion, which, though
certainly not overriding the principle of impartiality, qualified it to
some degree. This was the notion that judges had a duty to sit; that is,
they had an obligation not to recuse themselves from a case whenever
they could avoid doing so. In recent years, the belief that there is a duty
to sit has been greatly diminished. Indeed, today there is little, if any,
mention of the duty to sit.
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courts continue to invoke it,'47 while a larger number cite
Justice Rehnquist's Laird v. Tatum memorandum with
favor, although almost always for its most defensible
assertion that a judge is not disqualified merely because he
has general jurisprudential views that might bear on a
pending case.'48 Indeed, most federal courts addressing the
duty to sit are critical of the concept and correctly point to
its 1974 abolition.'49 Nonetheless, the duty to sit concept
147. See, e.g., United States v. Bray, 546 F.2d 851, 857 (10th Cir. 1976)
(citing cases decided prior to 1974 legislation). In Bray, the court held that a tax
protester's attempt to disqualify the judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 fell short
because "Bray's affidavit in support of his motion to disqualify the judge was
insufficient. The mere fact that a judge has previously expressed himself on a
particular point of law is not sufficient to show personal bias or prejudice." Id.
However, in spite of invoking the duty to sit and finding the affidavit
inconsistent, the court disqualified the judge pursuant to Section 455(a) due to a
reasonable question as to the judge's impartiality. Id. at 860. The judge had
"committed plain error in setting Bray's bail in the presence of the jury" and told
federal marshals to "lock him up' if bail was not met," which "effectively vitiated
the presumption of innocence." See id. at 859. In addition, the trial record
revealed intemperate remarks by the judge that "clearly import his feelings of
hostility toward the defendant." See id. at 859-61 (judge referred to Bray as
"damned impertinent bird" and "whippersnapper" with whom judge would settle
scores). Bray was wrong about the continued vitality of the duty to sit concept,
but it reached the right result. The duty to sit concept, however, added nothing
positive to the judicial inquiry.
Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit appears to continue to treat the duty to sit
as good law even though it is not relevant to the disposition of a recusal motion.
See, e.g., Switzer v. Berry, 198 F.3d 1255, 1257-58 (10th Cir. 2000) (invoking
duty to sit in case where motion to recuse was clearly subject to rejection under
rule of necessity).
148. As of November 1, 2008, Justice Rehnquist's Laird v. Tatum
memorandum has been cited in more than two-hundred subsequent opinions,
usually without any indication of negative treatment, as well as in more than
one-hundred law periodicals, often with negative comment. But a citation to the
Rehnquist memorandum does not necessarily indicate that the citing court is
unaware of the abolition of the duty to sit or otherwise incorrect in its overall
approach to disqualification. See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532,
1545-46, (11th Cir. 1987) (citing Rehnquist memorandum but also showing
substantial awareness and understanding of 1974 statutory change and
correctly ordering recusal of trial judge; court noted that Laird v. Tatum decided
prior to abolition of duty to sit doctrine and did not question Justice Rehnquist's
assertion of no personal knowledge regarding underlying case).
149. See FLANM, supra note 2, § 20.8. See also, e.g., United States v. Amico,
486 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279 (4th Cir.
1998); United States v. Cerceda, 139 F.3d 847 (11th Cir. 1998), vacated by, 161
F.3d 652 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Werner, 916 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1990);
Barkesdale v. Emerick, 853 F.2d 1359 (6th Cir. 1988); Delesdernier v. Porterie,
666 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1982); Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101
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continues to survive, at least in dicta, in some cases and
probably
continues
to
exert
pressure
against
disqualification in close cases. 5 °
In spite of the Laird v. Tatum controversy surrounding
Justice Rehnquist's non-recusal and statutory changes to 28
U.S.C. § 455, a surprising number of relatively recent
federal cases have continued to treat the duty to sit as a
continuingly viable concept. As one court noted, "[w]hile
most courts acknowledge the clear legislative intent of
abolishing the 'duty to sit"' rule,15' other courts have either
overlooked the legislators' intent or have sought to
articulate some limited version of that duty. 5 '
Thus, while the legislative history of Section 455
indicates Congress' intention to do away with the "duty to
sit" rule, and for judges not to consider that duty and
disqualify themselves in "close" cases they also show their
(5th Cir. 1980); Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114 (4th Cir. 1978); Fredonia
Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1978), disregardedon

other grounds, Riquelme Valdes v. Leisure Res. Group, Inc., 810 F.2d 1345 (5th
Cir. 1987); United States v. Pepper & Potter, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 123 (E.D.N.Y.
1988); In re Wolfson, 453 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Bradley v. Milliken,
426 F. Supp. 929 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
150. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8; Bassett, supra note 2, at 1243 n.146
("Although the 1974 amendments eliminated the 'duty to sit' doctrine .

.

. the

cases suggest that some judges effectively have retained this doctrine in
resolving recusal and disqualification matters involving suggestions of bias or
prejudice."); Obert v. Repub. W Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 138, 144-45 (1st Cir. 2005)
(noting varying attitudes of judges, with some still stressing duty to sit as
ground for resisting recusal in close cases).
151. See Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 722 (D. Idaho 1981), citing,
inter alia, United States v. Wolfson, 558 F.2d 59, 63 (2d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 139 n.360 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); Smith v. Pepsico, Inc., 434 F. Supp.
524, 526 n. 2 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Fong v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1334,
1337 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Bradley v. Milliken, 426 F. Supp. 929, 933 (E.D. Mich.
1977).
152. See Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. at 722 (citing United States v.
Bray, 546 F.2d 851, 857 (10th Cir. 1976)); Smith v. Danyo, 441 F. Supp. 171, 175
(M.D. Pa. 1977); Honneus v. United States, 425 F. Supp. 164, 166 (D. Mass.
1977); United States v. Sinclair, 424 F. Supp. 715, 710 (D. Del. 1977); Andrews,
Mosburg, Davis, Elam, Legg & Bixler, Inc. v. General Ins. Co., 418 F. Supp. 304,
307 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Simonson v. General Motors Corp., 425 F. Supp. 574, 579
(E.D. Pa. 1976); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 4997, 52627 (D.S.C. 1956); United States v. Pastor, 419 F. Supp. 1318, 1332 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Virginia State Bar Assoc. v. Hirschkop, 406 F. Supp. 721, 725 (E.D. Va.
1975); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 367, 373 (E.D.Pa.
1975); Hall v. Burkett, 391 F. Supp. 237, 240 (W.D. Okl. 1975).
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concern that only in proper cases are judges disqualified
and then only if the basis is reasonable. 5
If the case for disqualification is not close, the duty to
sit concept endures in its more benign form in that a judge
is of course required to do his or her duty and hear and
decide cases unless there is at least a colorable ground for
disqualification.'54 Although the duty to sit concept as a
barrier to disqualification has been rejected by federal law
since 1974 and the ABA since 1972, a few federal courts
appear not to have realized the impact of the legislative
changes and continue to endorse the problematic duty to sit
counseling
against
recusal
unless
the
case for
disqualification is beyond serious question.'55 Another
153. See Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. at 722; see also id. at 723-24
(positing that continued attraction to duty to sit concept may stem from judicial
concern that 28 U.S.C. § 144 not become a vehicle for litigants' automatic and
baseless peremptory challenge of judges).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 46 n.1 (1st Cir. 2000).
See supra Part I.A-B, discussing distinction between judge's responsibility to
discharge duties and the duty to sit concept as resistance to recusal.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Angelus, 258 Fed. Appx. 840, 2007 WL
4561519 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating judge "has equally strong duty to sit where
disqualification is not required" and citing Laird v. Tatum); Clemens v. U.S.
Dist. Court, 482 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding judge has "as strong a
duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse
when the law and facts require"); Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 599 (5th
Cir. 2004) (treating both duty to sit and Rehnquist memorandum as continuing
good and instructive law); Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 572 F. Supp. 2d 869,
876 (E.D. Mich. 2008); Blackwell v. United States, No. 2008 WL 1696947, at *1
(S.D. Ohio April 9, 2008); Arnell v. McAdam, No. 2007 WL 2021826, at *1 (S.D.
Cal. July 10, 2007); Beason v. Folino, No. 2008 WL 471641, at *2 (W.D.Pa. Feb.
19, 2008) (treating both duty to sit and Rehnquist memorandum as continuing
good law); Petruska v. Gannon, No. 2007 WL 3072237, at *4 (W.D.Pa. Oct. 19,
2007); United States v. Washam, No. 2007 WL 1166038 (W.D.Ky. April 17,
2007); United States v. Blohm, 579 F. Supp. 495, 505-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); United
States v. Ferguson, 550 F. Supp. 1256, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("The Court
concludes that under all the circumstances here presented it is required to
disqualify itself on the ground that its impartiality might be reasonably
questioned. It does so with reluctance since many long days and hours have
been expended in studying the voluminous affidavits, exhibits and briefs
submitted by the parties; in addition, this Court remains of the school that
adheres to the 'duty to sit' concept, notwithstanding which the case must now be
reassigned to one of my colleagues, all of whom are heavily burdened with other
matters. But the Court's reluctance and its 'duty to sit' concept must yield to a
higher authority-the majesty of the law. A cardinal principle of our system of
justice is that not only must there be the reality of a fair trial and impartiality
in accordance with due process, but also the appearance of a fair trial and
impartiality."); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 367, 374
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significant subgroup of federal cases cites problematic parts
of Justice Rehnquist's Laird v. Tatum memorandum as good
law instructive on questions of judicial disqualification.'56
Although many of these cases cite the memorandum for its
less controversial view that a judge's philosophy is not
ground for recusal,'57 all these cases seem oblivious to the
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (considering duty to sit as good law, citing Rehnquist
memorandum favorably, but then noting 1974 legislation and finding case for
recusal not close and denying disqualification); In re Stoller, 374 B.R. 618, 62122 (Bkrptcy. N.D. Ill. 2007) (treating both duty to sit and Rehnquist
memorandum as good law); Cherokee Nation v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 215,
218 (Ct. Cl. 1992) (same); Choctaw Nation v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 219, 221
(Ct. Cl. 1992) (same).
156. See, e.g., Scott v. Metropolitan Health Corp., 234 Fed. Appx. 341, No.
2007 WL 1028853, at *10 (6th Cir. 2007) (observing that when the "objective
appearance-or-partiality standard presents a close question"; judge "must"
recuse himself (quoting Union Planters Bank v. L & J Dev. Co., Inc., 115 F.3d
378, 383 (6th Cir. 1997)), but immediately adding, "Nonetheless, as the late
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, a federal judge has a duty to sit where not
disqualified which is equally as strong as the duty to not sit where
disqualified."); United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540, 1543,1546, (11th
Cir. 1987) (applying correct law and reaching correct result but quoting
Rehnquist memorandum at length); Republic of Panama v. Am. Tobacco Co.,
265 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2001) (denying rehearing en banc). Wessmann v.
Boston Sch. Comm., 979 F. Supp. 915, 916-917 (D. Mass. 1997) (noting abolition
of duty to sit but then stating that "Justice Rehnquist's memorandum in Laird
has become a standard for recusal decisions of judges at all levels of the judicial
system." (citing cases)). See also United States v. IBM Corp., 475 F. Supp. 1372,
1388-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding disqualification unwarranted under either pre1974 or post-1974 version of Section 455).
157. Although the 1974 Amendments to federal disqualification law reflect
congressional dissatisfaction with pre-existing disqualification law such as the
pernicious version of the duty to sit and portions of the Rehnquist
memorandum,
[tiestimony at the hearings established that such an
expression of opinion should not disqualify the judge. However,
where the judge had expressed an opinion about the merit or
lack of merit of a specific case before such matter came before
him in a particular proceeding, the witnesses were in
agreement that under such circumstances the judge would be
disqualified. [The proposed amendments seek] to make this
distinction.
See Senate Report, supra note 29, at 2. Court decisions continue to find general
judicial philosophy an insufficient ground for disqualification even if adverse to
a litigant's theory of the case. See, e.g., National Rifle Ass'n v. City of Evanston,
No. 2008 WL 3978293, at *2-*6 (N.D.Ill. 2008) (stating that prior jurisprudential
views are ordinarily not ground for recusal but specific opinions as counsel in
related matter are disqualifying; citing Rehnquist memorandum but
appreciating that Justice Rehnquist was compromised not because of his
general constitutional views but his specific involvement in Nixon
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controversial history of the Laird v. Tatum case and the
degree to which Justice Rehnquist's refusal to recuse was
legislatively overruled in large part, consistently criticized
by scholars and political commentators, and almost enough
to stop his ascension to Chief Justice.
These comparatively clueless or incomplete federal
court opinions are disturbing, even when citing the benign
portions of the Rehnquist memorandum, in that they
display an amazingly ahistorical perspective on the law. In
effect, some federal courts are continuing to cite as
authoritative an opinion that not only is no longer good law
in substantial part but also has largely been discredited in
that nearly all informed observers have concluded that
Justice Rehnquist made the wrong decision in continuing to
participate in Laird v. Tatum and incorrectly described the
degree of his involvement with the case prior to coming to
the Court. Use of the Rehnquist memorandum without at
least some comment on its history is a bit like citing,
without comment, Lochner v. New York' 55 for the proposition
that a contract creates rights and that contract rights are
constitutionally
protected.'59
Yet
the
Rehnquist
Administration's domestic surveillance program) (but also cleaving to
traditional view that judge may hear cases involving legislation authored by
judge when previously serving as legislator).
158. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) ("[t]he general right to
make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution"). It is equally true,
of course, that the states have "power to prevent the individual from making
certain kinds of contracts," id. at 53, subject to certain federal constitutional
constraints. Lochner is notorious for representing what many view as the high
water mark of Supreme Court use of the Constitution to strike down state
regulatory efforts that limit contractual freedom. See id. at 64 ("the freedom of
master and employe[e] to contract with each other in relation to their
employment, and in defining the same, cannot be prohibited or interfered with,
without violating the Federal Constitution.") But the high water mark was not
reached without some resistance. See id. at 65 (Harlan, White, and Day, JJ.,
dissenting); id. at 74 (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F.
Supp. 580, 594 (D. Me. 1995) ('The Lochner case and its progeny employed
freedom of contract to strike down social legislation regulating aspects of the
work place .... The Supreme Court, however, has dramatically curtailed the

due process right to freedom of contract") (rejecting Lochner-style freedom of
contract argument that Americans With Disabilities Act is unconstitutional).
159. At least I hope readers will agree with me that Lochner is a
controversial case in that it famously held that the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution prevented a state from enacting labor laws protective of
workers on the ground that this unduly infringed a substantive legal right of
contract between employers and the workers themselves who were the objects of
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memorandum is often cited as if it were an unobjectionable,
"Brand X" recitation of an uncontroversial proposition of

law.
How can this happen in a system supposedly built upon
the careful weighing, selection, and application of
precedent? Judicial use of the Rehnquist memorandum
without at least some qualifying commentary is a less
extreme version of citing Plessy v. Ferguson6 ' as good law.
Plessy, although its separate-but-equal view of the
Fourteenth Amendment has been rejected for more than a
half-century, does contain some statements of the law that
the legislation's protective intent. This principle of "substantive" due process
limited state regulatory efforts no matter how procedurally fair. Lochner's
reasoning was rejected a few years later in Mueller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908) and Lochner is now seen as an archaic, formalist anachronism that
predates the modern regulatory state. See preceding note, supra; West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (overruling Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), and by implication the Lochner line of cases);
LAURENCE TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 169 (2008) ('"Lochnerizing' now
serves more as an epithet;" decision was "insufficiently sensitive to the
dynamics of power that rendered ostensibly self-governing relationships of
employer to employee or of producer to consumer hollow forms that concealed
what were, at bottom, unilateral impositions of power."); JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§11.3, 11.4 (6th ed. 2000); G. STONE,
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (2d ed. 1991). However, the concept of substantive
due process arguably survives to a degree in decisions limiting the power of the
state over citizens' personal lives. See TRIBE, supra, at 168 (arguing that
although Lochner erred in giving undue preference for "contract and property as
especially important forms of social ordering," decision employs a geometric
construction of the Constitution that is defensible jurisprudential approach in
that Constitution cannot be properly construed solely based on its text or
drafting history); Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873
(1987).
But whatever vestiges of Lochner remain and whatever one's opinion on the
merits of its holding and reasoning, only someone unfamiliar with American law
would randomly pull the case from a digest or database and cite it without
comment for any of the propositions within the case that are uncontroversial in
isolation. Given its history, Lochner can never be a generic case just as the
Rehnquist memorandum should never be treated as a generic source of
disqualification law principles.
160. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Plessy, of course, is the famous case in which the
Supreme Court refused to apply the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike down a state law providing for segregation of white and
black train passengers. It was formally and functionally overturned by Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492, 494-95 (1954) ("we cannot turn the clock
back . . . to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written."). See . NOWAK &
ROTUNDA, supra note 159, §§ 14.8(c), 14.8(d); STONE, ET AL., supra note 159;
TRIBE, supra note 159, at 117 (describing Plessy as "now infamous" after
rejection in Brown v.Board).
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are not erroneous standing alone.' 6 ' Nonetheless, most law
school graduates would be a little shocked to see Plessy cited
matter-of-factly and without elaboration in a judicial
opinion. Yet federal courts sometimes use the discredited
Rehnquist memorandum in similar fashion.
Fortunately, a few insufficiently researched or
thoughtful judicial opinions are hardly a threat to the
system. The number of errant federal cases, although
disturbingly high, is dwarfed by the number of reported
opinions correctly realizing that the duty to sit no longer
exists as a counterweight against recusal.'62 But to the
161. See, e.g., 163 U.S. at 543 (Fourteenth Amendment forbids state from
"making or enforcing any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States" or depriving persons of due process of law or
equal protection of the laws).
162. See, e.g., King v. United States, 576 F.2d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 1978)
(discussing 1974 amendments to disqualification statute were "passed, among
other reasons, to eliminate the 'duty to sit' concept, which had found expression
in many judicial opinions" including Rehnquist memorandum); Parrish v. Bd. of
Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 103 (5th Cir. 1975); Davis v. Bd. of Sch.
Comm'rs of Mobile County, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Garrudo, 869 F. Supp. 1574, 1577 (S.D. Fla. 1994) ("Congress amended Section
455 approximately fifteen years ago in order to eliminate the 'duty to sit'
doctrine which had previously required a judge to hear a case absent a clear
demonstration of bias or prejudice."); United States v. Moskovits, 866 F. Supp.
178, 182 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citing to Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 871
(1988), to show that 1974 legislation removed duty to sit); In re Fed. Skywalk
Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415, 426 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (noting that duty to sit concept
survives in more benign form of cautioning judges not "to avoid sitting on
difficult or controversial cases"); Smith v. Pepsico, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 524, 526
n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 407
F. Supp. 324, 331 (E.D. Va. 1976) (referring to legislative history of 1974
amendments); Lazofsky v. Sommerset Bus Co. 389 F. Supp. 1041, 1044-45
(E.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. Gorski, 48 M.J. 317, 323 (C.A.A.F. 1997)
(stating that the 1974 legislation eliminated duty to sit but cautioned that
asserted basis for recusal must be reasonable and that statute should not lead to
wholesale disqualification of judges). Gorski also noted that the 1974 legislation
agreed with the aspect of the Rehnquist memorandum that took the view that a
judge's general jurisprudential views were not ordinarily ground for recusal but
that recusal was apt where a judge "had expressed an opinion about the merit or
lack of merit of a specific case." Id. at 319. See also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3544, 590 n.8 (2d ed. 1984). "Consistent with congressional intent concerning §
455, members of the judiciary generally have not disqualified themselves from
cases involving issues of law on which they have expressed an opinion or
participated in the formulation of public policy prior to appointment to the
bench." 48 M.J. at 319. See also United States v. Kincheloe, 14 M.J. 40, 53 n.3
(C.M.A. 1982).
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extent that the continued afterlife of the Rehnquist
memorandum
impacts disqualification
decisions,
it
degrades federal recusal law at the margin even though the
official or true position of federal disqualification law holds
no place for the pernicious version of the duty to sit and will
not invoke it to resist recusal in cases of significant question
regarding judicial impartiality.
Apart from deleterious impact on recusal law, the
continued occasional unexamined citation of the Rehnquist
memorandum reflects poorly on the craft of the judiciary.
The vestige of the Rehnquist memorandum in federal
caselaw at a minimum stands as an example of sloppy,
uninformed opinion writing. This may suggest a broader
problem of the manner in which courts work. Some federal
judges are perhaps letting too much of their prose be
drafted by law clerks who may easily find the Rehnquist
memorandum in electronic databases but have no
appreciation of its role in American judicial history.'63 The
typical law clerk is between twenty-five and thirty years
old. Not only was he or she not alive at the time of Laird v.
Tatum, but he or she was almost certainly too young to have
any recollection over the role Justice Rehnquist's actions
played in almost denying him the position of Chief Justice.
The potential ignorance of youth (like its counterpart,
the undue traditionalism of age) is understandable. More
disturbing is that these law clerks as law students never
learned (or at least did not remember) le affaire de
Rehnquist/Laird v. Tatum. The episode is respectably
chronicled in few of the leading professional responsibility

163. Ironically, Justice Rehnquist himself expressed concern that law clerks
working for the Supreme Court would, through their ideological inclinations,
have an impact on the Court's jurisprudence. See Adam Liptak, Influence on the
Supreme Court Bench Could Be an Inside Job, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2008, at A20.
See also infra note 282 and accompanying text (noting current Supreme Court
practice, with approval of Chief Justice Rehnquist during his time on the Court,
of ceding law clerks substantial power over certiorari decisions due to the "cert
pool" in which a single law clerk drafts memoranda on merits of cert petitions to
be voted upon by the Justices). My concern is not that lower court law clerks
have any particular ideological agenda regarding disqualification but rather are
relatively ignorant about the evolution of modern recusal standards and the
important role played by Laird v. Tatum and reaction to the Rehnquist
memorandum.
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casebooks'" and, like the duty to sit generally, completely
ignored in most.165
Judicial ethics is generally a poor stepchild in most
professional responsibility casebooks which are, to perhaps
state the obvious and be fair to the authors, focused on
lawyer conduct rather than judge conduct. Nonetheless, the
treatment of judicial disqualification in the major casebooks
is very light, often involving no presentation of an edited
"main case" but proceeding only through relatively brief
164. See, e.g.,

GILLERS, REGULATION,

supra note 28, at 517-18 (discussing

duty to sit and Rehnquist role in Laird v. Tatum in particular). For further
discussion of duty to sit and criticism of the Rehnquist role in Laird v. Tatum,
see id. at 523 (citing FLAMM, supra note 2; Ifill, supra note 28, at 606; Leubsdorf,
supra note 12; Rehnquist, supra note 53). See also JAMES R. DEVINE ET AL.,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

399-400 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing Rehnquist

memorandum and Tatum but treating error of failure to recuse as open question
and failing to discuss duty to sit); WILLIAM H. FORTUNE ET AL., MODERN
LITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HANDBOOK 339 n.3 (2d ed. 2000)
(referring briefly to Laird v. Tatum, but only for its interpretation that §§ 455(a)
and (b) are not "materially different" with no mention of duty to sit or Rehnquist
Memorandum); ANDREW L. KAUFMAN & DAVID B. WILKINS, PROBLEMS IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CHANGING PROFESSION 742 (4th ed. 2002)

(mentioning Rehnquist memorandum briefly and Laird v. Tatum but referring
to Second Edition for more in-depth excerpts and criticism of memorandum).
165. See, e.g., ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. & TERESA COLLETT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 309-332 (2d ed. 2003) (failing to address
judicial disqualification, judicial conduct, or duty to sit); NATHAN M. CRYSTAL,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION 590-

603 (4th ed. 2008) (making no mention of duty to sit, Laird v. Tatum, or
Rehnquist memorandum); PAUL T. HAYDEN, ETHICAL LAWYERING: LEGAL AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 532-54 (2003) (failing to
mention duty to sit, Laird v. Tatum, or Rehnquist memorandum); GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING (3d ed. 1999) (same);
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION (3d ed. 1994); LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G.
SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 395-97 (2005) (same);
THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (9th
ed. 2006) (same); JOHN T. NOONAN, JR. & RICHARD W. PAINTER, PROFESSIONAL
AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER 717-37 (2d ed. 2001) (same);
MAYNARD E. PIRSIG & KENNETH F. KIRWIN, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: CASES
AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 1984); DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS
(5th ed. 2009) (same); DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS (2d ed.

1995) (same); MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS (7th ed.
2005) (same); ROY D. SIMON ET AL., LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (4th ed.

2009) (same); ROY D. SIMON, JR. & MURRAY L. SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (3d ed. 1994) (same); JOHN F. SUTTON, JR. & JOHN S.
DZIENKOWSKI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF

LAWYERS 679-700 (2d ed. 2002) (same); RICHARD A. ZITRIN & CAROL M.
LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (2d ed. 2001) (same).
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summary text and problems that require students to apply
statutory law and the ABA Model Code.'66 Almost all the
major casebooks give little or no historical treatment to the
development of disqualification norms and controversial
cases such as Rehnquist's failure to recuse himself in Laird
v. Tatum.'67 Although law clerks might have been expected
to be ambitious enough to Shepardize the Rehnquist
memorandum and see the many law review articles, most
critical, commenting upon it, the clerks can perhaps be
excused on the ground that their law school professors have
not provided much help in this area of the law. 6 '

166. See generally, e.g., CRYSTAL, supra note 165; LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra
note 165; MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 165. The other casebooks cited in the
previous footnote that treat judicial disqualification at all excerpt at least one
main case. But the cases tend to focus on judicial misconduct and discipline of
judges rather than disqualification. My experience and that of most law
teachers is that students, following the lead of their professors, tend to pay most
attention to the highlighted excerpted cases in a coursebook (and problems
assigned for class discussion) while giving considerably less attention to the
explanatory notes, which often contain most of the historical background
contained in a coursebook.
167. In similar fashion, the typical casebook does not discuss, even in
passing, controversies such as Justice Fortas's ties to the Wolfson Foundation or
other past scandals of the bench. See supra note 165.
168. At least not if the content of the casebooks is any guide. Realistically,
law professors in class are unlikely to say much about a topic that is not given
significant attention in the casebook. For example, I use the Gillers casebook,
GILLERS, REGULATION,

supra note 28, which appears among all casebooks to

have the most extensive treatment of the duty to sit and the Rehnquist
memorandum but I seldom take more than a few moments of class time to
discuss this portion of the assigned reading, an oversight that I now know needs
correction.
Similarly, in civil procedure, the other law school course where students
would likely get some exposure to the development and application of standards
for judicial disqualification, the major casebooks give little or no treatment to
the topic. See, e.g., JOHN T. CROSS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, PROBLEMS
AND EXERCISES (2006) (referencing no discussion of judicial disqualification);
DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (4th ed. 2001)
(same); RICHARD D. FREER & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES,
MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS (5th ed. 2008) (same); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (rev. 9th ed. 2008) (same); JOEL WM.
FRIEDMAN ET AL., THE LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 2006) (same); A. LEO
LEVIN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1992) (same);
RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH (2d ed. 1995)
(same); MAURICE ROSENBERG ET AL., ELEMENTS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND

MATERIALS

(5th ed. 1990) (same);

THOMAS

D.

ROWE, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE

(2d ed.

2008) (same); A. BENJAMIN SPENCER, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH (2007) (same); STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE:
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Even more disturbing is that the judges involved in the
opinions continuing to treat the Rehnquist memorandum or
the pernicious duty to sit as good law, who at least
presumably read the drafts created on their behalf by law
clerks, seem not to have much historical understanding of le
affaire de Rehnquist/Laird v. Tatum or the evolution of
judicial recusal standards. Some of this may again be age
related as today a significant number of federal judges are
in their forties or perhaps younger and may be only slightly
more likely than their law clerks to have independent
knowledge of the case or the controversy surrounding the
Rehnquist appointment to the Chief Justice post in 1986.
But it also suggests that judges were as disserved by their
law school instruction in judicial recusal as were their
clerks. Worse yet, the judges seem not to have learned on
the job through press accounts of the Rehnquist/Laird v.
Tatum matter such as the recent New York Times
discussion of the release of Justice Rehnquist's personal
'
papers focusing on Laird v. Tatum. 69
Potentially related to the specter of historical ignorance
or sloppiness of judicial craft is the nature of many of the
cases invoking the Rehnquist memorandum. A significant
number of these are decisions withheld from official case
reporters, meaning that the judge has elected (individually
or as part of an internal policy of chambers) not to submit
DOCTRINE, PRACTICE AND CONTEXT (3d ed. 2008) (same); LARRY L. TEPLY & RALPH
U. WHITTEN, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE: BASIC AND ADVANCED

(1997) (same); (RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: MATERIALS FOR A

BASIC COURSE 147 (8th ed. 2003) (alluding to federal disqualification statute in
one paragraph). But see BARBARA ALLEN BABCOCK & TONI M. MASSARO, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: CASES AND PROBLEMS 320-28 (1997) (addressing disqualification but
without any discussion of duty to sit); ROBERT M. COVER ET AL., PROCEDURE

1239-67 (1988); id. at 1267-76 (excerpting Rehnquist memorandum in Laird v.
Tatum and noting controversy it engendered, reprinting portions of Prof.
Geoffrey Hazard's 1986 letter to the Senate Judiciary Committee that criticized
the Rehnquist decision and analysis); ROGER S. HAYDOCK ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS
OF PRETRIAL LITIGATION § 11.5.2 (7th ed. 2008) (addressing judicial
disqualification but no discussion of duty to sit); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL 1152-

67 (7th ed. 1994) (addressing disqualification but without any discussion of duty
to sit); FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.4 (5th ed. 2001)

(discussing "Recusal of Judge" but not duty to sit, citing articles that address
duty to sit); STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 582-90 (7th ed. 2008)
(addressing judicial recusal, excerpting illustrative case, but not addressing
Laird v. Tatum or duty to sit).
169. See Liptak & Glater, supranote 127.
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the opinion to ThomsonlWest or to another official case
reporter service for publication. In effect, judges self-edit by
deciding whether an opinion is important enough to be
published as an "official" court precedent. Historically, this
means that judges do not treat as publishable opinions
involving minor issues, clear cases, small stakes, or that do
not reflect the court's most serious legal scholarship. This
may explain why naked invocation of the Rehnquist
memorandum and the pernicious duty to sit seems to show
up in unpublished opinions. 7 '
170. Regarding unpublished judicial opinions, see Amy E. Sloan, If You
Can't Beat 'Em, Join 'Em: A PragmaticApproach to Nonprecedential Opinions
in the Federal Appellate Courts, 86 NEB. L. REV. 895, 898 (2008)
("Nonprecedential opinions have become the dominant mode of disposition for
cases resolved on the merits in the federal appellate courts. The numbers vary
somewhat by circuit, but overall 84% of opinions issued by the federal courts of
appeals are nonprecedential.') (tracing history of rule 32.1 in Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure historically limiting counsel's ability to cite unpublished
opinions but that was recently revised to permit citation of appellate opinions
issued after January 1, 2007, regardless of their designation); David C. Vladeck
& Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate over Unpublished
Opinions, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1671 (2005); Richard B. Cappalli, The
Common Law's Case Against Non-PrecedentialOpinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755,
788-92 (2003) (questioning whether cases resolved through non-precedential
opinions truly receive full judicial consideration and arguing that lack of public
accountability likely results in less thorough consideration); Jeffrey 0. Cooper,
Citability and the Nature of Precedent in the Courts of Appeals: A Response to
Dean Robel, 35 IND. L. REV. 423, 428 (2002) (arguing that manipulable
publication decisions create at least appearance of arbitrary judging); Amy E.
Sloan, A Government of Laws and Not Men: Prohibiting Non-Precedential
Opinions by Statute or ProceduralRule, 79 IND. L.J. 711, 732 (2004); Lauren K.
Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and
Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV.
940 (1989) (examining deployment of published and unpublished opinion and
concluding that it presents opportunity for unequal application of law); William
L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-PrecedentialPrecedent-Limited
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978) (criticizing the system of selective publication and
restrictions on citation as creating opportunities for result-oriented decisions
with thin analysis; also perhaps the most prominent scholarly article on this
subject).
As reflected in the citations above, almost all scholarly attention on the
subject has focused on appellate court use of unpublished non-precedential
opinions. However, the same factors encouraging use of unpublished opinions by
the court and making such use problematic exist at the trial court level.
In the modern cyber-world, one can argue that there is no longer such a
thing as an unpublished opinion. See Sloan, supra, at 898 ("Although frequently
referred to as unpublished opinions, nonprecedential opinions are, in fact,
published in any meaningful sense of the word."); id. at 898 n.13 ("[Tloday all
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In similar fashion, a disproportionate number of the
cases invoking the pernicious version of the duty to sit or
citing the Rehnquist memorandum appear to involve
criminal prosecutions in which a defendant is seeking to
disqualify the assigned judge. The disqualification motions
in this sub-genre of cases appear not to be well-taken.
Where the criminal matter is not one of high-dollar, whitecollar crime, the criminal defendant is more likely not to be
represented by top flight counsel devoting great attention to
the case, nor is the government likely to be devoting
substantial resources to research of legal or historical
questions. Further, the government is presumably resisting
most criminal defendant motions for judicial recusal and
has an incentive to refrain from correcting a court's
misplaced reliance on either the Rehnquist memorandum or
the pernicious duty to sit because consideration of either of
these makes it less likely that the court will grant a
defendant's recusal motion. It also simply appears that
current legal opinion runs less favorably toward recusal
efforts by criminal defendants, perhaps out of a view that
most such motions are baseless or that wariness regarding
recusal is required more in the criminal arena out of
efficiency and prompt disposition of
concerns for judicial
1 71
criminal dockets.
[opinions] are published, either in print in West's FederalAppendix... reporter
or electronically on Westlaw, LexisNexis, or on the courts' own websites.").
Nearly all judicial decisions are capable of being retrieved from an electronic
database. Lexis and Westlaw are available to practically every attorney whose
office has electricity, as are court websites. Recognizing this, the federal courts
have recently relaxed or eliminated traditional prohibitions on citation of
"unpublished" opinions in briefs and memoranda. Notwithstanding these
practical limitations on the published/unpublished distinction, courts and
practitioners continue to note the difference between the thorough opinions
often found on the pages of the Federal Reporter or Federal Supplement
Reporter and the usually shorter, less elegant memoranda issued by courts
hurriedly disposing of business. Perhaps disqualification opinions, especially
those thought to lack merit, fall inordinately into this latter category, which
may in turn provide a breeding ground where the Rehnquist memorandum and
the duty to sit can continue to live in spite of the 1974 statutory changes to
federal recusal law.
171. For example, Nevada permits peremptory challenges of trial judges in
civil cases but not in criminal cases; see NEV. S.CT. R. 48.1(2) (2007). In addition,
the federal system has the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, a version of
which is found in most states, requiring that trial begin within a specified time
after arrest or charge. If the deadlines are missed, the criminal defendant may
be released and escape prosecution, creating both legal and political problems
for the state and perhaps making the courts less willing to grant a
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For whatever combination of reasons, there continue to
appear references in federal court cases to a purported duty
to sit or a fawning citation to the Rehnquist memorandum.
These are an embarrassment to the federal judiciary, even
where they do not actually result in misapplication of the
law or erroneous recusal decisions. In at least a few of these
cases, however, it appears that judges improperly enamored
of the duty to sit or the Rehnquist memorandum have
displayed insufficient sensitivity to disqualification issues."'
Worse yet, at the highest level of the federal system-the
Supreme Court-duty to sit thinking continues to be
advanced with perverse pride in cases where the Justices
should realize that advancing the integrity of the Court's
decisions is far more important than whether their children
can practice law in their most preferred setting or whether
a Justice can go duck hunting with a the Vice-President.'73
B. ContinuingPersistenceof the Duty to Sit Concept in the
States
More important than the occasional embarrassments
reflected in federal opinions, however (save for the
occasionally significant failure of a U.S. Supreme Court
Justice to recuse), is that a significant number of state court
opinions have continued to refer to and embrace the duty to
sit, notwithstanding its abolition by the federal courts and
the ABA. Approximately a half-dozen states, most clearly
Nevada, continue to profess allegiance to the pre-1972
pernicious version of the concept as one highly resistant to

disqualification motion that may delay proceedings. See Margaret M.
Vierbuchen, Speedy Trial, 83 GEO. L.J. 981, 995 n.1309 (1995). However, the
time spent deciding a defendant's recusal motion can be construed as defendantinduced delay that prevents dismissal for failure to meet Speedy Trial Act
deadlines. See, e.g., United States v. Mufioz-Franco, 487 F.3d 25, 60-61 (1st Cir.
2008); Martin v. Sec'y, Dept. of Corr., 262 F. App'x. 990, 995 (11th Cir. 2008).
Nonetheless, the pressure to move swiftly in criminal matters and avoid release
of a potentially dangerous defendant on technical grounds may make courts less
receptive to disqualification in criminal cases.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 152-53 (discussing cases where duty
to sit or Rehnquist memorandum have been invoked to deny meritorious
disqualification motions).
173. See infra notes 229-42 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Supreme
Court's continued insensitivity regarding disqualification and in particular
Justice Scalia's now-infamous hunting party with Vice-President Cheney).
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judicial recusal.'74 State law regarding recusal is not, of
course, controlled by the 1974 amendments to 28 U.S.C. §
455. But state law should be equivalent regarding recusal if
the state has adopted the 1972 ABA Judicial Code (or a
later version). Consequently, these states would appear to
continue to be applying a variety of outmoded and
discredited disqualification law and using it to the
disadvantage of litigants.
As discussed below, an even larger number of states,
perhaps as many as twenty, remain divided or unclear
regarding the continuing existence of a duty to sit doctrine 75'
even though the overwhelming adoption of 1972 ABA Code
Canon 3C (which was part of the impetus for the 1974
federal legislation) or its successor 1990 Code Canon 3E by
the states logically should mean that the duty to sit doctrine
has been repealed or defanged in these states.'76
The ABA Code change alone, of course, could not erase
the duty to sit unless individual states adopted it and
interpreted it as eliminating the duty to sit doctrine. In
some states as well as in the federal courts, statutory
change was also required to the extent that duty to sit
precedent had been based on an interpretation of a
disqualification statute. But whatever the individual state
technicalities of revising their respective state judicial
codes, one would have expected eventual near-uniformity on
the issue. Instead, as discussed below, the duty to sit
doctrine, or at least a large part of the notion of a duty to
sit, continues in many states and in some federal court

174. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Ex parte Hill,
508 So. 2d 269, 271-72 (Ala. 1987) (reversing trial judge's decision to recuse self
due to friendship with litigants); Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Eighth
Judicial Dist. Ct., 5 P.3d 1059, 1063 (Nev. 2000) (reversing trial court judge's
decision to recuse on basis of receiving campaign contributions from litigants
and ordering him to preside over case). Nevada is particularly unusual in that
its commentary to Canon 3C regarding disqualification expressly endorses the
duty to sit and cites Ham v. District Court, 566 P.2d 420, 424 (Nev. 1977), the
state's initial lead case endorsing the concept after Laird v. Tatum and the 1974
amendment to federal law. See NEv. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3E (2006).
175. See infra notes 190-216 and accompanying text.
176. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8 (discussing the division of the
states and making rough categorization of states' rules).
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decisions that seem not to appreciate the historical
significance of the 1974 legislation."'
Even commentary affiliated with the ABA appears to
understate the degree to which the organization's own Code
had turned away from the duty to sit, a fact that should
have been apparent after the 1974 amendments to the
federal law of disqualification, which was intended to move
in lockstep with the ABA standards and recusal practice in
the states. For example, the annotations to the 1990
Judicial Code treat the duty to sit as continuing to prevail,
giving the concept a bold-faced heading in the annotation
and citing Justice Rehnquist's Laird v. Tatum opinion as if
it were just another case. 78
To be fair to the annotators of the 1990 Judicial Code,
the commentary read as a whole appears to recognize that
when recusal is required, the duty to sit concept does not
negate the duty to disqualify upon a proper showing of bias,
reasonable question regarding impartiality, or prohibited
financial or family ties to litigants or counsel. Similarly, the
ABA commentary does not suggest that duty to sit notions
be used to resolve close cases against recusal. One might
therefore only criticize the ABA authors for merely being
unclear about whether they were speaking of the benign
version of the duty or its pernicious evil twin. Just the
same, it is at least a little shocking to see the Rehnquist's
memorandum quoted as unquestioned authority when
Congress regarded it as so deficient as to require a change
in federal disqualification law.

177. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8; Bassett, supra note 2, at 1243 n.146
("Although the 1974 amendments eliminated the 'duty to sit' doctrine . . . the
cases suggest that some judges effectively have retained this doctrine in
resolving recusal and disqualification matters involving suggestions of bias or
prejudice."); Obert v. Republic W. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 138, 144-45 (1st Cir. 2005)
(noting varying attitudes of judges, with some still stressing duty to sit as
ground for resisting recusal in close cases).
178. See ABA ANNOTATED, supra note 31, at 87 ('Though a judge has a duty
to not sit where disqualified, a judge has an equally strong duty not to recuse
himself when the circumstances do not require recusal.") (citing Laird v. Tatum,
409 U.S. 824 (1972)); id. ('CThough a judge has a duty to recuse when required by
Canon 3E, a judge has an equally strong duty not to recuse when the
circumstances do not require recusal. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (a
judge 'has a duty to sit where not disqualified which is equally as strong as the
duty to not sit where disqualified.)." (citations omitted)).
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In addition, the ABA annotators cite cases continuing to
embrace the common law duty to sit as though this were
uncontroversial while giving only attention rather than
endorsement to the better modern view that close questions
should be resolved in favor of disqualification, a fact that
makes it impossible for any supposed duty to sit to carry
weight equal to the duty of impartiality. For example, the
ABA Commentary to Canon 3(E)(1) gives only passing
treatment to Professor Leslie Abramson's sensible
assessment:
See also, Leslie W. Abramson, Appearance of Impropriety:
Deciding When a Judge's Impartiality "Might Reasonably Be
Questioned," 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 55, 62 fn. 37
(2000)(asserting that the Code of Judicial Conduct's rules for
disqualification suggest that the appearance of partiality
outweighs the duty of a judge to sit and decide a particular case).
Some courts have held that on close questions, "the balance tips in
favor of recusal." See In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d 164
(1st Cir. 2001); Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995).179

Professor Abramson's assessment is the majority view
among scholars, federal courts, and most state courts, not
merely a view of recusal offered as an alternative to an
equally valid approach resistant to recusal. Yet as late as
2004, ABA publications could be read by those without
background in the issue as continuing to treat the
pernicious duty to sit concept as viable. It perhaps should
then be no surprise that many states continue to cling to the
doctrine, at least rhetorically. The Abramson assessment
should be the centerpiece of the ABA's discussion of
disqualification rather than a "see also" cite on the
periphery of discussion. Yet the duty to sit and the
Rehnquist memorandum continue to be cited as if they had
not been the subjects of controvery thirty-five years ago.
The episode calls to mind the famous aphorism that the
English common law forms of action have been "buried" but
"rule us from the grave."' 0 In similar fashion, the pre-1970s

179. See ABA ANNOTATED, supra note 31, at 188 (italics in original).
180. See generally F.W. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 2
(1965).
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traditional attitude toward the duty to sit seems to continue
rising from its presumptive coffin.'
Legal scholarship requires some humility. During the
course of a five-hundred-page book, mistakes or poor choices
of emphasis are often made, just as there are likely to be
such errors in this 150-page Article. But the Annotated
Judicial Code's preference for treating recusal in close cases
as a minority view subordinate to the power of the duty to
sit concept seems inexplicable. By 2004, the date of the ABA
Annotated Code from which the above quotation is taken,
the clearly established better view was that neither the
1972 nor 1990 ABA Codes retained the common law duty to
sit concept as a brake against disqualification and it was
clear beyond doubt that the duty to sit had been abolished
under the federal judicial code. Similarly, it should also
have been clear to the annotation authors that Justice
Rehnquist's participation and memorandum in Laird v.
Tatum had attracted substantial criticism and nearly
derailed his quest for the Chief Justice position. As of 2004,
the Annotation's deferential view of the duty to sit was at
least inappropriate and in my view clearly wrong. Even
defenders of the benign duty to sit as part of a general
responsibility to hear and decide cases could not credibly
maintain that this concept was of equal importance to the
requirement that judges recuse themselves if an adequate
showing of recusal had been made pursuant to Canon 3A.
Ironically, one state court decision mentioning the duty
to sit with seeming approval is the now-notorious and
perhaps soon infamous matter of Caperton v. A. T. Massey
Coal Company, Inc., 1"2 a case related to Caperton v. A.T.

181. More benignly, one could see the continued persistence of duty to sit
rhetoric and use of the Rehnquist memorandum as merely the carryover of
linguistic bad habits similar to the continued use of the term "cause of action"
when under federal pleading law one should be talking only of a "claim for
relief." Similarly, one continued to hear of motions for "directed verdict" or
"j.n.o.v." instead of the modern term "judgment as a matter of law." Just as
some states have retained those civil procedure terms rather than adopting the
federal nomenclature, states may willingly choose to continue to adhere to pre1970s notions of the duty to sit. But where a state has adopted a recent version
of the ABA Judicial Code, one would have expected that the state was also
eliminating the pernicious version of the duty to sit and that the Rehnquist
memorandum would not be cited in disqualification decisions.
182. No. 33350, 2008 WL 918444 (W. Va. Apr. 3, 2008).
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Massey Coal Co.,'83 which the U.S. Supreme Court has
agreed to review and where the ABA has submitted an
amicus brief attacking the decision of a West Virginia
Supreme Court Justice to sit on a case (and provide the
deciding vote) in spite of having received three million
dollars in campaign contributions (more than sixty percent
of his electoral war chest) from the CEO of Massey or
entities affiliated with him.' Among other things, the
Caperton v. Massey litigation illustrates the degree to which
the duty to sit doctrine and nomenclature makes
disqualification
jurisprudence
unnecessarily
more
complicated and uncertain.
The ABA Model Code or commentary, of course, could
neither erase nor enshrine the duty to sit unless individual
states adopted it and interpreted it as eliminating the duty
to sit doctrine. In some states and in the federal courts,
statutory change was also required to the extent that duty
to sit precedent had been based on an interpretation of a
disqualification statute. Also, if the case for disqualification
is not close, the duty to sit concept endures in a more benign
form in that a judge is of course required to do his or her
duty and hear and decide cases unless there is at least a
colorable ground for disqualification.'85 Consequently, not
every state court's dicta regarding a "duty to sit" indicates

183. No. 33350, 2007 WL 4150960 (W. Va. Nov. 21, 2007).
184. See 2008 WL 918444 at *38 ("West Virginia's judicial officers have a
duty to hear such matters as are assigned to them, except those in which
disqualification is required. This 'duty to sit' is not optional." (quoting U.S. v.
Mitchell, 377 F. Supp 1312, 1325-26 (D.C. Cir. 1974), a case decided prior to the
statutory abolition of the duty to sit in the federal judicial code and Canon 3B(1)
of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct, which reads exactly like the 1990
ABA Model Code, which does not embrace the duty to sit). See also Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 2008 WL 918444 (Benjamin, C.J., concurring)
(attempting to defend participation in the case despite being target of
complaints about his financial and political ties to defendant CEO); John
Gibeaut, Caperton's Coal: The Battle over an AppalachianMine Exposes a Nasty
Vein in Bench Politics, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2009, at 52 (summarizing case
background); id. at 53 ("[Tlhere are remnants of British legal thought [resistant
to recusal] .... For one, a duty to sit arose so cases in small jurisdictions won't
go wanting for resolution in the absence of an unquestionably evenhanded
jurist. The obligation to hear cases can become especially nettlesome for
intermediate appeals courts and courts of last resort, where the pool of
replacement judges is considerably smaller than at the trial level.").
185. See United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42, 46 n.1 (1st Cir.
2000).

888

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

that the court continues to embrace the now-discredited
version of the concept as unduly resisting recusal.
While the majority of federal courts reject the
traditional pernicious duty to sit concept and note its 1974
abolition,'86 state courts have been less clear on the point,
although it appears the majority of states have precedent
consistent with federal law.' 87 On the other end of the
spectrum, the leading treatise on judicial disqualification
identifies as many as eight states (Alaska, Arkansas,
Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Texas, and
Wyoming) as continuing to be
firmly in accord with the rule that a judge has a duty to sit in
cases in which mandatory grounds for disqualification have not
been established. In these jurisdictions, a judge may only
disqualify himself where there is a compelling reason for doing so....
In fact, it is sometimes considered improper for a judge to
disqualify himself unless he knows the alleged cause of
disqualification to exist, or it is shown to be true in fact-no
matter how
much he would personally like to remove himself from
188
the case.

186. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8. See, also e.g., United States v. Amico,
486 F.3d 764, 775 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Cerceda, 139 F.3d 847,
852 (lith Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 172 F.3d 806 (11th. Cir. 1999) (en
banc); United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 286-87 (4th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Werner, 916 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1990); Barksdale v. Emerick, 853
F.2d 1359, 1360 (6th Cir. 1988); Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d 116, 119 (5th
Cir. 1982); Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1107 (5th Cir.
1980); Fredonia Broad. Corp. v. RCA Corp., 569 F.2d 251, 256-57 (5th Cir. 1978);
Rice v. McKenzie, 581 F.2d 1114, 1115-16 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Pepper & Potter, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 123, 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Wolfson, 453
F. Supp. 1087, 1092 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Bradley v. Milliken, 426 F. Supp. 929, 933
(E.D. Mich. 1977).
187. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8, at 610-12 (discussing the division of
the states and making rough categorization).
188. Id. at 610-11 (footnotes omitted). City of Las Vegas Downtown
Redevelopment Agency v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 5 P.3d 1059 (Nev.
2000), is quite consistent with Flamm's description of the remaining hard-core
duty to sit cases. In that case, the trial judge, although not being persuaded that
he was actually prejudiced by campaign contributions, recused himself in order
to avoid what he regarded as potential reasonable concern over his impartiality.
Id. at 1061. The Supreme Court reversed and required his continued
participation in the case absent a clearer, more compelling ground for
disqualification. Id. at 1062-63.
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One state, Nevada, has not only continued to endorse the
duty to sit but also has specifically approved it in
commentary to the Judicial Code. 89
According to Flamm's disqualification treatise, which
lists considerable but not exhaustive state-specific
information, the duty to sit, although alive and well in some
states, is a minority rule. Additional state-by-state
examination reflects the following divergence among the
states regarding the duty to sit inhibition of recusal. As of
the close of 2008:
a) One state (Nevada) specifically speaks to the
duty to sit and endorses the doctrine in state
commentary to Canon 3E regarding disqualification;
b) A half-dozen states (Alabama; Arkansas;
Mississippi; Nevada; South Carolina) still seem to
clearly embrace the duty to sit doctrine. 9 °
c) Although nearly twenty states are unclear
about the status of the duty to sit, at least twenty
appear to have rejected it and another eight have
probably buried the doctrine, at least implicitly or
sub silentio.
A rough current scorecard of the status of the duty to sit
in the states suggests the following characterization of
status of the duty to sit.

189. See NEV. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3 cmt. 3E(1).
190. There is some divergence between my interpretation of the case law
and Flamm's. For example, Flamm lists Alaska as a hard-core duty to sit state.
However, the case cited by Flamm for this proposition, in addition to being an
intermediate appellate case, simply states that a judge should sit on a case
"when there is no valid ground for disqualification," an admonition that stops
short of counseling judges to resolve doubts in favor of remaining on a case. See
Keller v. State, 84 P.3d 1010, 1012 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). In my view, Alaska's
version of the duty to sit is simply the benign version of the concept that
counsels judges not to avoid difficult or politically charged cases. See Marla N.
Greenstein, Judicial Disqualification in Alaska Courts, 17 ALASKA L. REV. 53
(2000) (explaining Executive Director of Alaska Commission on Judicial
Conduct's reasoning for the State's recusal policy, including availability of
peremptory challenges, and suggests that the duty to sit concept in Alaska does
not require case for disqualification based on cause to be beyond debate to
require recusal); see also FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8, at 611-12 (noting that
even in states where duty to sit is still good law, the concept is not applied
where state permits peremptory challenge to initially assigned judge).
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1) No Duty to Sit or Abolition of the Duty to Sit
District of Columbia;' 9' Georgia; 92 Iowa; Kansas;'93
Maine; Massachusetts; Michigan;' 94 Minnesota; Missouri; 95
Montana; Nebraska; New Jersey; North Carolina; Ohio;
Oregon; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island; South Dakota;
Tennessee; Virginia.
2) Most Likely No Duty to Sit or Abolition of Duty to Sit
Arizona"96 Florida;' 97 Hawaii;' 98 Idaho; Illinois; New
Hampshire;199 New York; Washington; Wisconsin
191. In surveying the states, I have assumed (as, apparently, has FLAMM,
supra note 2, § 20.8), that where a state has adopted the current version of the
ABA Judicial Code and there is no recent case law discussing the duty to sit
concept that the state adheres to the broad ABA and federal court position that
the duty to sit has been eliminated, at least in its pernicious version counseling
against recusal absent compelling circumstances. The District of Columbia is
such a jurisdiction, as is Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Virginia.
192. I am at some variance with Flamm regarding classification of Georgia.
Flamm cites Patterson v. Butler, 371 S.E.2d 268, 269 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988), as
authority for his view that Georgia is a duty to sit state. FLAMM, supra note 2, §
20.8, at 610 n.46. Upon reading, I did not view this case as endorsing the duty to
sit and found no modern Georgia cases endorsing the duty to sit.
193. See, e.g., State v. Logan, 678 P.2d 181, 185 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984)
(Abbott, J., concurring) (noting with favor congressional abolition of duty to sit
in 1974 legislation).
194. See Grievance Adm'r v. Fieger, 729 N.W.2d 451 (Mich. 2006) ("Neither
the Michigan Constitution nor the Michigan Court Rules impose a 'duty to
sit."'). But see Adair v. State, 709 N.W.2d 567, 579 (Mich. 2006) ("jW]here
standards governing disqualification have not been met, disqualification is not
optional; rather, it is prohibited (quoting In re Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 201 (2d

Cir. 2001)).
195. Missouri is another state where my construction of the caselaw is at
variance with Flamm's. Flamm cites In re B.R.M., 111 S.W.3d 460, 462 (Mo.
App. 2003), as making it a duty to sit state, but the case merely states that a
"trial judge has an affirmative duty not to disqualify himself from hearing a case
unnecessarily." See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8, at 611 n.49. This language can
be reasonably interpreted as simply stating the general rule and benign version
of the duty to sit positing only that judges should do their jobs in the absence of
a colorable recusal claim.
196. Arizona has old caselaw supporting the duty to sit, permitting a judge
to preside in a case in which involving a bank to which he was indebted, a result
clearly out of sync with modern attitudes about judicial propriety. See Conkling
v. Crosby, 239 P. 506, 511-12 (Ariz. 1925). Because Conkling v. Crosby seems so
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3) Perhapsa Duty to Sit or Continued Vitality of Old Duty to
Sit Cases
Alaska200
Delaware;2

California: 20 1
Indiana;, °

Colorado; 20 2
Kentucky;2 6

Connecticut; 20 3
Louisiana; °7

outdated and no recent duty to sit caselaw exists in Arizona, which has adopted
the ABA Model Code, it is probably safe to say that Arizona would not apply the
pernicious version of the duty to sit concept to resist recusal if the case for
disqualification were at least a close one. However, Conkling v. Crosby has not
been overruled.
197. See, e.g., Dep't of Revenue v. Golder, 322 So. 2d 1, 1, 2, 6 (Fla. 1975)
("As between the two policies, I have little difficulty making the choice so long as
the apparent predisposition is based solely on my prior analysis of the law for
purposes unconnected with this particular lawsuit, the parties or their
counsel.") (noting benign version of duty to sit but also notes requirement of
impartial judiciary and importance of public confidence in courts). In essence,
Golder appears to adopt the soundest portion of the Rehnquist memorandum,
which espouses the view that a judge's general jurisprudential views are not
cause for recusal, but rejects the Rehnquist memorandum's endorsement of a
duty to sit as a counterweight to recusal. Id.
198. Hawaii cases mentioning the duty to sit are older and appear only to
embrace the benign version of the duty counseling courts not to avoid difficult or
controversial cases. See, e.g., EWA Plantation Co. v. Holt, 18 Haw. 509, 510
(1907); Notley v. Brown, 17 Haw. 393, 394 (1906).
199. New Hampshire has no recent duty to sit precedent, but the rule of
necessity is discussed in a manner suggesting that New Hampshire follows the
Federal and ABA Model Code approach. See, e.g., Lorenz v. N.H. Admin. Office,
858 A.2d 546 (N.H. 2004).
200. See generally Greenstein, supra note 190 (describing disqualification in
Alaska courts).
201. California Civil Code 170 states that a "judge has a duty to decide any
proceeding in which he or she is not disqualified." At first blush, this looks like a
codification of the traditional pernicious duty to sit set forth in the Rehnquist
memorandum. However, subsequent caselaw suggests that the statute is merely
codifying the benign view that judges should not recuse themselves without at
least a reasonable basis for disqualification. See Morrow v. Superior Court, No.
A113535, 2007 WL 241778 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2007) (by longstanding
precedent, judge's indirect financial links to subject matter of dispute do not
present reasonable basis for disqualification); United Farm Workers v. Superior
Court, 216 Cal. Rptr. 4, 8-9 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) ("Section 170, which introduces
the disqualification statues, is a new section expressing the proposition ... that

'[a] judge has a duty to decide any proceeding in which he or she is not
disqualified.' The legislative history shows this section was prompted by
statements suggesting that certain judges did not believe they had such a
duty.") (alteration in original); see also infra pp. 72 74 (discussing perceived
tendency of Nevada trial judges to avoid politically sensitive cases as impetus
for Nevada Supreme Court's embrace of duty to sit doctrine). But see Olson v.
Cory, 184 Cal. Rptr. 325, 334 (1982) (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (claiming federal courts
to have unanimously embraced duty to sit and failing to note its abolition in

892

BUFFALO LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 57

1972 ABA Code and 1974 federal legislation). But read as a whole, Olson v. Cory
was a rule of necessity case rather than a specific disqualification case.
Consequently, the duty to sit language really is mere dicta unnecessary to the
decision.
202. Colorado's judicial code follows the 1990 ABA Model Code language but
recent caselaw favorably mentions the duty to sit. See, e.g., People v. Thoro
Prods., 45 P.3d 737, 747 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). In context, however, these cases
appear to be embracing only the benign version of the duty to sit concept. For
example, People v. Thoro Products involved a defendant who felt the presiding
judge was biased due to the judge's earlier admonishment of defense counsel.
This admonishment was related to defense counsel's prior representation of a
former client of the judge's in a malpractice action against the judge. The Thoro
Products defendant had been informed of this prior to retaining counsel in
question.
203. Connecticut has adopted the 1990 ABA Model Code but recent caselaw
endorses the duty to sit and cites the Rehnquist memorandum. See, e.g.,
Jordaan v. Wayland, No. CV065004384, 2008 WL 544619, at *2 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Jan. 1, 2008) (quoting earlier state case favorably citing section of Rehnquist
memorandum commenting favorably on pernicious version of duty to sit); State
v. Fuller, No. CR1022619, 1996 WL 218207, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 8,
1996) (citing Rehnquist memorandum favorably regarding duty to sit). However,
the Flamm treatise, supra note 2, § 20.8, at 610-11 does not classify Connecticut
as a duty to sit state and cites no Connecticut precedent on the issue.
204. The Flamm treatise does not characterize Delaware as a duty to sit
state but it has recent precedent aggressively endorsing at least the benign
version of the duty. See, e.g., State v. Charbonneau, No. 0207003810, 2006 WL
2588151, at *23 ()el. Super. Ct. Sept. 8, 2006) ('The Supreme Court also has
noted that there is a compelling policy reason for a judge not to disqualify
himself or herself unnecessarily, and in the absence of genuine bias, a litigant
should not be permitted to 'judge shop.' In that regard it is also recognized that
judges who too lightly recuse shirk their official responsibilities, imposing
unreasonable demands on their colleagues to do their work and [making for] the
untimely processing of cases.").
205. Indiana is not classed as a duty to sit state by the Flamm treatise and
recent precedent appears to take the mainstream approach of combining a
benign version of the duty to sit that does not unduly resist recusal. See, e.g.,
Peterson v. Borst, 784 N.E.2d 934, 935 (Ind. 2003) ("A judge has a 'duty to sit'
under Canon 3(b) (1) and not to recuse 'unless disqualification is required."').
Reasonable minds may differ as to whether "required" means that a clear and
compelling case for disqualification must be made or whether "required" simply
means that a reasonable and meritorious case for disqualification has been
made. Hence, Indiana, like most states, is probably not a duty to sit jurisdiction
as the term was used in the Rehnquist memorandum. But one cannot be sure
that the pre-1970s version of the duty to sit will not in the future be used in
Indiana or similar states to resist disqualification.
206. See, e.g., Dean v. Bondurant, 193 S.W.3d 744, 749 (Ky. 2006) (quoting
City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 5
P.3d 1059, 1062 (Nev. 2000), a prominent duty to sit case from a strong duty to
sit jurisdiction). The Flamm treatise, however, does not treat Kentucky as a
duty to sit state. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8, at 610-11; see also
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21 1
21 0
Maryland°.; New Mexico;" 9 North Dakota; Oklahoma;
Texas 212; Utah;213 Vermont; 214 West Virginia; 21 5 Wyoming2 6

Commonwealth v. Smith, 875 S.W.2d 873, 879 (Ky. 1946) (setting forth benign
version of duty to sit doctrine prior to abolition of pernicious version of doctrine
at federal level).
207. See, e.g., State v. Connolly, 930 So. 2d 951 (La. 2006) (finding that a
judge has discretion to recuse for any reason regarded as sufficient but reason
must be reasonable). The Flamm treatise classifies Louisiana as a duty to sit
state but this in my view reads too much into State v. Connolly. See also
Bergeron v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 402 So. 2d 184, 186 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (denying
recusal when asserted grounds did not fit any listed in Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure Article 151, which provides exclusive listing of grounds for
disqualification); State v. Doucet, 5 So. 2d 894, 898 (La. 1914) (discussing
traditional duty to sit as requirement not to avoid difficult cases)
208. Maryland is another state where Flamm and I diverge. See FLAMM,
supra note, § 20.8, at 610-11 (citing In re Turney, 533 A.2d 916, 920 (Md. 1987))
for his view that Maryland is a strong duty to sit state. But Turney states only
that the duty to sit where not disqualified is equal to the duty to recuse when
required, which stops short of creating a presumption against disqualification
and there placing Maryland in the category of states leaning toward a duty to
sit but not overtly embracing it.
In Thrney, a judge refused to disqualify himself in a case in which the
defendant potentially would expose the judge's son as the purveyor of a fake
driver's license involved in the case. The judge's refusal to recuse was reversed
and the judge censured. See also Corapcioglu v. Roosevelt, 907 A.2d 885, 904
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (endorsing duty to sit in what appears to be its benign
form as admonition not to recuse unnecessarily); Jefferson-El v. State, 622 A.2d
737, 742-43 (Md. 1993) (same); Surratt v. Prince George's County, 578 A.2d 745,
758 (Md. 1990) (requiring recusal motion to be heard by different judge where
motion involved sensitive personal allegations that judge allegedly made
romantic overtures to counsel).
209. Flamm does not list New Mexico as a duty to sit state, but there are
several recent cases that can be read as adopting the duty to sit concept as it
existed prior to the 1972 ABA Code and changes to federal law. See State v.
Hernandez, 846 P.2d 312, 326 (N.M. 1993) (stating that duty to sit is of equal
strength to duty to step aside where disqualified); Gerety v. Demers, 589 P.2d
180, 184 (N.M. 1978) (same); State v. Salazar, 612 P.2d 1341, 1343 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1980) (same).
210. Flamm does not list North Dakota as a duty to sit state and its most
recent precedent, although approving the concept, appears to be speaking of the
benign version of the duty as a guard against meritless, strategically driven
recusal motions. See State v. Jacobson, 747 N.W.2d 481, 487 (N.D. 2008)
("Canon 3(B)(1) was added to the Code 'to emphasize the judicial duty to sit and
to minimize potential abuse of the disqualification process."').
211. Oklahoma's duty to sit precedents are older. See, e.g., Ex rel. Murray v.
Weems, 29 P.2d 942, 942 (Okla.1934); Edwards v. Carter, 29 P.2d 605, 607
(Okla. 1933). In addition, Oklahoma is not characterized as a duty to sit state by
FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8, at 610-11.
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4) Duty to Sit Clearly Established
Alabama; 17 Arkansas;2 "8 Mississippi;2 "9 Nevada;22 ° South
Carolina 2 1

212. Texas is seen by FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8, at 610-11, as a clear duty
to sit state on the strength of In re KE.M., 89 S.W.3d 814, 819 (Tex. App. 2002)
and we agree it probably but not inevitably is a duty to sit state.
213. Utah, much like North Dakota, has recent caselaw supporting the duty
to sit, but probably only in benign form. See, e.g., Hi-Country Estates
Homeowners Ass'n v. Bagley & Co., 996 P.2d 534, 537 (Utah 2000). FLAMM,
supra note 2, § 20.8, at 610-11, does not regard Utah as a duty to sit state.
214. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 527 A.2d 223, 224 (Vt. 1987) (deeming recusal
apt but citing Rehnquist memorandum with approval).
215. Although FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8, at 610-11, does not treat West
Virginia as a duty to sit state, it is the home of the now-infamous Caperton
decision currently under U.S. Supreme Court review (see supra notes 184-84
and accompanying text) as well as other modern duty to sit precedent. See, e.g.,
Tennant v. Marion Health Care Found., 459 S.E.2d 374, 385 (W. Va. 1995)
(endorsing duty to sit as set forth in Rehnquist memorandum, which is cited).
216. Wyoming is characterized in FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8, as a strong
duty to sit state on the strength of Brown v. State, 816 P.2d 818, 824 (Wyo.
1991). Farman v. State, 841 P.2d 99, 101 (Wyo. 1992), makes the point even
more strongly.
217. See, e.g., Exparte Hill, 508 So. 2d 269, 271-72 (Ala. 1987).
218. See, e.g., Long v. Wal-Mart Stores, 250 S.W.3d 263, 274 (Ark. Ct. App.
2007) (holding judge must sit unless "there is a valid reason to disqualify" and
judge's decision to step aside "will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion'); Bogachoff v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., No. CA 04-1183,
2006 WL 1344072 (Ark. Ct. App. May 17, 2006) (same); Turner v. N.W. Ark.
Neurosurgery Clinic, 210 S.W.3d 126, 134 (2005). However, it can be argued
that Arkansas is not a true duty to sit state as the term is used in this Article
and that the Long and Turner language merely endorses the benign version of
the doctrine in that a "valid" reason for recusal need not be a compelling reason
but only a colorable case for disqualification. Erring on the side of caution,
however, I am treating Arkansas as a duty to sit state.
219. See, e.g., Hathcock v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins., 912 So. 2d 844, 852
(Miss. 2005) ("In the absence of a judge expressing a bias or prejudice toward a
party or proof in the record of such bias or prejudice, a judge should not recuse
himself.") (finding no basis for disqualification where judge represented
defendant for twenty years when in private practice and where judge's son
worked for defendant as claims adjuster; Plaintiff in case was claims adjuster
claiming wrongful discharge; although case seems egregiously wrongly decided,
duty to sit is not mentioned). But see Washington Mut. v. Blackmon, 925 So. 2d
780, 785 (Miss. 2004) ("[T]here must be an equilibrium between [the] need for
impartiality and the need to prevent the frivolous and unnecessary
disqualification of those elected to perform judicial duties.... Where required
by farness and compliance with the standards of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
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C. The Errorof Duty to Sit Thinking and Its Continuing
Impact
The presumption against disqualification created by the
duty to sit doctrine is detrimental to the judicial system in
that it reverses what should be the logical presumption in
favor of disqualification in close cases. Where the decision of
whether to recuse is uncertain or difficult, a ruling in favor
of recusal logically enhances public confidence in the
judiciary. The court is being careful-perhaps more careful
than absolutely necessary-to ensure that no reasonable
person (or critical mass of people claiming to be reasonably
concerned) can assert that the resulting rulings in the case
or the case outcome are the product of bias, prejudice,
partiality, or impropriety. In contrast, to the degree that the
duty to sit prompts a judge to remain presiding when there
are good arguments for disqualification, the lay and legal
communities have valid reason to wonder whether the
outcome of the case turned in any significant part on
favoritism by the judge.
Even where a judge is personally confident that he can
be impartial, substantial social science research confirms
the common sense insight that people regularly
overestimate their ability to be fair and to resist the
influence of extraneous factors.222 Although judges may be
the duty to recuse prevails; but otherwise, the judges have a duty to serve
unless they cannot adjudicate the litigants' claims fairly.").
220. See Millen v. Dist. Court, 148 P.3d 694, 700 (Nev. 2006); Las Vegas
Downtown Redev. Agency v. Dist. Court, 5 P.3d 1059, 1061 (Nev. 2000); see also
discussion of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. case, 940 P.2d 127, infra note 227 and
accompanying text.
221. See Simpson v. Simpson, 660 S.E.2d 274, 278 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008)
(finding that Canon 3(B)(1) imposes a "duty to sit" and citing Millen v. Dist.
Court, 148 P.3d 694 (Nev. 2006), a strong duty to sit precedent from perhaps the
leading duty to sit state). However, FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8, does not list
South Carolina as a duty to sit state.
222. See Note, Disqualificationof a Judge on the Ground of Bias, 41 HARV.
L. REV. 78, 81 (1927) ("The reasons advanced by the courts [resisting recusal],
namely, that he is vindicating the court and not himself and that there is a
sufficient check on his emotions through an appeal or impeachment, seem
entirely inadequate. A biased mind rarely realizes its own imperfection and
would normally prevent that perfect equipoise so desirable in our system of
trial. And even if the trial is conducted with perfect justice the public would still
be apt to grasp at the thought that vindication actuated by a feeling of revenge
has been achieved."). Notwithstanding the excessively flowery prose and now
sexist-sounding vision of the judge as inevitably male, the Harvard Law student
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more innoculated against these subconscious influences or
biases than laypersons, it appears that they, too, are
susceptible.223 This is hardly surprising. Judges are human
beings and humans, even if well-trained to resist, have
shown themselves vulnerable to a number of cognitive
errors and heuristic biases.224 Judges appear resistant, at
times almost defensively so, to the idea that they could be
anything other than perfectly fair and immune to influences
outside the record.225
who penned this note some eighty years ago correctly anticipated the social
science research of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and
reflects the widespread belief that a person accused of insufficient neutrality is
probably the worst person in the world to assess the charge.
223. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 777 (2001) (reporting on study showing judges susceptible to cognitive
illusions and biases); Arthur J. Lurigio et al., UnderstandingJudges' Sentencing
Decisions: Attributions of Responsibility and Story Construction, in
APPLICATIONS OF HEURISTICS AND BIASES TO SOCIAL ISSUES 91 (Linda Heat et al.
eds., 1994); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 595-602 (1998) (discussing hindsight bias and
its impact on judiciary); Rachlinski, supra note 12, at 102 (same).

224. See CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., BEHAVIORAL LAw AND ECONOMICS
(2000); Jerome Frank, Are Judges Human?, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 17 (1931).
225. See, e.g., Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913, (2004)
(Scalia, J., mem.); Rehnquist, supranote 127; Roger J. Miner, JudicialEthics in
the Twenty-First Century: Tracing the Trends, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1107, 1117
(2004) (commenting that author, a Second Circuit Judge, "think[s] that the
suspicion of the laity [regarding questions as to a judge's impartiality] is not as
great as the rulemakers think it is."); Amy J. Shimek, Professional
Responsibility Survey: Recusal, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 903 (1996) (arguing judges
are relatively quick to perceive need to disqualify in cases of financial conflict of
interest but resist recusal for reasons of personal relationships, past practice,
outside activity, group affliation, and other non-financial grounds for recusal);
see also Shimek, supra note 225 (noting that panel of judges commenting on
Lubet & Shaman and Goldschmidt articles appear to find modern
disqualification law insufficiently deferential to judge's own good sense); Panel
Discussion, Disqualificationof Judges (The Sarokin Matter): Is It a Threat to
JudicialIndependence?,58 BROOK. L. REV. 1063 (1993) (judges tend to view both
public and reviewing courts as overly suspicious of trial judges and in particular
are, as the title suggests, concerned that disqualification may happen too easily
simply because a judge forms an opinion during the course of a case and uses
perhaps intemperate language in assessing a situation).
The "Sarokin Matter" involved the disqualification of then federal trial judge
H. Lee Sarokin from continuing to sit in Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d
81 (3d Cir. 1992), a case involving a claim that the cigarette industry has
consciously marketed a dangerous product and deceived consumers. After years
of litigation, Judge Sarokin in an opinion characterized the tobacco industry as
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Although no system can be made perfectly immune to
such influences, erring on the side of disqualification rather
than on the side of continuing to sit provides a greater
margin of safety and, just as important, upholds the
appearance of impartiality and fair justice to the public and
policymakers.226 In return for this benefit, abolition of the
the "kings of concealment." See Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 140 F.R.D. 681,
683 (D. N.J. 1992). Although the language was headline-grabbing and (along
with other factors) ultimately disqualifying, Judge Sarokin's supporters have a
reasonable argument that his opinion of the tobacco defendants was not from an
extrajudicial source and hence should not have prompted disqualification.
226. This was a prime reason Congress in amending 28 U.S.C. § 455 chose to
eliminate the traditional duty to sit concept. See House Report, supra note 29, at
6355 (discussing duty to sit concept, as resistance to recusal, "has been criticized
by legal writers and witnesses at the hearings were unanimously of the opinion
that elimination of this 'duty to sit' would enhance public confidence in the
impartiality of the judicial system.").
The 1972 ABA Model Code, by adding the provision that a judge should step
aside where his or her impartiality could be reasonably questioned, was
implicitly rejecting the duty to sit but unfortunately did not make this explicit
in the Code, Commentary, or Reporter's Notes. However, the discussion in the
Reporter's Notes is completely consistent with this Article's criticisms of the
duty to sit doctrine and illustrates the evils of the doctrine.
The disqualification section [Canon 3C] begins with a general standard
that sets the policy for disqualification-that is, "A judge should
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned." The general standard is followed by a series
of four specific disqualification standards that the Committee
determined to be of sufficient importance to be set forth in detail.
Although the specific standards cover most of the situations in which
the disqualification issue will arise, the general standard should not be
overlooked. Any conduct that would lead a reasonable man knowing all
the circumstances to the conclusion that the judge's "impartiality might
reasonably be questioned" is a basis for the judge's disqualification.
Thus, an impropriety or the appearance of impropriety in violation of
Canon 2 that would reasonably lead one to question the judge's
impartiality in a given proceeding clearly falls within the scope of the
general standard, as does participation by the judge in the proceeding if
he thereby creates the appearance of a lack of impartiality.
See THODE, supra note 133, at 60-61; accord FLAMM, supra note 2, § 20.8; see
also ABRAMSON, supra note 12, at 16-19; ALFINI, ET AL., supra note 2, § 14.05D;
Bassett, supranote 2, at 1227.
Logically, the 1972 Code's new requirement of recusal where judicial
impartiality is subject to reasonable question is inconsistent with the traditional
duty to sit and effectively eliminates the duty to sit as discussed in the
Rehnquist memorandum. A reasonably informed lay observer could harbor
doubts about a judge's impartiality even if the case for recusal is not clear,
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duty to sit carries few costs. Although disqualification
motions may be made for strategic rather than legitimate
reasons, this occurs even where a duty to sit holds sway.
The primary protection against pretextual disqualification
motions is sound application of the law. Although judges
should not be spooked or railroaded into stepping aside, a
policy of disqualification in close cases does not open the
floodgates to meritless motions and undue delay.
The duty to sit had more logic a century ago when the
population of both citizens and judges was smaller and
when communication and travel was more difficult. To
recuse in a close case in 1900 may have imposed significant
burdens on the system. To recuse in 2008, particularly in an
urban area, is merely to allow a judge whose impartiality is
beyond question to hear the case. Even in rural areas,
substitution of judges is not a great burden. Judges from
another region can be assigned to replace a disqualified
judge. Travel and electronic communication can be used to
facilitate judicial substitution as a consequence of recusal.
Although a duty to sit notion retains some allure for
specialized courts or a state supreme court, even these
situations do not support use of a duty to sit doctrine to
permit a judge to continue when there are doubts about
impartiality or to require a judge willing to recuse in such
cases to remain on the case.
compelling, or absolute. Under the 1972 Code (and its successors), the judge in
such a situation should step aside. But under the duty to sit doctrine, this same
judge would be required to ignore the Code and remain on the case unless the
argument for disqualification went beyond creating a reasonable question and
rose to the level of near-absolute assurance that the judge could not be
impartial. Thus, the duty to sit doctrine, if it remained in force, would negate a
substantial measure of the changes in the Model Judicial Code adopted by the
ABA and subsequently the U.S. Congress some thirty-five years ago. In
addition, of course, the duty to sit doctrine would undermine public confidence
in the courts if it resulted in judges staying on a case where reasonable
laypersons were concerned about the judge's ability to be fair.
227. For example, the Nevada Supreme Court noted that the Nevada legal
community was sufficiently small that relations between parties, counsel, and
judges were bound to occur and that requiring recusal in every instance of
negative contact outside the courtroom would be inefficient for the system. See
City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Hecht, 940 P.2d 127, 129 (Nev.
1997) (citing In re Dunleavy, 769 P.2D 1271, 1275 (Nev. 1988)). See ALFINI ET
AL., supra note 2, § 4.05D (discussing Hecht and disqualification generally).
Even if this view were correct in 1997, it has begun to look increasingly
outdated in light of the growth in Nevada population and the size of the bench
(particularly in Las Vegas) during the ensuing years. Even in 1997, of course,
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The very language of the duty to sit concept is
problematic. By speaking of a "duty" to preside, it is implied
that judges who err on the side of disqualification have in
some sense gone AWOL or shirked their duties to the office
or the system. A better view might be that these judges are
in fact acting on a higher plane to ensure that there is no
doubt about their impartiality. To be sure, no one wants
judges avoiding hard or controversial cases or using recusal
as an illegitimate means of reducing caseload. But this goal
is adequately accomplished through the ABA Model Code
language speaking of a "responsibility" to decide cases. One
can even argue that ABA Rule 2.7 is unnecessary in that
judges generally reach the bench as a result of a strong
work ethic and desire to be noticed. Logically, most will
relish the chance to hear and decide cases and have a
natural reluctance to do anything other than work hard at
the judicial task. 22 Judges who fail to fit this profile present
an issue for court administrators and judicial discipline
commissions. The pernicious duty to sit, however, will not
improve their performance.

D. Difficulties of the Duty to Sit Doctrine in Application
1. The U.S. Supreme Court: Still Insensitive After All
These Years. Perhaps the least enlightened bench regarding
judicial disqualification is the U.S. Supreme Court. The
Court was almost born with indefensible attitudes toward
and examples of recusal. The great Chief Justice John
Marshall was a "judge in his own case" when penning the
seminal Marbury v. Madison opinion in that he had been
personally involved in the underlying dispute.229 Equally
iconic Oliver Wendell Holmes committed a similar error
the Hecht view was outmoded in that even Western states like Nevada that are
sparsely populated outside their urban centers have modern roads, modes of
transit, and electronic communications. While one might expect outsiders to
treat Nevada as though parts of the state were still served by stagecoach (recall
the famous New Yorker cartoon with a detailed map of the city that quickly slips
into a vast and open brown patch west of the Hudson River), it is a little
surprising to see a state's own high court promoting such a provincial view of
the state.
228. I have heard local lawyers bemoan the resistance of some judges to
court-ordered or encouraged mediation or other alternative dispute resolution
efforts because (from the lawyers' perspective) of the judges' felt need to retain
control of cases. If these perceptions are correct, trial judges in Nevada hardly
need to be reminded of their work responsibilities.
229. 5 U.S. (Cranch 1) 137 (1803); see supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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when he participated as a Justice in reviewing his work on
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.23 Hugo Black,
hero to many devotees of the First Amendment and the
Seventh Amendment, sat on cases involving the
constitutionality of legislation he authored.3 Abe Fortas
continued to advise President Johnson while sitting in
judgment on challenges to the activities of the Johnson
Administration.232 Then-Justice Rehnquist committed his
infamous faux paus in Laird v. Tatum and in the course of
defending it also defended these and other questionable
instances of Supreme Court Justices refusing to recuse.233
More recently, Justice Antonin Scalia went on his now
equally infamous duck hunting trip with Vice-President
Dick Cheney and was even more combative about defending
his purported honor than was Justice Rehnquist in Laird v.
Tatum. 3 The case in question involved a challenge by the
Sierra Club and others to the alleged participation of
unidentified oil industry representatives in the VicePresident's National Energy Policy Development Group
[hereinafter the Group]. The Group, chaired by Cheney, was
established by President Bush with the charge of
establishing a national energy policy. Plaintiffs were
concerned that an energy policy designed for oilmen by
oilmen235 might give short shrift to environmental concerns
230. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
231. See id. Justice Black was particularly known as a First Amendment
absolutist who took literally the Amendment's command that Congress should
make no law restricting press freedom and generally resisted all censorship
efforts. He was also a strong proponent of the civil jury, where he was successful
in protecting jury trial against encroachment by the equitable powers
exercisable by the bench (See, e.g., Beacon Theatres, Inc., v. Westover, 359 U.S.
500 (1959)) and fought less successfully against expanded use of directed verdict
and judgment as a matter of law.
232. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
233. See Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., mem.) (denying
motion to recuse); supra Part I.C.
234. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.)
(denying motion to recuse). See also infra note 240 and accompanying text.
235. Like his father, President George H.W. Bush, President George W. Bush
had been involved in the oil industry, as had Vice President Cheney as head of
Haliburton Corp. See Benjamin W. Cramer, The Power of Secrecy and the
Secrecy of Power: FACA and the National Energy Policy Development Group, 13
CoMM. L. & POL'Y 183, 187-88 nn.16-17; Christopher Scott Maravilla, That Dog
Don't Hunt: The Twelfth Amendment After Jones v. Bush, 23 PACE L. REV. 213,
223-24 (2002).
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and green technologies. They wanted to know the Group's
sources of information and opinion. Plaintiffs took the
position that the Group was a sufficiently official policymaking arm of government to require transparency and
public records regarding the Group's activities by making
them subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act
Cheney
and
the
Bush
(FACA).
Vice-President
Administration resisted the lawsuit as an undue
infringement upon Executive Branch prerogatives. The trial
court agreed with plaintiffs and ordered disclosure, which
was affirmed by the federal appellate court.2 36 The
Administration
successfully obtained
Court review
reversing the decision, with the participation of Justice
Scalia, in what was in essence a 5-4 majority ruling.237

236. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004). See also In re
Cheney, 334 F.3d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 367 (2004); In re
Cheney, No. 02-5354, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 19407 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2004)
(proceeding before D.C. Circuit en banc after Supreme Court remand) (per
curiam).
The division of votes in Cheney was a bit complicated and did not strictly or
predictably align according to the political party responsible for a Justices'
appointment to the Court, a factor arguably reducing the problematic nature of
Republican-appointed Justice Scalia's participation in a case involving
Republican Vice-President Cheney.
Justice Kennedy (Republican) wrote the primary opinion of the Court, which
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist (Republican) and Justices Stevens
(Republican but considered an ideological and jurisprudential moderate/liberal);
O'Connor (Republican); and Breyer (Democrat), with Justices Scalia
(Republican) and Thomas (Republican) joining as to crucial Parts I-IV of the
decision. 542 U.S. at 372 (listing majority, concurring and dissenting opinions).
Justice Stevens concurred. Id. at 392. However, Justices Thomas and Scalia
dissented in part, arguing for outright reversal of the appeals court opinion
rather than vacation and remand. Id. at 393-95. Justices Ginsburg (Democrat)
and Souter (Republican but considered moderate) dissented. Id. at 396-405.
Without Justice Scalia's participation, the Court would have deadlocked on
the major issue of the case, a fact that provides some support to the argument in
the Laird v. Tatum Rehnquist memorandum that a single Justice's recusal can
have undue impact since it would in Cheney have resulted in affirmance of the
trial court decision by an equally divided Supreme Court. It would hardly be bad
jurisprudence to require greater transparency than found with the Cheney
energy group. Further, the Court or Congress could provide for substitution of a
missing Justice or could instead allow such cases to be decided by the relevant
court of appeals sitting en banc.
237. See Cheney, 542 U.S. 367. The government's petition for certiorari
accepted by the Court framed the issues as:
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The case, like many cases with political overtones, was
controversial in its own right but became moreso when
plaintiff Sierra Club sought Justice Scalia's recusal on the
basis of the Justice's duck-hunting trip with the VicePresident while the case was pending. 8 Justice Scalia
denied the motion in a memorandum. 39 He argued that
while his friendship with Vice-President Cheney would be
grounds for recusal if Cheney had been sued in his personal
capacity, their social connection was of no moment when the
suit involved a suit against Cheney in his official capacity.24 °
(1) Whether [FACA] . . . can be construed . . . to authorize broad
discovery of the process by which the Vice President and other senior
advisors gathered information to advise the President on important
national policy matters, based solely on an unsupported allegation in a
complaint that the advisory group was not constituted as the President
expressly directed and the advisory group itself reported.
(2) Whether the court of appeals had mandamus or appellate
jurisdiction to review the district court's unprecedented discovery
orders in this litigation.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Cheney, 542 U.S. 367 (No. 03-475). The tone of
the questions, slanted with loaded words even as compared to other examples of
certiorari advocacy, suggests that the four or more Justices voting to grant
review were quite receptive to vacating the trial court order. Id. Regarding
FACA and constitutional questions it presents, see Jay S. Bybee, Advising the
President: Separation of Powers and the FederalAdvisory Committee Act, 104
YALE L.J. 51 (1994).
238. As Justice Scalia was quick to point out, plaintiff Judicial Watch, Inc.
did not join the Sierra Club motion and issued a statement that it did not
believe recusal was required. 541 U.S. at 913-14.
239. Id. at 929.
240. Id. at 926 ("If friendship is basis for recusal (as it assuredly is when
friends are sued personally) then activity which suggests close friendship must
be avoided. But if friendship is no basis for recusal (as it is not in officialcapacity suits) social contacts that do no more than evidence that friendship
suggest no impropriety whatever.") (emphasis in original); id. at 920 ("In sum, I
see nothing about this case which takes it out of the category of normal officialaction litigation, where my friendship, or the appearance of my friendship, with
one of the named officers does not require recusal."); id. at 918-19 (rejecting
plaintiff argument that Cheney's reputation is "on the line" in the case).
Justice Scalia's strident statement is at least empirically and psychologically
misleading and in my view wrong. The differences between personal capacity
suits against a party and official capacity suits against a party are differences of
degree and not the type of night-and-day distinctions that would justify a rule
that always requires recusal in one type of case (personal capacity suits) but
never in the other type of case (official capacity suits). If one is socially and
emotionally friendly with a litigant, one wishes for the friend to prevail in
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Depending on one's perspective, Justice Scalia either took
strong issue with the facts asserted by the Sierra Club or
quibbled over them and their likelihood of reflecting an
excessively cozy relationship with a litigant.24 More bluntly
than most, the Scalia memorandum noted that the Justices
act as if they are the law onto themselves regarding matters
of recusal. "Since I do not believe my impartiality can
reasonably be questioned, I do not think it would be proper
for me to recuse. That alone is conclusive." '42 The sentiment
is not much different than Richard Nixon's famous
statement that "[i]f the President does it, it can't be against
' words that continue to retain their shock value
the law,"243
thirty years later" while the legal profession still too
litigation regardless of whether an adverse outcome affects the friend/litigant's
reputation, pocketbook, personal freedom, or political agenda. Although it may
be even harder to be impartial if the friend is a criminal defendant facing a
potential prison term, this hardly means there is no partiality when the litigant
is a government official whose conduct and reputation will be affected by the
case result.
241. Id. at 914-15 (detailing facts, characterizing connection to Cheney as
remote and trip as modest; "In other words, none of us [Justice Scalia, his son,
and his son-in-law] saved a cent by flying on the Vice President's plane."); id. at
923 (contending that both movant and newspapers critical of trip "do not even
have the facts right"). Of course, Justice Scalia glosses over a significant
problem in that because there is no formal discovery concerning the facts of the
trip and its secluded nature makes investigation difficult, observers are highly
dependent on the Justice's own version of the facts, which may be colored by
self-interest.
See also id. at 921 ("I daresay that, at a hypothetical charity auction, much
more would be bid for dinner for two at the White House than for a one-way
flight to Louisiana on the Vice President's jet. Justices accept the former with
regularity. While this matter was pending, Justices and their spouses were
invited (all of them, I believe) to a December 11, 2003, Christmas reception at
the residence of the Vice President-which included an opportunity for a
photograph with the Vice President and Mrs. Cheney. Several of the Justices
attended, and in doing so they were fully in accord with the proprieties.")
(emphasis in original). One might at least question whether the customary
Washington galas mingling the pinnacle of the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of government deserve to be considered immune from
disqualification consideration.
242. Id. at 926-27 (2004). For authority, Justice Scalia cites Chief Justice
Rehnquist's nonrecusal memorandum in United States v. Microsoft, 530 U.S.
1301 (2000), discussed infra notes 283-87 and accompanying text.
243. Archibald Cox, Op-Ed, Watergate: A Dike That Can Leak, N.Y. TIMES,
June 17, 1982, at A27.
244. The statement is perhaps the centerpiece of the play and movie
Frost/Nixon and advertisements for the film frequently highlighted the
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meekly accepts the Justices' decision to be judges of their
own case regarding recusal.
A leading legal ethics authority described the Scalia
memorandum as "both disappointing and disingenuous,"
and an opinion that engaged in "fallacious arguments and
misstates and misapplies the Federal Disqualification
Statute. 2 45 As this commentator observed:
The close and long-standing friendship between Scalia and
Cheney might cause a reasonable person to question Scalia's
impartiality in a case of such importance to Cheney, especially in
a presidential election year in which energy and environmental
issues are being debated.24 6
In addition, a situation that is universally recognized as relevant
to a judge's impartiality is the acceptance of something of value
from a litigant .... 247
Another situation that is universally recognized as relating to a
judge's impartiality is ex parte communications .... 248
[These bases for recusal] are all implicated in Scalia's duckhunting trip with Cheney.

'

9

Other commentators reached similar assessments of the
Scalia memorandum.25 °
The
Scalia
memorandum,
like
its ideological
predecessor, the Rehnquist memorandum in Laird v.
Tatum, is also notable for its defiant attitude. Like the
statement being made by actor Frank Langella in his portrayal of Nixon (in the
slightly revised form of "If the President does it, it's not illegal").
245. Monroe H. Freedman, Duck-Blind Justice: Justice Scalia's
Memorandum in the Cheney Case, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 229, 229, 235 (2004).
246. Id. at 230.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See David Feldman, Note, Duck Hunting, Deliberating, and
Disqualification: Cheney v. U.S. District Court and the Flaws of 28 U.S.C.
§455(A), 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 319 (2006); Timothy J. Goodson, Note, Duck,
Duck, Goose: Hunting for Better Recusal Practicesin the United States Supreme
Court in Light of Cheney v. United States District Court, 84 N.C. L. REV. 181
(2005); Christopher Riffle, Note, Ducking Recusal: Justice Scalia's Refusal to
Recuse Himself from Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004), and the Need for a Unique Recusal Standardfor
Supreme Court Justices, 84 NEB. L. REV. 650, 651 (2005).
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Rehnquist memorandum, the Scalia memorandum is heavy
on historical examples of Justices being excessively cozy
with litigants or interested parties such as Presidents,251 a
history that (notwithstanding Justice Scalia's contentions to
the contrary) no longer reflects modern norms of
impartiality or the law."' Despite considerable empirical
evidence showing that many observers had difficulty with
the duck hunting, Justice Scalia dismissed their concern,
although observing that "8 of the 10 newspapers with the
largest circulation in the United States" and "20 of the 30
largest" had called on him to recuse without "a single
newspaper" favoring his continued participation.253 As
Professor Freedman put it, "Unless we are to believe that
all these editorialists are unreasonable people, the
conclusion is inescapable that a reasonable person might
'
question Scalia's impartiality in the case."254
Extended examination of the Scalia memorandum is
beyond the scope of this Article. What is important and
within the scope of this Article is Justice Scalia's use of the
pernicious version of the duty to sit doctrine to justify his
non-recusal.
Let me respond, at the outset, to Sierra Club's suggestions that I
should "resolve any doubts in favor of recusal." That might be
sound advice if I were sitting on a Court of Appeals. There, my
place would be taken by another judge, and the case would
proceed normally. On the Supreme Court, however, the
consequence is different: The Court proceeds with eight Justices,
raising the possibility that, by reason of a tie vote, it will find
itself unable to resolve the significant legal issue presented by the
case. Thus, as Justices stated in their 1993 Statement of Recusal

251. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913,
916, 924-26 (2004) (Scalia, J., mem.) ("Many Justices have reached this Court
precisely because they were friends of the incumbent President or other senior
officials-and from the earliest days down to modern times Justices have had
close personal relationships with the President and other officers of the
Executive.').
252. Freedman, supra note 245, at 234 (noting that "the law relating to
disqualification has undergone what Scalia himself has called 'massive
changes."' (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 546 (1994)) (emphasis
omitted).
253. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 923 (quoting Sierra Club, Motion to Recuse at 3-4).
254. Freedman, supranote 245, at 234.
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Policy: . . . "Even
255 one unnecessary recusal impairs the functioning
of the Court."
A rule that required Members of this Court to remove themselves
from cases in which the official
actions of friends were at issue
25 6
would be utterly disabling.
If I could have done so in good conscience, I would have been
pleased to demonstrate my integrity, and immediately silence the
criticism, by getting2 off
57 the cases. Since I believe there is no basis
for recusal, I cannot.

One can of course read the Scalia memorandum as
endorsing only the benign version of the duty to sit since he
found "no basis" for disqualification. But even if Justice
Scalia believes as stridently as he purports to in the
personal capacity/official capacity distinction and the longstanding coziness of the Washington governmental power
elite, he realistically is invoking the pernicious duty to sit to
a degree in that he takes the position that he should not
recuse himself unless compelled under the law because of
the particular status and scarcity of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices.
Despite his protestations about the weakness of the case
for recusal, the fact remains that press and public opinion
was highly critical of the Scalia-Cheney bonding in ways
that did not hinge on whether the two were ever in the
same duck blind or the relative benefits of flying Air Force
Two as compared to coach. Any reasonable person would
have to acknowledge that the situation at least should give
a jurist pause before declining to recuse, as Justice Scalia
implicitly does by devoting a fifteen-page memorandum to
the topic.
In effect, the pernicious version of the duty to sit
permits Justice Scalia to have it both ways. He can with one
breath, in the best admit-no-weakness-or-nuance style of
Justice Black, claim to see no basis for recusal, while in a
back-stopping second breath invoke the notion that if close
255. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 915-16, 929 (citations omitted). See also id. at 91516 and Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc. (In re Aguinda), 241 F.3d 194, 201 (2d Cir. 2000),
for the implicit proposition that resolving doubts in favor of recusal in lower
courts may also be bad policy.
256. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 916.
257. Id. at 929.

20091

DUTY TO SIT

907

cases are not resolved against recusal, the institutional
implications are ominous. Like Justice Rehnqist in Laird v.
Tatum and U.S. v. Microsoft, and like seven of the nine
justices in the 1993 Statement of Recusal Policy,25 Justice
Scalia in Cheney deploys a doctrine that was supposed to
have been abolished to resist recusal and buttress a
nonrecusal decision that is at least questionable if not
clearly erroneous.
More recently, Justice Scalia went hunting with
prominent plaintiffs' lawyer W. Mark Lanier, who authored
an amicus brief in the Wyeth v. Levine case259 pending before
the Court. The case involves the issue of whether FDA
approval of a drug label preempts state law-based failure to
warn suits against pharmaceutical manufacturers.26 The
outing was an outgrowth of Scalia's appearance as a guest
speaker in a lecture series at Texas Tech University,
Lanier's law school alma mater.26 ' Unlike the prior case, the
hunting host is not a party to the case. Lanier is not even
counsel to the litigants; but stands in the more attenuated
position of a plaintiffs' lawyer interested in the
ramifications of the result but who is not tied to the result.
In addition, Justice Scalia's relatively pro-defendant tort
law opinions are sufficiently well known 2 .2 that it is hard to

258. See supra note 127 and accompanying text regarding the Rehnquist
nonrecusals in Laird v. Tatum and U.S. v. Microsoft; see infra note 258 and
accompanying text regarding the 1993 Justices' Statement.
259. See Wyeth v. Levine, 128 S.Ct. 1118 (2008) (granting writ of certiorari
to Vermont Supreme Court regarding decision in Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179
(Vt. 2006)).
260. See Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006) (upholding trial judgment
for plaintiff against drug manufacturer in tort action sounding in failure to
warn by four to one; defendant unsuccessfully contended that plaintiffs action
was contradicted by and precluded by FDA regulation of prescription drug
labels). A divided Supreme Court affirmed, with Justice Scalia dissenting and
favoring the drug company position. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187 (2009).
261. See Debra Cassens Weiss, Justice Scalia Goes on Hunting Trip with
Plaintiffs Lawyer, A.B.A. J., Nov. 21, 2008, http://www.abajournal.com/weekly/
justice scalia_goesonhunting-trip-with-plaintiffslaywer (last visted Mar. 5,
2009).
262. See Larry Cati Backer, A Cobbler's Court, A Practitioner'sCourt: The
Rehnquist Court Finds Its "Groove," 34 TULSA L.J. 347, 350 (1999) (stating
Justice Scalia supports restrictions on applicability to other jurisdictions of state
court rulings that would, as practical matter, help tort plaintiffs present expert
testimony); Center for Democractic Culture at UNLV, The Law and Politics of
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imagine a reasonable observer thinking that his views on
preemption will be shaped by a particularly good junket
with a plaintiffs' lawyer (Justice Scalia is known for his
deference to state law in tort issues).263 By contrast, Justice
Scalia's views on Executive Branch prerogatives2 seem
sufficiently close to those of the Vice-President that one
might reasonably worry that the bonding of a little duck
hunting would cement the Justice's likely favorable attitude
toward vice-presidential prerogatives.
One can make a good case that Justice Scalia's hunting
jaunt with Lanier, like his trip with Cheney, raises concerns
about impartiality in that it is a gift of value (at least if you
like hunting) and an opportunity for ex parte interaction
with someone who has something riding on the outcome of a
pending Supreme Court decision. However, there is also a
distinction between the two trips in terms of the appearance
of social outings with a litigant as compared to a merely
interested party. Further, Cheney is a friend of the Justice
rather than a mere acquaintance; and the Lanier outing is
less likely to bother lay observers than the Cheney junket.
Just the same, I would have preferred Justice Scalia not
take either hunting trip, just as I would prefer that Justices
not attend events where they may have occasion to have
informal, private encounters with persons or entities
interested in specific pending litigation before the Court. It
is one thing for a justice to visit an academic setting that
creates exposure to a general legal issue, particularly where
the event is witnessed by many and chronicled in the press.
It is another matter to participate in a social event with
someone with a significant stake in a pending matter,
regardless of the specific amount of time available for
private ex parte contact or intimate bonding.
Tort Reform, 4 NEV. L.J. 377, 430-34 (2003) (stating Justice Scalia is not
considered a supporter of tort plaintiffs).
263. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that state punitive damages law is not
subject to judicial supervision via the Due Process clause); BMW of N. Am., Inc.
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599-603 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same).
264. See Michael Avery, The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement, 42
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 89, 95 n.36 (2008) (noting correlation between judges'
Federalist Society ties and judicial conservatism); Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi's
Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as Authorization?, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 435
n. 139 (2006) (noting Scalia's opposition to giving Guantanamo Bay detainees the
right to sue captors).
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The response of some (perhaps many, but pretty clearly
not most) newspaper editorial pages is that it is
unreasonable to ask Justices to cease social outings with old
friends simply because they may have an interest in Court
litigation. But there are outings and there are outings. And
timing counts for something. Surely it would not have killed
Justice Scalia to forgo social outings with a sitting VicePresident until the conclusion of the case and perhaps
throughout his term of office. Similarly, it is not
unreasonable to ask Justices to refrain from accepting
expensive hospitality from eager new friends with pending
interests coming before the Court. Although Mark Lanier
may not have been a formal party to the Wyeth litigation, he
stood to win or lose substantial counsel fees in the future
depending on the Court's decision in the litigation. Justice
Scalia would have better exercised his discretion to restrict
his time in Lubbock to the lecture and skip the hunting trip.
Perhaps even more revealing about the Court's
insufficiently self-reflective attitude toward recusal is
something less headline-grabbing and more institutional
than the Rehnquist and Cheney episodes. In 1993, the
Court issued a Statement on Recusal Policy signed by then
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Scalia,
Thomas, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg (Justices
Blackmun and Souter did not sign). The Statement
addressed recusal concerns posed because the Justices
"have spouses, children or other relatives within the degree
of relationship covered by 28 U.S.C. § 455 [first cousins or
26
closer] who are or may become practicing attorneys.""
In particular, the Court was addressing the issue of
whether a relative's partnership in a law firm representing
a Supreme Court litigant or appearance on behalf of a
litigant required recusal pursuant to § 455(b)'s limitations
on judicial participation where a relative was acting as
counsel or had a substantial financial interest in the
outcome of a case.266 Sensibly, the Statement concluded that
a Justice should recuse where the relative was lead counsel
or actively involved in the case because the case outcome
265. See 1993 Statement of Recusal Policy, reprinted in GILLERS & SIMON,
supra note 30, at 742-43.
266. See id. at 742 (noting Court Statement focuses on 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)
(5(ii) but also considers whether such financial ties create a reasonable question
as to impartiality under § 455(a)).
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"might reasonably be thought capable of substantially
enhancing or damaging his or her professional reputation"
or would have significant financial benefit to the attorneyrelative.267
However, where the attorney-relative was merely a
partner in the Court litigant's law firm, this alone would not
require recusal, as the Court viewed the attorney-relative's
economic or professional stake in the case as too small and
attenuated from the case result. However, where the
"amount of a relative's compensation could be substantially
affected by the outcome" this "would require our recusal
even if the relative had not worked on the case, but was
' For
merely a partner in the firm that shared the profits."268
example, a lawyer-relative may be a partner in a small or
medium sized firm with a contingency fee agreement
defending a large judgment below. In such cases, even if the
lawyer-relative is not the lead attorney, he or she stands to
profit handsomely if the judgment is not disturbed by the
Court.
From this sensible assessment, the Court proceeds to
recognize economic reality, stating,
It seems to us that in virtually every case before us with retained
counsel there exists a genuine possibility that success or failure
will affect the amount of the fee, and hence a genuine possibility
that the outcome will have a substantial effect upon each
partner's compensation. Since it is impractical to assure ourselves
of the absence of such consequences in each individual case, we
shall recuse ourselves from all cases in which appearances on
behalf of parties are made by firms in which our relatives are
269
partners ....

But then the Court takes away with one hand what it
gave with the other, declaring that there need be no recusal
in such cases if "we have received from the firm written
assurance that income from Supreme Court litigation is, on
a permanent basis, excluded from our relatives' partnership
shares."270

267.
268.
269.
270.

See id. at 743.
See id. at 742.
See id. at 743.
See id.
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Although the Court's escape hatch from what first
seemed to be a recusal policy protective of public confidence
may at first seems reasonable, it falters under closer
examination. Money is fungible. In any given wallet, a
dollar stolen from the church collection plate looks like a
dollar earned from honest labor-and both dollars have the
same purchasing power. Although a law firm may
technically bar a hypothetical attorney and Justice-relative
from sharing in the profits from representing Court
litigants, law firm partner compensation involves a mix of
often subjective factors such as "value to the firm." No one
substantial
can assure that the attorney-relative's
compensation based on value to the firm is not indirectly or
at least subconsciously the result of the business brought to
the firm because of his or her famous name and link to a
powerful parent.271
Defenders of the distinction proffered by the Court can
point to lower court decisions on variants of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, which permit a law firm to avoid
imputed disqualification by screening an incoming
disqualified attorney, including a prohibition on giving the
screened attorney any funds generated by the case on which
the screened attorney is disqualified."7 Of course, this
271. If nothing else, the attorney-relative benefits from the fees on a matter
for which he or she is disqualified if the firm decides to use some of those fees for
expenditures that benefit the firm as a whole: better furniture; company cars;
adjacent parking; the firm retreat; CLE programs in resort locations; new
computers or other technology; better law library resources; additional associate
or paralegal support. Although these may or may not be trivial depending on the
amount and attorney-relative's preferences, they are at least evidence that the
attorney-relative benefits from firm cases before the Court, even if he or she
does not formally receive a portion of the fee.
272. See, e.g., NEV. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.10(c) (permitting screening of lawyer
subject to conflict so that entire firm can avoid imputed conflict, requiring as
one condition that disqualified lawyer not share in fees from the matter);
Cromley v. Bd. of Educ., 17 F.3d. 1059 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 816
(1994)) (permitting screening via common law decision, requiring as condition of
effective screen that disqualified lawyer not share in firm's fee for the matter).
However, cases like Cromley also serve to make my skeptical point in that the
migrating, disqualified lawyer in Cromley moved from being plaintiffs counsel
to joining defendant's firm as a partner while the litigation was pending. One
might reasonably ask whether the lawyer's negotiation of a partnership in a
new firm adversely affected his loyalty to the plaintiff as well as whether the
migrating lawyer really enjoyed no benefits from fees generated in the matter
even where not directly compensated. See GILLERS, REGULATION, supra note 28,
at 296-97 (raising this and other questions in commenting on Cromley). But see
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
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theory of the screening rule is subject to the same critique of
economic reality that can be leveled at the Court's Recusal
Policy. If the critique is rejected for migrating lawyers, one
might ask, why should it not also be rejected regarding
judicial recusal?
One reasonably good short answer is that judges are not
lawyers and that attitudes toward and concerns about
judicial fairness are generally stronger than even the
system's concerns for attorney loyalty and the possibility
that a conflicted lawyer may use sensitive proprietary
information against a former adversary. For example, as
discussed above, the judicial recusal standard requiring
disqualification if a judge's impartiality may be reasonably
questioned is to a large degree an appearance of impropriety
standard.273 But lawyers have not been subject to this
standard since the 1983 ABA Model Code removed what
had been Canon 9 to the formerly controlling 1970 Code of
Professional Responsibility.274 Although the concept lingers
in the field of attorney disqualification, 2" it has always had
significantly more impact regarding judicial disqualification
as well as having held official status for twenty-five years
after the concept was at least formally removed from the
rules of attorney disqualification. Simply put, the legal
system is more inclined to disqualify a judge than an
attorney when the situation looks bad to a reasonable lay
observer.
In addition, one may make a strong case that the
concerns over apparent impropriety or questionable
Recommendation to the House of Delegates, Feb. 2009, at 9 (recommending
amendment of ABA Model Rule 1.10 to permit screening as means of avoiding
imputed disqualification where disqualified attorney joins new firm, noting that
23 states permit such screening; proposed rule, like that in states permitting
screening, would require that disqualified lawyer be "apportioned no part of the
fee" new firm earns in connection with matter in which new lawyer is
disqualified).
273. See supra text accompanying note 55.
274. See GILLERS, REGULATION, supra note 28, at 313-14 (noting that 1983

Model Code removed "appearance of impropriety" standard that formerly
governed attorney conduct); HAZARD, supra note 165, at § 65.7; CHARLES
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (1986).

275. See Analytica, Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir.
1983) (Posner, J.) ("While 'appearance of impropriety' as a principle of
professional ethics invites and maybe has undergone uncritical expansion
because of its vague and open-ended character, in this case [where a law firm
switched sides in related matters] it has meaning and weight.").
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impartiality should be at their zenith concerning the U.S.
Supreme Court, which plays such an important role in
American public policy, even as compared to other federal
and state courts. Unfortunately, the Statement of Recusal
Policy turns this concept on its head and instead argues
that the unique status and awesome power of the Court and
its comparative small and fixed number of jurists favors
resistance toward recusal.
We do not think it would serve the public interest to go beyond the
requirements of the statue, and to recuse ourselves, out of an
excess of caution, whenever a relative is a partner in the firm
before us or acted as a lawyer at an earlier stage. Even one
unnecessary recusal impairs the functioning of the Court. Given
the size and number of today's national law firms, and the
frequent appearance before us of many of them in a single case,
recusal might become a common occurrence, and opportunities
would be multiplied for "strategizing" recusals, that is, selecting
law firms with an eye to producing the recusal of particular
Justices. In this Court, where the absence of one Justice cannot be
made up by another, needless recusal deprives litigants of the
nine Justices to which they are entitled, produces the possibility of
an even division on the merits of the case, and has a distorting
effect upon the certiorari process, requiring the petitioner to
obtain (under our current practice) four votes out of eight instead
of four out of nine.

The Statement's rhetoric on this point is eerily
reminiscent of the Rehnquist memorandum in Laird v.
Tatum, using almost the same prose and substantive
argument.276 In effect, the Statement of Recusal Policy is
continuing to defend the duty to sit, in both its benign and
pernicious form. The Statement's version of the duty to sit is
benign in that it is of course true that U.S. Supreme Court
Justices should not recuse without a valid reason, a truism
reinforced by the comparative scarcity of Justices (nine) as
opposed to the hundreds of federal trial judges. But the
Statement's endorsement of the duty to sit is also pernicious
in that it perpetuates the dangerous conceit of duty to sit
thinking by suggesting that but for participation by all nine
Justices, the world may end. Although the problems of
affirmance by an equally divided court, lack of a quorum, or

276. See 409 U.S. 824, 837-39 (1972); supra notes 122-26 and accompanying
text.
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unrepresentative voting are non-trivial, they are not the
apocalyptic risks painted by the Recusal Statement.
In addition, the Statement's version of the duty to sit is
pernicious in that, when coupled with the exception to
recusal where fees from Court litigation are sequestered
from the attorney-relative, the Statement as a whole
implicitly takes the position that it is more important for
the Justices to participate than to provide a Court with
impartiality not subject to reasonable question, even under
circumstances raising close questions of judicial fairness.
For example, under the Statement's policy, there could exist
a two-person Washington, D.C., boutique law firm with
Attorney Justice-Child and Attorney Unrelated. If they
agree that Justice-Child will not share in Unrelated's
Supreme Court billings, the related Justice may sit on cases
argued by Attorney Unrelated. Even to non-skittish
laypersons, this looks awful as the firm of Justice-Child &
Unrelated appears before the Court, including the affected
Justice. Further, even if attorney Justice-Child does not
directly take a cut of attorney Unrelated's billings on Court
matters, there is an obvious symbiosis here that suggests
that Attorney Justice-Child is indeed profiting in at least
some not very attenuated manner from the fusion of his or
her filial connection to a Justice and Attorney Unrelated's
skills as an advocate. Where the law firm in question is
large and multinational, the risk of reasonable question is
reduced, but not categorically eliminated.
To be fair to the signing Justices, the Statement does
not eliminate the possibility that an individual Justice will
find a situation to require disqualification under 28 U.S.C. §
455(a) even though the affected law firm has a policy of
segregating Court-related compensation from the attorney
related to a Justice. The Statement is directed primarily at
disqualification for a relative's financial interest pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 455(b). But the tone of the Statement
overstates the dangers of recusal and also is unwilling to
grapple with the argument that the awesome power of a
Justice may of necessity put limits on the Justice's actions
or the career choices of an attorney relative. Although the
child of a Justice may desperately desire a partnership in a
noted Supreme Court litigation law firm such as Hogan &
Hartson or Smith & Taranto or a large multi-national firm
like Mayer Brown, the better part of valor for the attorneychild may be to elect a modestly less satisfying and
remunerative practice in a firm with few stops at the
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Supreme Court. Well short of hanging a shingle in rural
Wyoming, the attorney-child of a Justice logically has many
career opportunities that will seldom pose recusal problems
for the Justice-parent.277 Alternatively, if the attorney-child
is bound and determined to have a practice that presents
more such problems, this should logically place some limits
on the Justice-parent's participation.278 Then there is the
question of a litigant strategically seeking recusals by
retaining a law firm with a Justice's relative. But where is
it written that a law firm employing a Justice's relative is
required to take a case? The relatives of Justices and their
firms could perhaps be expected to show some dignity and
dedication to the system in spurning business thought to
come from clients seeking a strategic recusal.
At a specific level, the Statement of Recusal Policy plays
fast-and-loose with problems of the Court's own making.
The Statement notes that recusals may have a "distorting
effect" on grants of certiorari because with a recusal, the
party seeking Supreme Court review must obtain fifty
percent of the available votes (eight) rather than the
customary forty-four percent (four of nine votes).279 The idea
that the Court should perhaps permit a Justice to sit under
troubling circumstances simply to avoid this slight increase
in a party's chance of obtaining certiorari review is a bit
troubling. It is also unrealistic in that certiorari is only

277. The case of the attorney-spouse is perhaps more sympathetic in that
the attorney-spouse of a Justice has normally invested considerable time and
resources in establishing a legal career niche prior a Justice's appointment. For
example, Chief Justice Roberts' wife was already a partner at Hogan & Hartson
when he became Chief Justice and Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's husband was
already an experienced lawyer with an established practice when she was
appointed to the Court. But as discussed infra text accompanying note 288,
confidence in the neutrality of the Court is a strong enough value to sometimes
require more sacrifice of attorney-relatives.
278. I believe this logic justifies subjecting the attorney-spouse to the same
standards that govern the attorney-child. Although the spouse may be faced
with a situation of retooling a career in mid-life while a child often merely must
use some judgment when embarking on a legal career (e.g., Chief Justice's
Roberts' children were all well short of college, let alone law school and their
first full-time jobs when he was appointed), family member career aspirations
need in some cases to be subordinate to a strong recusal policy promoting public
confidence in the Court.
279. See Recusal
accompanying text.

Statement at 743,

discussed supra note 258 and
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granted three percent of the time,2s making the chances
that a recused Justice thwarted an important cert grant
rather remote. If the issue is that important or involves that
much conflict in the circuits, the odds are pretty good that it
will be presented in another cert petition that enjoys full
participation by all Justices.2"'
But the Recusal Statement's example of the supposed
ravages of recusal become laughable when one considers the
Court's own decision to have petitions evaluated by a "cert
pool" in which a single law clerk drafts an evaluative memo
relied upon by all Justices participating in the pool, which
means the entire Court, except for Justice Stevens, who
continues to be the lone hold-out in refusing to participate
in this communal delegation of the decision-making
process.282 If the genuine participation of each Justice were
so vitally important to questions of granting cert, the Court
would require each chambers to conduct its own
independent evaluation of the merits of the cert petition.
But instead, the Court compromises this value of each
Justice's participation that is supposedly so important by
homogenizing the process. Once the evaluative function has

280. See Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the
Supreme Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1528-29 (2008);
Peter J. Messitte, The Writ of Certiorari: Deciding Which Cases to Review,
EJOURNAL USA, Apr. 2005, at 18 (reporting that only four percent of certiorari
petitions fied by counsel are successful; when pro se petitions are included, the
figure drops to close to one percent).
281. Further, it appears that litigants, especially large, frequently litigious
"repeat player" litigants, have opportunities to select optimal cases for seeking
certiorari review. See Lazarus, supra note 280, at 1528-29. Regarding the
relative advantages of repeat players, see Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come
Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC'y REV. 95
(1974) (coining term and modeling advantages possessed by repeat players).
Most likely, the group of litigants that may be most impacted by a stronger
Court recusal policy on lawyer-relatives is also the group represented by large
law firms or firms with expertise in Supreme Court litigation, which is also
inordinately comprised of repeat players. In other words, even if more
aggressive disqualification prevents a repeat player litigant from gaining review
in Case A because Attorney Justice-Child is a partner in its law firm, Case B
will probably present another chance for review in the near future.

282. See TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND
INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006); ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID
L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS' APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT (2006); Lazarus, supra note 280, at 1509 n.100 (2008).
David R. Straus, The Supreme Court's Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in
the CertiorariProcess, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947 (2007).
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been so greatly centralized at a cost of more searching
consideration by the individual Justice's chambers, it
becomes much harder to make the case that the recusal of a
Justice or two has much impact.
Over the proverbial long haul, the Recusal Statement of
the Court concerning attorney-relatives is unlikely to create
scandal or deep mistrust of the Court. But the Statement
continues the Court's long history of being less sensitive to
recusal than much of the legal community. More to the
point for purposes of this Article, the Court continues to at
least implicitly endorse the duty to sit and reflect at least
potentially pernicious duty to sit thinking notwithstanding
abolition of the concept. The example of Justice Rehnquist's
participation in U.S. v. Microsoft provides an example of
mischief in this attitude.283 His son was not only a partner in
a law firm representing Microsoft as local counsel but was
an antitrust specialist acting on behalf of Microsoft in the
very same type of matter at issue in the federal
government's case against Microsoft. The Microsoft company
represented by Boston attorney James Rehnquist"' would
surely benefit if there were a U.S. Supreme Court ruling
favoring that same Microsoft company in the government's
lawsuit.
However, the Chief Justice, although recognizing this,
concluded that a reasonable objective observer would not
regard him as less than impartial and sat on the U.S. v.
Microsoft case. Justice Rehnquist reasoned that his son's
potential benefit from a decision against Microsoft before
the Court was too attenuatedly de minimis to raise a
reasonable question as to the Chief Justice's impartiality. :"5
283. Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301 (2000).
284. See id. at 1301 ('Microsoft Corporation has retained the law firm of

Goodwin, Procter & Hoar in Boston as local counsel in private antitrust
litigation. My son James C. Rehnquist is a partner in that firm, and is one of the
attorneys working on those cases.").
285. See id. at 1302 ("[Tlhere is no reasonable basis to conclude that the
interests of my son or his law firm will be substantially affected by the
proceedings currently before the Supreme Court.... [I]t would be unreasonable
and speculative to conclude that the outcome of any Microsoft proceeding in this
Court would have an impact on those interests when neither he nor his firm
would have done any work on the matters here."). Perhaps. But should a Justice
not also ask whether his or her neutrality in the matter will be compromised by
knowing that a child is a member of one litigant's legal team? More precisely,
would this not cause concern to a reasonable law observer?
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He made this decision despite acknowledging that "[it is
true that both my son's representation and the matters
before this Court relate to Microsoft's potential antitrust
liability" and that "[a] decision by this Court as to
Microsoft's antitrust liability could have a significant effect
'
on Microsoft's exposure to antitrust suits in other courts."286
In declining to recuse, Justice Rehnquist once again
invoked the "scarcity of Justices" argument used in the
Recusal Policy Statement and his Laird v. Tatum
memorandum, evoking the specter of a Court stymied in its
tasks because of undue ethical sensitivity.2 "7 Although Chief
Justice Rehnquist's assessment of the risk in Microsoft is
far more defensible than his analysis in Laird v. Tatum,
both decisions reveal a Justice overly resistant to recusal in
part because of his continued invocation of the pernicious
version of the duty to sit. Similarly, the Court's general
attitude toward recusal is steeped in duty to sit thinking
coupled with a perhaps excessive sense of each individual
Justice's importance to the fate of American law.
2. Nevada: Codifying the Duty to Sit and Applying the
Concept in Problematic Fashion. Nevada appears to be the
only state that not only continues to endorse the traditional
duty to sit doctrine but also expressly adopts it in its
Commentary to the state Code of Judicial Conduct, which is
otherwise modeled on the 1990 ABA Code. Commentary to
Canon 3(e)(1) of the Nevada Judicial Code states that
A judge has a duty to sit. Ham v.District Court, 93 Nev. 409,
415,566 P.2d 420, 424 (1977). Whether a judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned, and the opinion of the judge as to
his or her ability to be impartial is determined pursuant to Las
Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Hecht, 113 Nev. 644, 940 P.2d
134 (1997).288

286. See id. at 1302.
287. See id. at 1302 ("[B]y virtue of this Court's position atop the federal
judiciary, the impact of many of our decisions is often quite broad .... [I]t is
important to note the negative impact that the unnecessary disqualification of
even one Justice may have upon our Court. Here-unlike the situation in a
District Court or a Court of Appeals-there is no way to replace a recused
Justice. Not only is the Court deprived of the participation of one of its nine
members, but the even number of those remaining creates the risk of affirmance
of a lower court decision by an equally divided court.").
288. See NEV. CODE JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3E(1) cmt. The Comment
immediately adds, 'The mere receipt of a campaign contribution from a witness,
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The Ham case cited in the Commentary post-dates
Laird v. Tatum, the Rehnquist memorandum, and the
1970s changes to ABA and federal recusal norms. Despite
its strength and status, Nevada's seeming affection for the
duty to sit doctrine is of relatively recent origin. Although
the concept was alluded to in older Nevada opinions,289 it
litigant or lawyer involved with a proceeding is not grounds for disqualification."
This provision was added Jan. 31, 2000 and is consistent with Las Vegas Redev.
Agency v. Dist. Court, 5 P.3d 1059 (Nev. 2000), which required a judge who had
recused on the basis of campaign contributions from the litigants to remain on
the case. See infra p. 81. Judicial elections for Nevada state court are often hotly
contested, expensive, and involve contributions by important interests such as
the gaming industry, mining, the plaintiffs trial bar, and other business
concerns. The Nevada-specific commentary reflects the state's concern that if
campaign contributions alone are disqualifying, there would be a significant
increase in disqualification with attendant logistical problems. See generally
Richard M. Cardillo, I Am Publius and I Approve This Message: The Baffling
and Conflicted State of Anonymous Pamphleteering Post-McConnel, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1929, 1944 (2005); Alan B. Rabkin, Judicial Elections and
Nonpartisan Candidates:Staying on the Right Side of Canon 5, 9 NEV. LAW. 20
(2001); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Malignant Democracy: Core Fallacies Underlying
Election of the Judiciary, 4 NEV. L.J. 35 (2003) (noting intense political
campaign activity surrounding state bench and calling for move to selection of
judges by appointment).
289. Historically, Nevada's early case law, like the majority of courts in the
early- to mid-twentieth century, took a resistant stance toward recusal. See, e.g.,
State v. Dist. Court, 5 P.2d 535, 537 (1931) (noting "popular criticism" of
disqualification statute "in that it destroys the elevated rank of district judges
in the estimation of the people"). In addition, the Court was concerned that the
recusal statute could be "abus[ed] by unscrupulous attorneys and their clients"
and place "another clog in the regular and orderly administration of justice." In
spite of this, however, the Court enforced the statute to require that a case be
reassigned from a voluntarily-recusing judge to a judge stipulated as fair by the
parties, something the Chief Judge of the District Court had been unwilling to
do. As to criticisms of the statute, the Court stated that "[t]hese considerations
are matters which are more properly addressed to the legislature." See id. at
537.
Nevada was, like most states, resistant to requiring disqualification simply
because of concern that a judge's participation might appear improper to the lay
public. For recusal, it was generally required that there be a showing of "actual
bias or prejudice or that for some persuasive reason a speedy or impartial trial
before the judge in question might not be had." See, e.g., State ex rel. Backer v.
Dist. Court, 274 P.2d 571, 573 (Nev. 1954). Subsequent changes to statutes and
the judicial code in most states have now established that a reasonable concern
about impartiality or even the avoidance of the appearance of impropriety will
support recusal, particularly when the judge has chosen to recuse rather than
continue on the case. See, e.g., State ex rel. Mosshammer v. Allen Super. Court,
206 N.E.2d 139, 142 (Ind. 1965) ("A judge should have such discretion to
disqualify himself under the circumstances. A court, in the administration of
justice, should strive not only to give a fair trial, but to have a party feel he is
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took strong rhetorical form only after the doctrine had been
abolished at the federal level and had become largely
discredited by commentators. This appears to have been the
result of adverse judicial reaction to what were perceived as
meritless or tactical recusal motions.29 ° Then came concern
that some judges were too quick to recuse in cases that
involved electorally powerful litigants who might, if
displeased, extract vengeance at the next judicial election
" ' Later came concern that
and unseat an offending judge.29
getting a fair trial.'). In Mosshammer, the Indiana Supreme Court further
noted: "A judge has a discretion to disqualify himself as a judge in a case if he
feels he cannot properly hear the case because his integrity has been impugned
or false charges have been made against him, and he has a mandatory duty to
disqualify himself if he is prejudiced, interested, or related to any of the parties
in the litigation." Id. at 142. Ironically, this Indiana case was approvingly cited
by the Nevada Supreme Court in Ham v. District Court, 566 P.2d 410, 423 (Nev.
1977), and in the more recent Mosley v. Nevada Commission on Judicial
Discipline,102 P.3d 555, 564 (Nev. 2004).
290. See, e.g., Ham, 566 P.2d at 420 (noting that the grounds for
disqualification were weak or it could reasonably be inferred that the motion
was made for tactical reasons rather than out of serious concern over judicial
favoritism); see also infra notes 293-94 and accompanying text (discussing Ham
further).
291. Such extraction of vengeance appears to have occurred at the Nevada
Supreme Court level where Justices supporting the Court's decision in Guinn v.
Legislature of Nevada, 76 P.3d 22 (Nev. 2003) (requiring, in essence, the
legislature to raise taxes to fund public education budget), were relentlessly
criticized in the press, particularly by the Las Vegas Review-Journal, the state's
largest circulation newspaper, see, e.g., Ed Vogel, Legislature:Most Oppose Tax
Ruling, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Nov. 1, 2003, at Al. In relatively short order, these
Justices either left the bench voluntarily prior to facing the electorate-for
example, Justices Deborah Agosti, A. William Maupin, Robert Rose, Miriam
Shearing, and Clifford Young and another Justice in the majority, Myron
Leavitt, died prior to leaving the bench, or were defeated-for example, Justice
Nancy Becker, whose opponent noted prominently Justice Becker's support for
the Guinn decision. This also appears to have clearly occurred at the State
Senate level in 2004 when incumbent Republican Ann O'Connell angered the
gaming industry by opposing its efforts to institute a general business receipts
tax that would in turn reduce public pressure for an increase in the state
gaming receipts tax. See Kirsten Searer, Four Longtime Senators Not Returning
to Capital, LAS VEGAS SuN, Feb. 7, 2005, at B1. The gaming industry backed
newcomer Joe Heck, a physician, in the Republican primary, where he wrested
the party's nomination and ultimately the state senate seat from O'Connell.
Heck was subsequently defeated in 2008 due to the strength of Democratic
registration efforts and the Obama presidential campaign. See Ed Vogel,
Democrats Seize Control of State Senate, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Nov. 5, 2008, at B1.
At the trial court level-there is no intermediate appellate court in Nevadait is less clear whether powerful interest groups have successfully targeted
incumbents for defeat. It is clear, however, that these electoral actors are active
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although receipt of campaign contributions would appear to
be the type of thing that would raise questions about
impartiality, treating contributions as a ground for recusal
would create substantial disruption in judicial assignments
and come close to violating the rule of necessity in a state
where there is much judicial electoral activity through a
broad array of interests that contribute to many or even
most judicial campaigns.292
Although the commentary to Nevada's current Judicial
Code cites Ham293 as the key case in establishing the duty to
sit, Ham did not embrace the pernicious version of the
doctrine with much fervor-or even use the words duty to
sit 294-although it did speak of a "duty to preside to the
and it is conventional wisdom that a judicial candidate, especially when running
for the first time, needs the support of at least a critical mass of the following
constituencies to win election: law enforcement organizations, firefighters, other
government workers, gaming, the Chamber of Commerce, the plaintiffs bar,
major ethnic or racial groups, the physicians' lobby (which tends to care
primarily about caps on non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases),
the culinary workers local (which, unlike many cities, is very powerful because
it dominates work in the hotel and entertainment industry that is the core of
the Las Vegas economy), and educators. A judge angering even one of these key
interest groups during the course of a case could very well imperil his or her reelection chances. See High Court Seat Goes to Pickering,LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Nov.
5, 2008, at 1B (noting that, in 2008 race for open Nevada State Supreme Court
seat, better-financed attorney Kristina Pickering narrowly defeated trial judge
Deborah Shumacher); see also High Court Hopefuls Use Their Money, LAS VEGAS
REv.-J., Aug. 7, 2008, at 3B.
In any event, at least one former Justice has stated in my presence that
concern over trial judges running from politically sensitive cases was a
substantial factor in encouraging the growth of the duty to sit doctrine during
the 1990s and early twenty-first century in Nevada. Conversation with
anonymous former Justice (Oct. 3, 2008).
292. See, e.g., City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Dist. Court, 5
P.3d 1059, 1062 (Nev. 2000).
293. 566 P.2d at 420.
294. The precise question framed by the court in Ham was "[w]hether a
district court judge can voluntarily disqualify himself from participation in or
consideration of proceedings pending before him, absent a judicially-warranted
reason or justification for such a recusal." 566 P.2d at 421. Not surprisingly, the
court answered this question "in the negative," id., but did not elaborate at
length as to what circumstances-for example, campaign contributions, friendly
or hostile relations with parties or counsel, or public perceptions of the judge's
ties to litigants-would constitute a "judicially-warranted reason" for
disqualification. In the Ham case itself, the basis for seeking recusal was
counsel's bare contention that "his client believed Judge [Llewellyn] Young to be
biased and prejudiced against her." Id. at 421. There was no articulation of the
reason for the client's belief much less any offer of proof on the point. Id. at 423.
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conclusion of [the case], in the absence of some statute, rule
of court, ethical standard, or other compelling reason to the
' The Ham Court quoted Corpus Juris Secundum
contrary."295
for the proposition that '[i]t is the duty of a judge, however,
to exercise the judicial functions only conferred on him by
law, and he has no right to disqualify himself in the absence
of a valid reason. ' In other words, Ham technically
Nonetheless, even though Judge Young stated that he thought he had no bias or
prejudice, he "agreed to disqualify himself and allow the parties fifteen days
within which to agree upon a judge to whom the case would be reassigned." Id.
at 421. The Nevada Supreme Court found the judge's accommodation
unwarranted under these circumstances and that there was "some limit" on
judicial discretion to recuse. Id. at 423. The court stated:
Here, no explanation of the nature of the claimed bias or
prejudice was given and, as such, stands unsubstantiated.
Indeed, the trial judge expressly denied that he entertained
any bias or prejudice when he offered to voluntarily disqualify
himself. There seems to be no other explanation for the judge's
voluntary disqualification other than that such a course was
suggested to him attendant to a claim of bias. While we are
entirely mindful that the direction of [Nevada Revised
Statutes] 1.230(3) is not mandatory in setting forth "actual or
implied bias" as a ground for a volunteered recusal, we cannot
expand this permissiveness to allow disqualification on any
grounds whatsoever.
Id.
According to the Ham decision, decided in 1977, the Nevada Revised
Statutes Section 1.230 and the Code of Judicial Conduct in effect at that time
each provided independent, but overlapping, bases for disqualification. See id. at
422-24 The primary distinction was that the Code stated that a judge shall
recuse where the judge's impartiality is subject to reasonable question while the
statute requires "actual or implied bias," a standard more resistant to recusal.
See id. Although Ham noted Nevada Supreme Court Rule 209 and the Judicial
Code's admonition that a judge should avoid the "appearance of impropriety," id.
at 423 n.5, the opinion does not address the "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned" standard of the current Nevada Judicial Code and ABA Model Code.
ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11 (2007); NEV. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT CANNON 3E(1) (1991);.
295. Ham, 566 P.2d at 424.
296. Id. at 423 (quoting 48 C.J.S. Judges § 93 (1947)); see also Conkling v.
Crosby, 239 P. 506, 511-12 (Ariz. 1925) (quoting Corpus Juris Secundum as
well). In addition to predating the 1970s revolution that abolished the duty to
sit, Conkling is not persuasive support of the duty to sit. First, like Ham,
Conkling does not articulate the doctrine clearly or use specific duty to sit
language. Worse, Conkling rejected a motion for disqualification under
circumstances that most modem observers would find reflect outdated notions
of judicial innoculation from partiality and obliviousness to public perceptions.
See id. at 514. In Conkling, the judge had taken out a loan of $5,000 to $6,000-
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adopted only the benign form of the doctrine but did so in
broad enough language to permit it to be applied by those
supporting a pernicious version of the doctrine.297
Further, the Ham Court stated that "were there any
suggestion of impropriety or action giving the appearance of
impropriety in any given case . . . then in effect, it seems
clear that recusal would be a necessary step to alleviate or
obviate such an appearance." Although there was "some
reasonable limitation on the disqualification of judges," the
Ham Court chose to adopt a "practical construction" of the
disqualification statues, "one which allows the voluntary
disqualification of a judge not for any reason, but only for
those reasons which reasonably appear to be judicially
'
warranted."298
On the facts, the Ham Court found no
colorable basis for recusal, stating: "We observe nothing in
the record that would show a manifestation of prejudice or
bias ....
To allow a voluntary disqualification under the
more than $60,000 in today's dollars-from a bank that was a party to the case.
Id. at 508. In other words, the judge owed a debt to one of the litigants
appearing before him. Id.
The Arizona Supreme Court could not "say as matter of law that [the judge]
was disqualified in the case in question because of his indebtedness" and the
movant had failed to file an affidavit of prejudice on these grounds, which the
court hinted might perhaps have been sufficient to accomplish recusal. See id. at
511. Nonetheless, the Conkling Court found that only a direct pecuniary
interest of a judge was automatically disqualifying. See id. Indebtedness that
was not itself the subject of the action before the judge was insufficient. The
court would not say as a matter of law that indebtedness to a litigant
"constitutes bias and prejudice per se." Id. Reviewing the case law of the era,
Conkling found considerable support for its conclusion, a result that would
probably not obtain in most courts today. Id.
Some of the era's defensiveness toward disqualification is also captured in
Conkling. For example, the court placed great stock in the trial judge's personal
view that he would not be biased for or against the bank because of his
indebtedness, reasoning that to disagree with the trial judge would be "to find
that he had deliberately perjured himself." Id. at 514. This view, of course, is
overstated and melodramatic. The trial judge could be wrong about his lack of
bias, not because he is dishonest, but because people are often unable to see
prejudice or favoritism in their own thoughts and actions. Considerable
psychological research conducted during the intervening eighty-three years has
confirmed this all-too-human trait.
297. See Ham, 566 P.2d at 424.
298. Id. at 423-24. The Ham opinion also cited a 1954 Arizona case as
standing for the proposition that judges have substantial discretion to recuse,
even if the grounds for recusal are not compellingly proven. See id. at 423 (citing
Zuniga v. Super. Court, 269 P.2d 720 (Ariz. 1954)).
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instant circumstances would introduce into the judicial
procedures in Nevada an approach wholly uncontemplated
'
by our Legislature and this Court."299
Despite its innocuous beginning, Ham and its progeny
embraced the duty to sit doctrine after the doctrine was
supposed to have died. Read carefully and as a whole, Ham
is not a judicial salvo in favor of the duty to sit-yet it came
to stand for that proposition and was even enshrined in the
commentary to the state Judicial Code. While it is fair to
say that the Nevada Supreme Court had historically been
resistant to arguably over-cautious disqualification based on
appearance of impropriety or reasonable question as to
impartiality grounds, the 1970s Nevada cases were not
really using the pernicious duty to sit as a tiebreaker
against recusal in close cases because the court did not see
that decade's recusal questions as close.3 °° Prior to the
299. Ham, 566 P.2d at 424. In addition, the motion for disqualification came
after years of litigation and was directed at a judge who was now quite familiar
with a complex case, a familiarity that would be lost if he was disqualified and
the case transferred. The court reasoned:
To permit disqualification on these facts would result in a
substantial inconvenience to the court and all parties and
persons directly or indirectly concerned, cause unnecessary
delay and expense, and could result in a trial judge acting
without or in excess of his jurisdiction, contrary to legislative
intent, which intent is to expedite proceedings and to require
that a judge preside on a case until he is prevented from doing
so for proper reason. Should a reason appear, he should then
step down and, at that time, explicate his reasons for the
withdrawal.
Id.
In addition, there was a short dissent in Ham, differing with the court's
holding because it appeared to require a judge to confess actual bias in order to
recuse, a position the dissent found insufficiently protective of the public faith in
the courts. See id. at 415 (Mowbray, J., dissenting) ("There may be cases where
a judge himself feels he is not biased, yet in the interest of presenting a high
standard of impartiality concludes that a requested transfer should be
granted.").
300. See, e.g., Hayes v. Forman, 568 P.2d 579, 580 (Nev. 1977) (requiring
Judge [Keith C.] Hayes to "be restored as trial judge" in the Howard Hughes
"Mormon Will" case where he voluntarily withdrew because of unfounded
allegations that he would uphold the will because it provided a substantial gift
to the Mormon Church of which Judge Hayes was a member). In Hayes, the
court's own description of Ham is that it "recognized that there may be
circumstances where the appearance of impropriety may require disqualification
if the judge created that appearance." Id. However, there should not be
disqualification out of an abundance of caution "where the judge's conduct is
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1990s, Ham appeared to have a low profile.3"' But during
the 1990s, Ham evolved into a purported edict on the duty
to sit" 2 and paved the way for occasionally pernicious
application of the doctrine.
beyond reproach and recusal is sought for admittedly false statements of
counsel." Id.
301. For example, in Jeaness v. Dist. Court, 626 P.2d 272, 274 (Nev. 1981),
the court noted that Ham was the exception to the general rule in favor of
voluntary recusal so long as there was not an absence of justification for
withdrawal. The Jeaness Court also noted that Ham had emphasized the factspecific nature of its holding resisting disqualification in a case that had gone on
for some time. Id. In Goldman v. Bryan, 764 P.2d 1296 (Nev. 1988), and In re
Dunleavy, 769 P.2d 1271 (Nev. 1988), the court rejected disqualification motions
in cases where it seems fairly clear that the case for recusal was weak. In
Goldman, one challenged judge had merely recited the facts of the case in a
letter but voiced no opinion on the matter. 764 P.2d at 1299-3003. In Dunleavy,
counsel for one of the parties had contributed to the judge's campaign some
years in the past. 769 P.2d at 1275. In Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co., 774 P.2d
1003, 1018 (Nev. 1989), the court found Chief Justice E.M. Gunderson not to be
disqualified because his admittedly negative attitude toward counsel was based
upon the proceedings before the court and did not constitute extra-judicial bias.
See also Laxalt v. McClatchy, 602 F. Supp. 214, 218 (D. Nev. 1985) ("[R]ecusal
or disqualification should not be based on speculation. This is true even though
a judge should resolve any close issue in favor of disqualification if a reasonable
person might question his impartiality. .... There are policy reasons why a judge
does have an obligation not to recuse himself when no probative evidence
reasonably gives rise to doubt as to his impartiality." (citations omitted)).
302. See, e.g., City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Hecht, 940 P.2d
134, 138 (Nev. 1997) (rejecting disqualification motion based on justice's alleged
antipathy toward counsel); Sonner v. State, 930 P.2d 707, 712 (Nev. 1996)
(finding judge's representation in unrelated matter by prosecuting attorney now
appearing before the judge does not require recusal by the judge); Kirksey v.
State, 923 P.2d 1102, 1118 (Nev. 1996) (rejecting disqualification motion based
on inappropriate ex parte communication, proper judicial calling of witnesses,
and judge's judicially acquired knowledge and emphasizing judge's "obligation
not to recuse himself' without reason and "substantial weight" to be given to
judge's decision rejecting recusal); Snyder v. Viani, 916 P.2d 170, 174-75 (Nev.
1996) (concluding that Justice Robert Rose's past ownership of a bar sold subject
to promissory note was not a "direct, ongoing pecuniary interest that would
disqualify him from participation" in a case involving an attempted common law
dram-shop cause of action against an unrelated bar); Valladares v. Dist. Court,
910 P.2d 256, 257-58, 260 (Nev. 1996) (holding judge not disqualified even
though he had previously, during the course of a judicial campaign, questioned
the honesty and competency of counsel for one of the parties). But see In re
Varain, 969 P.2d 305 (Nev. 1998) (rejecting judicial discipline for judge's
reassignment of case after recusal; no invocation of duty to sit doctrine); In re
Oren, 939 P.2d 1039, 1040 (Nev. 1997) (holding disqualification was required
where judge had, as a deputy district attorney, been involved in criminal child
neglect case against the same father involved in termination of parental rights
hearing before the judge), partially overruled by Towbin Dodge LLC v. Dist.
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Although reasonable observers may disagree over
whether the 1990s Nevada recusal decisions are correct,
several seem very problematic. Valladares v. District
3 °4 , Redevelopment Authority v.
Court,3° 3Sonner v. State
Hecht35 and perhaps Snyder v. Vianni3 °6 and Kirksey v.
State36 7 appear wrongly decided in that recusal should have
been required or would have been the better, more
confidence-building course of action. Thus, it appears that
the state's endorsement of the duty to sit, initially only in
its benign form, evolved into a more pernicious duty to sit
Court, 112 P.3d 1063 (2005) (permitting affidavit of prejudice to be filed within
reasonable time after counsel becomes aware of grounds for affidavit;
interestingly, this ruling was based in part on the court's interest in following
federal judicial disqualification procedure); Whitehead v. Nevada Comm'n on
Judicial Discipline, 908 P.2d 219, 219 (Nev. 1995) (overruling appointment of
special master deemed void because of participation of justices subject to
recusal); PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 894 P.2d 337, 341 (Nev. 1995) (holding
judge's membership on advisory board of foundation interested in case creates
appearance of impropriety supporting disqualification), partially overruled by
Hecht, 940 P.2d at 138). If federal recusal procedure is considered reasonable by
the court, one might question why the court continues to invoke a duty to sit
doctrine that was abolished under federal law nearly thirty-five years ago.
The decision in Snyder, 716 P.2d at 170, was 3-2, with Chief Justice Robert
Steffen and Justice Charles Springer in dissent. There was at the time wellknown tension between the Justices of the court with respect to the Whitehead
litigation, which involved allegations of improper conduct against former trial
judge Jerry Carr Whitehead. See Stephen Magagnini, Nevada's Top Court
Hogtied by Feud: Justices Tangle Over Probe of Reno Judge, SACRAMENTO BEE,
March 17, 1996, at Al. Consequently, it might be well for both Nevadans and
nonresidents to regard recusal debate among the Justices of that composition of
the court as forming a separate category that should not greatly impact the
Commission's recommendation regarding continued endorsement in the Code of
a duty to sit.
Hecht involved alleged animosity between former Justice Robert Rose and
prominent Las Vegas attorney Laura FitzSimmons. See also O'Brien v. State
Bar, 952 P.2d 952, 956-58 (Nev. 1998) (Rose, J., dissenting) (discussing
majority's rejection of challenge to FitzSimmons' election to State Bar of Nevada
Board of Governors). Hecht can also be described as a case where the Court
rejected recusal because of the perceived necessities of administering the
judicial system in a state with an elected judiciary and often contentious judicial
elections that may lead to tensions between judges and attorneys who supported
their opponents.
303. 910 P.2d at 256.
304. 930 P.2d at 707.
305. 940 P.2d at 134.
306. 916 P.2d at 170.
307. 923 P.2d at 1102.
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concept that pushed its Supreme Court to resist recusal in
cases where disqualification would have been the better
choice.
08the
For example, In Valladares v. District Court,3
challenged judge was not disqualified even though he had
previously, during the course of a judicial campaign,
questioned the honesty and competency of counsel for one of
the parties. Surely that must have raised reasonable
concern about the judge's ability to be impartial in
adjudicating the matter. In Sonner v. State,3" 9 the judge's
representation in an unrelated matter by a prosecuting
attorney now appearing before the judge did not require
recusal of the judge. In Kirksey v. State, the Court rejected a
disqualification motion based on inappropriate ex parte
communication, improper judicial calling of witnesses, and
the judge's judicially acquired knowledge leading to
antipathy toward a party and counsel.3"' Kirksey
emphasized the judge's "obligation not to recuse himself'
without reason and the "substantial weight" to be given to a
judge's decision rejecting recusal. In these situations, it is
hard not to see some reasonable ground for concern over the
judge's ability to be impartial.
In Snyder v. Viani, the Court concluded that Justice
Robert Rose's financial interest related to a bar was not a
"direct, ongoing pecuniary interest such that would
disqualify him from participation" in a case involving a
request that the Court create a dram-shop cause of action
by common law.3 ' Unlike most states, Nevada has no dram
shop liability statute, a reflection of the political power of
the hospitality industry. Justice Rose had sold his interest
in the bar-which was not the defendant in the case-prior
to the case but still held a promissory note for payment
promised by the new owners, creating the argument that
payment on the note would be at risk if establishments
serving alcohol were subjected to increased potential
liability.

308. 910 P.2d at 257.
309. 930 P.2d at 712.
310. 923 P.2d at 118-19.
311. 916 P.2d at 171-72.
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Hecht involved alleged animosity between Justice Rose
and prominent Las Vegas attorney Laura FitzSimmons.3" 2
FitzSimmons alleged that Justice Rose held animosity
toward her growing out of what Nevadans commonly refer
to as the Whitehead matter, a nexus of investigations,
litigation, and conflict arising out of allegations of improper
conduct against former trial Judge Jerry Carr Whitehead.3" 3
Judge Whitehead agreed to leave the bench as part of a
negotiated arrangement with the prosecution in which
charges were dropped.3" 4 Satellite litigation revolved around
the question of the confidentiality of investigation records
and whether some members of the Supreme Court
improperly had made selective leaks to the press.315
Battle lines became drawn at the court regarding the
Whitehead matter, with Justices E. M. "Al" Gunderson,
Charles Springer, and Thomas Steffen tending to align with
Whitehead, while Justices Rose, Miriam Shearing, and
Clifford Young were viewed as the anti-Whitehead camp.3" 6
FitzSimmons had been law clerk to Gunderson and
remained a friend. Attorneys tended to ally with various
Justices in their views of the Whitehead matter.
FitzSimmons was one of the prominently identified
attorneys in the fight, and she and Justice Rose came to
have well-known tension with one another that became

312. 940 P.2d 134, 136 (Nev. 1997) (rejecting disqualification motion based
on justice's alleged antipathy toward counsel).
313. See, e.g., Whitehead v. Nevada Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 920 P.2d
491 (Nev. 1996), stricken as void by Del Papa v. Steffen, 920 P.2d 489, 491 (Nev.
1996); Whitehead v. Nevada Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 908 P.2d 219, 219
(Nev. 1995); Whitehead v. Nevada Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 893 P.2d 866,
872 (Nev. 1995). See also Stephen Magagnini, Nevada's Top Court Hogtied by
Feud: Justices Tangle Over Probe of Reno Judge, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 17,
1996, at Al; Ed Vogel, High Court Rejects Attorney's Request, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Oct. 2, 1992, at 3B; Todd Woody, Nevada's No-Holds-BarredPolitics and Casino
Culture Has Made Serving on the State's Supreme Court a Dicey Proposition,
RECORDER (SAN FRANCISO), Oct. 6, 1997, at 1.
314. Subsequent to leaving the bench, Judge Whitehead became a
prominent mediator who commands a significant hourly rate for his alternative
dispute resolution efforts. David Berns, Group to Honor Former Judge, Las
Vegas Rev.-J. June 19, 2003, at 38 (reporting that Whitehead received lifetime
achievement award from Nevada Trial Lawyer Association and was praised as
mediator).
315. See Whitehead, 893 P.2d at 879.
316. See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
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widely known in the legal community." 7 When Justice Rose
stood for re-election in 1994,
FitzSimmons supported his opponent and worked in the
opponent's campaign office. She also arranged a press conference
where statements were made by former U.S. Attorney Bill
Maddox that were detrimental to Justice Rose's campaign. During
these political campaign exchanges, Justice Rose cited
FitzSimmons' activity as evidence that she opposed his reelection.
After Justice Rose won the 1994 election, FitzSimmons filed a
lawsuit to make public any telephone conversations between
Justice Rose and third parties that had previously been sealed by
the district court. FitzSimmons stated that the purpose of the
request was so that she could use the statements in a legal action
against Justice Rose; however, FitzSimmons gave neither Justice
Rose nor the other third parties to the conversations notice of the
petition or hearing. When Justice Rose and the third parties
became aware of the action through sources other than
FitzSimmons,
they opposed it; and FitzSimmons did not pursue it
318
further.

The court went on to state:
In a document filed [in the case] Justice Rose accuses
[FitzSimmons] of being part of an ongoing conspiracy against him,
a conspiracy which he calls the "GundersonlWhiteheadl
Springer/Steffen coalition." The Rose document is comprised of a
long bill of complaints against Ms. FitzSimmons and against the
mentioned conspiratorial coalition, including charges that Ms.
FitzSimmons was part of a plan to make public sealed criminal
charges that had been filed by a Metropolitan police officer
against Justice Rose, and that, had it not been for Ms.
FitzSimmons and her co-conspirators, these charges would have
been kept from the public eye and remained "sealed" by order
of
3 19
District Judge [later Supreme Court Justice] Nancy Becker.

317. See also O'Brien v. State Bar, 952 P.2d 952, 956-58 (Nev. 1998) (Rose,
J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's rejection of challenge to
FitzSimmons's election to State Bar of Nevada Board of Governors).
318. See City of Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Hecht, 940 P.2d 134,
136 (Nev. 1997).
319. Id. at 142 n.3 (Springer, J., dissenting) ('Ms. FitzSimmons vehemently
denies that she is part of any such conspiracy; but it is obvious from [the
document] that he earnestly believes that Ms. FitzSimmons is conspiring to
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In addition, although the Court majority does not give
details, it notes that "[a]dmittedly, a few of Justice Rose's
comments [about FitzSimmons] may have been better not
made . . .".""o
But the Court nonetheless found recusal
inappropriate because of the "political realities" of a
"difficult campaign for re-election" in which FitzSimmons
was "actively opposing" Justice Rose. 2 ' Relying in part on
the tainted Valladares precedent, which held that a judge
may preside even when an attorney in the case is his former
opponent who he labeled unfit for the bench,322 the Hecht
majority stressed that it generally takes more concern about
impartiality to disqualify a judge due to attitudes toward an
attorney than where the judge's negative attitudes concern
a party to the litigation.32 The Hecht Court, "[i]n reviewing
the statements made by Justice Rose about FitzSimmons'
activities," found that the statements had "none of the
vindictiveness found in the statements made in Valladares
where the attorney's ethics, honesty, and competency were
'
challenged."324
And, as noted above, not even these
vindictive statements in Valladares were sufficient to
warrant disqualification. In essence, the Hecht majority was
able to take the erroneous Valladares decision, spawned in
part from the state's duty to sit, anti-recusal culture, and
use it to reach another arguably erroneous decision.'
destroy him."). Because the description of the document referenced is provided
by Justice Springer, an open opponent of Justice Rose, some caution is required
in accepting Justice Springer's characterization of the document. Unlike Justice
Young and the court majority, Justice Springer supported disqualification of
Justice Rose. See id. ("In my judgment, [Justice Rose's] beliefs and the other
charges . . .create a strong appearance of extreme bias on the part of Justice
Rose and lead to the almost inescapable inference that it is impossible for
Justice Rose to sit in impartial judgment in this case while Ms. FitzSimmons is
acting as counsel."). Nonetheless, the contents of the document, if even roughly
accurately described by Justice Springer, are quite damning and reflect a
situation where hostility between a judge and an attorney is so great as to raise
reasonable questions as to impartiality.
320. See id. at 137 (majority opinion).
321. See id.
322. See Valladares v. Dist. Court, 910 P.2d 256 (Nev. 1996); see also supra
text accompanying note 308.
323. See Hecht, 940 P.2d at 137 (citing Valladares,910 P.2d at 256).
324. See id. at 138.
325. I say arguably out of a belief that reasonable persons may be able to
form a conclusion that Justice Rose should not have been disqualified in Hecht,
although my own opinion is to the contrary, on the ground that the often rough-
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The theory of the distinction between prejudice against
counsel and prejudice against a party, of course, is that it is
the party that stands to win or lose from litigation, while
the attorney has no personal stake in the outcome and
merely moves on to the next case. But this theory is less
than satisfying if the attorney is working on a contingent
fee basis, which in part explains why counsel for personal
injury plaintiffs-for example, Mark Lanier, who recently

and-tumble nature of Nevada judicial elections, which heavily involve the bar,
leads to difficult exercises of line-drawing as to when lawyer-judge conflict is
sufficient to require a judge to be removed from the lawyer's cases. In addition,
there are concerns over strategic and selective use of recusal motions. One of
Justice Rose's strongest arguments against recusal was that FitzSimmons had
appeared as counsel before the Court in eighteen cases "since the Whitehead
case (the time which FitzSimmons claims Justice Rose's bias against her
began)" but that she "filed a formal demand [for recusal] in only half of them."
Id. at 137.
Further, Justice Rose also had available to him something of a "no harm, no
foul" defense in that "Justice Rose apparently voted in favor of FitzSimmons'
clients five out of eight times, with one case still pending' and that "Justice Rose
cites the record of rulings in her cases as clear evidence that he is fair and
impartial in cases where FitzSimmons is an attorney for a party." Id. Although
seemingly persuasive, the "no harm, no foul" defense should not defeat an
otherwise valid recusal motion. A judge may have intense personal antipathy for
an attorney that calls into question the judge's neutrality and yet be unable to
consistently rule against the attorney because of other factors such as an
overwhelmingly strong case on the merits, the presence of other lawyers or
parties to whom the judge owes allegiance or has greater antipathy. A biased
judge may also have tactical reasons for voting a certain way in order to build
coalitions on the court or establish precedent for future deployment on an issue.
The judge may consider this more important than his individual enmity for a
single lawyer.
Although this may make jurists seem excessively Machiavellian, my point is
simply that a lawyer's track record before a judge is often of minimal
evidentiary value. Although it would clearly strengthen the case for recusal if
the judge always ruled against the parties the attorney represented, it does not
conversely follow that a mixed record refutes the charge of lack of neutrality. A
partial judge may even realize his attitudes toward an attorney tend to warp his
judicial judgment and fight against this tendency with erratic success, making a
mixed record on counsel's cases the product of simple human frailty rather than
anything more calculating. Regardless of the reasons for a judge's mixed voting
record on an attorney's cases, the core relevant question is whether a reasonable
person knowing of the judge's strong enmity toward an attorney would have
reasonable questions about the judge's ability to be impartial when hearing
cases in which that attorney is involved. In my view, that standard was clearly
met in Hecht because of the peculiar but well-known circumstances of legal,
political, and personal conflict growing out of the Whitehead matter.
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hunted with Justice Scalia 32 6 -are often heavy contributors
to judicial campaigns. As Justice Rose, and most everyone
in the Nevada bar, surely knew, FitzSimmons, a lawyer for
landowners seeking compensation for actual or constructive
taking of their property by government entities, was almost
certainly representing Hecht under some form of a
contingency or bonus fee arrangement rather than billing by
the hour. Quite literally, her financial rewards in the case,
as well as any reputational awards, would rise or fall with
the Court's decision for or against her client just as if she
were a party to the case. Under these charged
circumstances, many questioned the correctness of the
decision to let Justice Rose remain sitting in judgment in a
case that could so greatly reward or punish an attorney
regarded as his enemy. The hostility between Justice Rose
and FitzSimmons was widely known in the legal community
and, like the Whitehead matter, was reported in the press,
adding to concern that his failure to recuse himself could
undermine public confidence in the courts.
Eventually, Justice Rose did elect to recuse himself
from cases involving FitzSimmons,327 suggesting some tacit
admission of error in the Hecht decision. Regardless of
whether the duty to sit led to bad decisions in these cases,
its existence in Nevada did not do anything to make the
recusal questions involved any easier. For example, in
Hecht, the majority defended its opposition to recusal by
arguing that "[i]n a state with a relatively small number of
attorneys disqualifying judges because an attorney before
them had participated in the process or had opposed a judge
or justice would subject many judges and justices to
32 The court then quoted a prior case to
disqualification.""
buttress this argument: 'In a small state such as Nevada,
with a concomitantly limited bar membership, it is
inevitable that frequent interactions will occur between the
members of the bar and the judiciary."'329
326. See supra notes 259-63 and accompanying text (describing Justice
Scalia's hunting trip with prominent personal injury attorney Mark Lanier).
327. See Whitehead v. Nevada Comm'n on Judicial Discipline, 920 P.2d 491
(Nev. 1996), stricken as void by, Del Papa v. Steffen, 920 P.2d 489, 491 (Nev.
1996).
328. See 940 P.2d at 137.
329. Id. (quoting In re Petition to Recall Dunleavy, 769 P.2d 1271, 1275
(Nev. 1988)).
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But this "small state" exception, a variant of the
argument against recusal in the U.S. Supreme Court by
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and the others who issued the
Court's 1993 Statement on Recusal Policy,33° is not well
taken. Today, Nevada has roughly 2.5 million residents and
more than 6,000 active members of the State Bar as well as
nearly fifty trial judges of general jurisdiction and an equal
number of family court and municipal judges who could be
called for service in cases where recusal left a court shortstaffed. The seven-member state Supreme Court permits
the appointment of a retired justice or designated trial
judge to fill vacancies in a case created by recusal. Although
obviously smaller than neighboring states like California,
Nevada is not so small as to create an exception to the usual
ground rules regarding recusal. Further, the state's main
population centers, the Reno-Sparks and Las Vegas
metropolitan areas, are 400 miles apart. Consequently, even
if the entire bench in one metro area is disqualified, the case
could be transferred to a widely separated metro area where
at least some members of the bench are likely to be eligible
to preside.
Notwithstanding Nevada's adequate size and status as
the fastest-growing state for much of the 1995-2005 time
period, the Nevada Supreme Court's Twenty-First Century
cases endorsed the duty to sit doctrine with considerably
more force than did Ham and under circumstances where
the recusal question was close.33 ' Most prominently, City of
Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency v. District
Court required the trial judge to retain a case on which he
had previously determined to step aside in order to avoid
any semblance of a question as to his impartiality due to the
receipt of campaign contributions for parties to the
litigation.332 Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency
serves as a good example of the manner in which invocation
of a duty to sit doctrine results in resolving a close case-for
example, whether to recuse because of campaign
contributions-against disqualification rather than in favor
of disqualification as would most federal courts. More
330. See supra notes 265-70 and accompanying text.
331. See Millen v. Dist. Court., 148 P.3d 694, 699-700 (Nev. 2006); City of
Las Vegas Downtown Redev. Agency v. Dist. Court, 5 P.3d 1059, 1061-63 (Nev.

2000).
332. 5 P.3d at 1062-63.
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importantly, the duty to sit concept was used to require a
trial judge to hear a matter in spite of the fact that the trial
judge, for non-frivolous reasons that did not implicate his
dedication to his work,333 felt more comfortable allowing the
matter to be presided over by another judge without an
arguable shadow on his impartiality.334

333. One could, I suppose, argue that the 2000 Las Vegas Downtown
Redevelopment Agency case, since it involved a major downtown redevelopment
project popularly known as the "Fremont Street Experience" and vigorously
contested litigation, was the type of controversial, unpopular, or difficult case
from which a judge may be tempted to absent himself. But it was not the
functional equivalent of a case involving espionage and capital punishment (e.g.,
the Rosenbergs), deciding an election (Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)),
charging a once popular public figure with immorality (e.g., Michael Jackson), or
one with media circus potential (e.g., the O.J. Simpson criminal prosecutions).
In these latter types of cases, one can understand the rationale for duty to sit
sentiment since a judge might want to avoid the political and logistical
headaches of such a case. But Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency does
not seem to fit this category.
334. The Court noted that trial Judge Mark Denton's recusal on grounds of
receipt of campaign contributions had initiated a "chain" of recusals in that two
other judges had subsequently recused themselves. See Las Vegas Downton
Redevelopment Agency, 5 P.3d at 1060. My definition of a chain involves
somewhat more than three links. If recusal on grounds of campaign
contributions would disqualify the entire Eighth District bench, the recusal
issue would be more problematic. But because there were an additional fifteen
local judges who might have been available to hear the case as well as judges
from outside the Las Vegas area, one can question whether Judge Denton's
voluntary disqualification created sufficient administrative difficulties to force
him to stay on the case.
Unfortunately, reported cases like Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment
Agency may underreport the degree to which the Nevada Supreme Court has
been unduly resistant to recusal due to the pernicious version of the duty to sit.
For example, in an unreported prior decision, the Court reversed a trial judge's
recusal resulting from the judge's receipt of a certified letter from a litigant
reminding the judge that the litigant had contributed five-hundred dollars to his
campaign. Shocked, the judge assembled counsel in chambers and stated that
although he thought he would not favor the campaign contributor, the letter
created doubt that required his disqualification, both to assuage concerns that
the judge could be bought for five-hundred dollars and concern that he would be
so insulted by the letter that he would retaliate against this amazingly hamhanded and unethical litigant. On review, the Supreme Court ordered the trial
judge to continue to preside-the liability phase of the case had been
determined prior to the certified letter crowing about the campaign
contribution-stating that the duty to sit compelled participation absent a
reason to recuse. Because the trial judge had stated he was not biased, the
Supreme Court found that there was consequently no reason to recuse. See
Conversation with judges, including affected judge, Feb. 7, 2009. I only wish I
could say I was making this up.
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In Millen v. District Court, the Court provided an
extensive discussion of recusal lists-lists of persons or
entities given to the clerk of court to prevent the clerk from
assigning cases involving these parties to judge.335 Millen
also sensibly concluded that the duty to sit did not require a
judge to continue to hear a case in which the litigant's
choice of attorney created grounds for disqualification,
unless "the lawyer was retained for the purpose of
disqualifying the judge and obstructing management of the
court's calendar." ' 36 During the course of the opinion, the
Court reiterated its support for the duty to sit doctrine.337
However, as with many of the 1990s Nevada recusal cases,
one can make a strong argument that consideration of the
duty to sit was not necessary to resolving the
disqualification issue in Millen.
The Millen Court devoted an entire page of the
relatively brief opinion balancing the duty to sit against a
party's right to counsel and right to a judge whose
impartiality could not be reasonably questioned. 3' At the
conclusion of this needless hand-wringing, the Court
reached the correct result and did not insist that the
originally assigned judge with ties to counsel, a former
judge, remain on the case. Continued recognition of a duty
to sit unnecessarily required the Court to hesitate in
requiring judicial disqualification in cases where the
presence of a particular counsel created legitimate grounds
for recusal due to bias, prejudice, or the appearance of
impropriety. The Court could have reached the same
sensible decision-that lawyer-based grounds for recusal
are ineffective where the lawyer was selected merely to
attempt to disqualify a judge-even if the duty to sit
doctrine had never existed.
335. 148 P.3d at 699-701.
336. Id. at 696-97:
We also consider whether a judge's duty to sit and hear a case
supersedes a client's right to select an attorney of his or her choice
when that attorney appears on the assigned judge's recusal list. We
conclude that, when a judge's duty to sit conflicts with a client's right to
choose counsel, the client's right generally prevails, except when the
lawyer was retained for the purpose of disqualifying the judge and
obstructing management of the court's calendar.
337. See id. at 699-700.
338. See id.
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Implicitly, Millen adopted the benign version of the
duty to sit doctrine rather than its pernicious cousin. But
the case could more easily have been decided if the Court
was not burdened by the duty to sit concept at all. At the
very least, the Millen Court would have benefitted if the
Judicial Code made clear that a judge's responsibilities to
hear and decide cases embraces only the benign duty to sit
and rejects the pernicious duty to sit. Whatever merits
Millen has standing alone, the fact remains that recent
Nevada precedent reflects as many as a half-dozen cases
where recusal was not required under circumstances that
should give most observers substantial doubt about judicial
impartiality. Erroneous decisions spurred by the pernicious
version of the duty to sit remain good law in Nevada even if
the state courts meant only to adopt the benign version of
the doctrine.
Despite this, Nevada law does not appear to take the
duty to sit concepts to the extremes reflected in Laird v.
Tatum or other, older cases that viewed the concept as
requiring that judges be removed from a case only under the
most extreme circumstances. Rather, Nevada caselaw, if
read closely, seems to suggest that the duty to sit should not
override application of the basic principles of impartiality
However, the
regarding
disqualification decisions."'
rhetorical impact of the duty to sit nomenclature appears at
the margin to make Nevada judges too resistant to recusal.
Certainly, the term and its caselaw appear as a matter of
course in the briefs of every litigant resisting a
disqualification motion in Nevada. In 2007, Nevada's state
courts were the subject of a multi-installment Los Angeles
Times series tellingly titled Juice vs. Justice? ("juice" a
colloquial term for influence). 4 ° Although there are

339. Depending on one's viewpoint, the "recusal and judicial campaigns"
decisions might be criticized as too resistant to disqualification. But these cases
could be decided the same way if the Court found the issue not to be a close
question or wished to invoke a version of the rule of necessity in resisting
disqualification for de minimus campaign support in view of the elected Nevada
judiciary.
340. See Michael J. Goodman, A Judge Who Isn't Playing by Fast and Loose
Rules, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2006, at A20; Michael J. Goodman, & William C.
Rempel, In Las Vegas, They're Playing With a Stacked Judcial Deck, L.A. TIMES
June 8, 2006, at A20; Michael J. Goodman & William C. Rempel, Juice vs.
Justice: For This Judge and His Friends, One Good Turn Led to Another, L.A.
TIMES, June 9, 2006, at Al; Michael J. Goodman & William C. Rempel, Juice vs.
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reasonable rebuttals to the article,34 which depended
heavily on the profiling of a few judges and the general
problem of judicial fundraising and elections, the fact
remains that, in part because of its embrace of the duty to
sit and resistance to recusal, Nevada courts have an image
problem that predates the L.A. Times series and
continues.342
3. Mischief in Other States. Although Nevada may be
the most prominent example of a state that formally
embraces the duty to sit long after it was supposed to have
disappeared, a few other states provide similar examples of
problems where the continued reign of the duty to sit may
make courts too resistant to judicial disqualification. As one
scholar observed, "[p]rior to 1975 Alabama courts found
Justice: Special Treatment Keeps Them Under the Radar, L.A. TIMES, June 10,
2006, at Al.
341. See, e.g., Sean Whaley, Rose Responds to Criticism, LAS VEGAS REv.-J.,
Sept. 20, 2006, at 5B (stating that the Nevada judiciary was taking steps to
improve disclosure of conflicts of interest affecting state judges).
342. See supra notes 303-07 (discussing cases where Nevada permitted
judges to preside in questionable circumstances); supra notes 312-25 (regarding
the Whitehead controversy and acrimony on the 1990s Nevada Supreme Court);
see also David Kihara, County is Called Court 'Hellhole,' LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Dec. 18, 2007, at 6B (noting Clark County/Las Vegas, Nevada courts named on
American Tort Reform Association's annual list of "Judicial Hellholes"
associated with judicial favoritism, erratic decisionmaking and abnormally high
verdicts for plaintiffs); Glen Puit, Lawsuit Critical of High Court, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Nov. 13, 2003, at 3B.
Of course, making the ATRA Judicial Hellhole list could be viewed, at least
in part, as an honor in that ATRA's evaluation of courts is largely geared to
whether the local courts are pro-plaintiff (bad in ATRA's view) or pro-defendant
(good in ATRA's view). My own opinion is that ATRA, having previously named
low-hanging fruit such as the St. Clair County, Illinois, courts (where the
plaintiff's bar appears to have developed a compliant bench) to its list, is now
straining a bit to find alleged hellholes. The Clark County courts are in my
experience more plaintiff friendly than many courts, including their federal
counterparts in Nevada, but not unduly so. Although a few of the state trial
judges are weak intellectually or occasionally intemperate, the bench as a whole
compares favorably with other courts. Furthermore, finding for a plaintiff
hardly is conclusive of judicial error. Some defendants are guilty as charged and
deserve an adverse verdict and a substantial judgment agasint them. See, e.g.,
Merrick v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (D. Nev. 2008)
(deciding, in a well-crafted opinion by U.S. District Judge James C. Mahan, who
was a target of the L.A. Times Juice vs. Justice series for alleged favoritism,
that on the basis of strong evidentiary record, large insurer acted in bad faith
and with malice, and awarding substantial compensatory and punitive
damages).
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sufficient reason to disqualify judges only in egregious
circumstances" and despite the state's subsequent adoption
of the 1972 ABA Model Code, "some Alabama courts
persisted in requiring parties who sought to disqualify a
' Although
judge to show that the judge was biased in fact."343
the state's continued embrace of the duty to sit 3" is not
directly textually linked in the state's recusal-resistant
3 45
decisions, the state remains recusal resistant in doctrine
and occasionally fails to disqualify in some seemingly
egregious cases.
Arkansas embraces the duty to sit in a seemingly
benign form but in a manner that creates a confusing
standard and seems to have narrowed the reach of the ABA
Model Code. When addressing recusal motions, Arkansas
courts typically state that "a judge has a duty to sit on a
case unless there is a valid reason to disqualify. '347 Also
frequently noted is that
343. See FLAMM, supra note 2, § 28.2 at 825. See, e.g., Exparte Hunt, 642 So.
2d 1060, 1069 (Ala. 1994) (requiring showing of prejudice rather than merely
reasonable question as to impartiality). But see In re Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350,
355 (Ala. 1985) (applying correct standard and requiring recusal).
344. See, e.g., Exparte Hill, 508 So. 2d 269, 271 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (stating
that although federal law has eliminated duty to sit, "we are not prepared to go
that far. .. ").
Alabama also uses the term "duty to sit" when referring to evidence that was
not heard in open court below. In Alabama, as in most states, a trial court's
findings of fact are reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard. However,
this deference is not accorded to trial court findings of fact that are not based on
evidence based on oral testimony, and it then becomes the appellate court's
"duty to sit in judgment on the evidence." See McLean v. Brasfield, 460 So. 2d
153, 155 (Ala. 1984); accord McCulloch v. Roberts, 296 So. 2d 163, 164 (Ala.
1974).
345. See, e.g., Ex parte Hill, 508 So. 2d 269, 271-72 (Ala. 1987) (affirming
judge's decision to disqualify self from divorce case due to personal friendship
with parties and personal knowledge regarding some facts at issue but setting
forth standard of actual prejudice rather than reasonable-question-as-toimpartiality standard.
346. See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 642 So. 2d 999, 1053-54 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993)
(holding that recusal not required even though judge's ex parte communications
created appearance of impropriety); Baker v. State, 296 So. 2d 794 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1974) (finding recusal not required where judge presided over trial of
defendant who was indicted in another case known to the judge).
347. Irvin v. State, 345 Ark. 541, 49 S.W.3d 635, 641 (Ark. 2001). See also,
e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 870 S.W.2d 383, 384-85 (Ark. 1994) (noting
abolition of pernicious duty to sit in federal law, construing this to leave benign
duty in place under Arkansas version of ABA Model Code and finding, "Under

2009]

DUTY TO SIT

939

The rule is long established that there is a presumption of
impartiality on the part of judges and a judge's decision to recuse
is within his or her discretion and will not be reversed absent
abuse. The party seeking recusal must demonstrate any alleged
bias. Unless there is an objective showing of bias, there must be a
communication
of bias in order to require recusal for implied
34 8
bias.

The Arkansas courts thus seem-notwithstanding the
state's adoption of the "reasonable question as to
impartiality" standard of the ABA Model Rule-to require
much more than merely a reasonable question about the
judge's neutrality but instead have raised the bar for
recusal to require a rather clear showing of actual bias or
prejudice.3 49 There is also often language in Arkansas cases
stressing that the "question of bias is usually confined to the
35 The net impact appears to be a
conscience of the judge.""
state resistant to recusal in that it requires proof of actual
bias and finds it insufficient that reasonable lay observers
could be concerned or that a judge's participation appears
inappropriate. Although the bulk of Arkansas cases
involving denial of recusal appear to reflect only weak
grounds, 5 the state's overall attitude seems resistant to
the current code, a judge has a strong duty not to sit in cases where he or she is
disqualified, but there is an equally strong duty to sit in cases when he or she is
not disqualified."). But see Walls v. State, 20 S.W.3d 322, 324-25 (Ark. 2000)
(employing duty to sit to reject recusal notwithstanding "apparent ethical
lapses" of trial judge in talking to press and meeting ex parte with victims and
families in a case involving rape of boy scouts by leader).
348. See, e.g., Malory v. Harsfield, Almand & Grisham, LLP, 86 S.W.3d 863,
866 (Ark. 2002).
349. See infra note 290 and accompanying text.
350. Bland v. Baxter Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. CA 05-1229, 2006 WL 2556394
(Ark. App. Sept. 6, 2006).
351. See, e.g., Porter v. Arkansas Dept. of Health & Human Servs., No. 08359, 2008 WL 4173644 (Ark. Sept. 11, 2008) (finding judge's characterization of
litigant's statement as "bad answer" insufficient ground for recusal, but citing
duty to sit); Johnson v. State, No. CR 03-1023, 2005 WL 3320855, at *2 (Ark.
Dec. 8, 2005) (finding defendant's claim of judge's friendship with crime victim
unsupported by evidence, but citing duty to sit); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill,
870 S.W.2d 383, 384 (Ark. 1994) (rejecting argument that judge's prior opinion
differing with current legal position of movant constituted ground for recusal,
but noting duty to sit); Long v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 250 S.W.3d 264, 274 (Ark.
App. 2007) (discussing lack of objective evidence of asserted judicial vendetta
against movant, but noting duty to sit); Bland v. Baxter Regional Med. Center,
No. CA 05-1229, 2006 WL 2556394, at *6 (Ark. App. Sept. 6, 2006) ("Although
Bland presented the theory of a personal vendetta against her attorney, she
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disqualification unless the case is compelling,352 a legacy of
the state's continued embrace of duty to sit rhetoric.

provided no objective evidence of bias, nor did she show that there was an actual
communication of bias. . . ," but noting duty to sit); Bogachoff v. Arkansas Dep't
of Human Svcs., No. CA 04-1183, 2006 WL 1344072 *7-*8 (Ark. App. May 17,
2006) (judge's decision not to order home study by Dept. of Human Services is
not sufficient ground for recusal, but citing duty to sit); Dodson v. State, No. CR
02-1221, 2005 WL 775859, at *1-*2 (Ark. Apr. 7, 2005) (holding that judge's
prior finding of contempt against counsel not ground for recusal, but duty to sit
cited); Turner v. Northwest Arkansas Neurosurgery Clinic, P.A., 210 S.W.3d
126, 134 (Ark. App. 2005) (finding judge's clearly erroneous evidentiary and
procedural rulings reversed on appeal were not ground for recusal, but citing
duty to sit). In addition, of course, Turner is supported by the rule that a judge
should ordinarily only be recused for bias or prejudice stemming from an
extrajudicial source. However, the nature of the Turner judge's rulings (e.g.,
excluding all evidence of mental illness of physician accused of malpractice) is so
extreme that one might be justified in inferring that such wildly pro-defendant
rulings reflect bias in favor of defendant, prejudice against plaintiff, prejudice
against medical malpractice suits, or raise reasonable questions as to judge's
impartiality.
352. See, e.g., Perroni v. State, 186 S.W.3d 206, 210 (Ark. 2004) (noting duty
to sit):
Upon our review of the record, we hold that Perroni has failed to
demonstrate the required bias on Judge Fox's part. While Perroni
alleges Fox erred by serving as prosecutor and as a witness, in
prejudging Perroni's case, in incarcerataing Ross, and in conducting an
ex parte investigation when preparing for a show-cause hearing, the
primary issue is whether he disobeyed Judge Fox's scheduling order.
See also Malory, 86 S.W.3d at 867 (finding violation of Canon 3B(7)(a)(ii)
prohibiting ex parte communications but finding that judge "cured this violation
by calling the parties and allowing an opportunity to respond. Further,
appellant has failed to show or demonstrate any bias of the trial court as a
result of the ex parte communication."); Irvin v. State, 49 S.W.3d 635, 642-43
(Ark. 2001) (rejecting defendant's argument "that the judge should have recused
because the judge had formerly prosecuted Irvin while serving as the elected
prosecuting attorney"; Irvin offered no evidence that the trial judge was biased
or prejudiced against him merely because he had acted as prosecutor in Irvin's
prior prosecutions. This bare fact proves nothing and, absent any actual
showing of bias or prejudice, cannot suffice to require the trial judge to recuse,"
citing duty to sit); Walls v. State, 20 S.W.3d 322, 324-25 (Ark. 2000) (employing
duty to sit to reject recusal notwithstanding "apparent ethical lapses" of trial
judge in talking to press and meeting ex parte with victims and families
involving rape of boy scouts by leader, but citing duty to sit); Beshears v. State,
947 S.W.2d 789 (1997) (rejecting recusal where trial judge had prosecuted
defendant in connection with unrelated matter ten years earlier and citing duty
to sit). Accord Parker v. Priest, 932 S.W.2d 320 (Ark. 1996) (Hochstetter, S.J.,
mem.) (rejecting recusal due to allegedly close relationship with law firm
involved; judge both denied as factual matter and cited duty to hear and decide
cases); Barritt v. State, No. CA CR 06-1261, 2007 WL 2713593 (Ark. App. Sept.
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As recently as 2008, a South Carolina appellate court
rejected recusal despite the trial judge's ties to a party
through counsel, her husband's law partner. The court
noted that the duty to sit had long been recognized in
federal court but failed to note its abolition at the federal
level.353 Further, the court required an actual showing of
prejudice rather than merely a reasonable question as to
impartiality.354 The court found "Canon 3B(1) to be
controlling, which imposes a 'duty to sit."'355 However, as
previously discussed, Canon 3B of the 1990 Code was
intended only to adopt the benign version of the duty to sit,
not its pernicious namesake." Fortunately, other South
Carolina cases properly result in recusal and do not invoke
the duty to sit, but the pernicious aspects of the concept
appear to produce error occasionally.
Despite its continued adherence to the duty to sit,
Mississippi courts will disqualify or sanction judges where
the situation is clear.358 However, the state's recusal record
19, 2007) (rejecting recusal despite judge's ex-parte communication with juror
who expressed reservations about guilty verdict).
353. See Simpson v. Simpson, 660 S.E.2d 274, 277-78 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008)
(citing cases from Arkansas, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, and West Virginia).
As previously discussed, see supra notes 194 and 208 and accompanying text,
Maryland and Michigan upon closer examination appear to be states with only a
benign version of the duty to sit. The Simpson approach to the doctrine can be
faulted for having managed to focus inordinately on a minority of states
retaining the pernicious version of the duty.
354. See Simpson, 660 S.E.2d at 278. Simpson speaks inconsistently of the
doctrine having been "recognized and imposed in both state and federal courts,"
id. at 278, but then cites as its federal authority McBeth v. Nissan Motor Corp.
U.S.A., 921 F. Supp. 1473, 1477 (D.S.C. 1996), which states that "[n]o judge, of
course, has a duty to sit where his impartiality might be reasonably questioned,"
demonstrating that the McBeth Court was referring only to the benign duty to
sit and not attempting to resurrect the pernicious version twenty years after it
had been abolished in federal law.
355. Simpson, 660 S.E.2d at 278.
356. See supra text accompanying note 288 (discussing the 1990 Code).
357. See, e.g., In re Dillon County Magistrate Davis, 630 S.E.2d 281, 282-83
(S.C. 2006) (finding that a judge engaged in misconduct by holding a special
hearing for his uncle, with no mention of duty to sit); In re Stocker, 608 S.E.2d
865, 870 (S.C. 2005) (finding that a judge improperly engaged in ex parte
communications, with no mention of duty to sit); Burgess v. Stern, 428 S.E.2d
880 (S.C. 1993) (same).
358. See, e.g., Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Justice Court Judge
11, 19, 834 So. 2d 31, 34, 36 (Miss. 2003) (holding
S.S., 2002-JP-01126-SCT,
that a private reprimand was appropriate where a judge "participated in
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has significant blemishes.359 The common thread among the
small cluster of strong duty to sit cases is one in which
courts in these states appear at times highly resistant to
recusal, and on the whole appear to be more reluctant to
recuse than in most state and federal courts. Although
comprehensive data on public confidence in the judiciary in
these states is not available, all of the "hard core" duty to sit
states have been the subject of unflattering press reports
concerning problems of partisanship and favoritism in their
courts.
Alabama was widely perceived as a nirvana for personal
injury plaintiffs until the business community struck back,
currently making the state favorable to corporate
defendants and insurers. 3"
Political affiliation and
drafting a petition against a law officer while serving as a judicial officer and
continuing to preside on cases involving the Deputy without disqualifying
himself'); Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Vess, 692 So. 2d 80, 84-85
(Miss. 1997)
(adopting the Commission on Judicial Performance's
recommendation that a judge "be subjected to public reprimand" for improper ex
parte communications); Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Milling, 651
So. 2d 531, 539-540 (Miss. 1995) (holding that a judge be removed from office for
becoming socially involved and openly living with a criminal defendant); Miss.
Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Peyton, 645 So. 2d 954, 956-57 (Miss. 1994)
(finding that a judge's improper ex parte communications warranted the
imposition of a fine of $1,000 and a fifteen day suspension).
359. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215 (1971) (finding that a
state court judge should have recused himself due to prior civil rights cases in
which the petitioner had obtained a verdict against the judge); In re Blake, 912
So. 2d 907, 917-18 (Miss. 2005) (holding that a trial court judge was so obviously
biased against an attorney that she must disqualify herself from all seven cases
on her docket involving the attorney).
360. See e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991)
(rejecting a constitutional challenge to an Alabama jury verdict of $840,000 in
punitive damages in an insurance bad faith case with $200,000 in damages, a
result called into question by subsequent Court decisions regarding
constitutional limits on punitive damages); Exxon Corp. v. Dep't of Conservation
& Natural Res., 859 So. 2d 1096 (Ala. 2002) (affirming a jury award of $3.42
billion in punitive damages on breach-of-contract and fraud claims); BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 515 (Ala. 1997) (reducing a punitive damages
award for a distributor's failure to disclose that a car had been repainted after
being damaged prior to delivery to $50,000 after remand from U.S. Supreme
Court); David Firestone, Alabama Acts to Limit Huge Awards by Juries, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 1999, at A16 (reporting the state legislature's passage of law
limiting punitive awards in response to the state's notoriety for huge tort
awards). Most of Alabama's bad press has concerned very large tort judgments
under circumstances that suggest some jury irrationality. For example, in BMW
of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), a jury awarded $4 million in
punitive damages because the buyer of a BMW automobile was not told that the
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ideological bent appear correlated with judicial outcomes.36 '
Supreme
Court
justice
Famously,
one
Alabama
inappropriately sat and cast the deciding vote in a case with
precedential value for his own pending lawsuit under
circumstances so egregious that the U.S. Supreme Court
(including Justice Rehnquist) found it a violation of due
process."'
Mississippi has long been pilloried as a "judicial
hellhole" by the American Tort Reform Association (ATRA),
a pro-defendant group.363 Although the ATRA agenda may
be a bit too callous for some tastes (my own included),3" the
organization has a point about state judges with excessively
paint job on the car had been retouched due to acid rain damage. Although the
trial court reduced the award, the judge-entered award was two million dollars,
an astonishing amount for such a relatively trivial, even if "fraudulent," wrong
perpetrated by the carmaker. Id. This sort of judicially adjusted award raises
concerns about the competence and fairness of the courts.
361. See Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics, and Judicial Decisions: A Case
Study of ArbitrationLaw in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645 (1999).
362. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824-25 (1986).

363. See AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2008/2009 3-19
(2008), available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/report.pdf. The worst
courts in America according to the ATRA list are, in descending order of
hellishness: West Virginia; South Florida (Miami); Cook County, Illinois
(Chicago); Atlantic County, New Jersey; Montgomery County, Alabama; Macon
County, Alabama; Los Angeles County, California (so much for the L.A. Times
throwing stones at Las Vegas); and Clark County, Nevada (Las Vegas). Id.
364. For example, the ATRA advocates strict (and in my view arbitrary)
caps on noneconomic damages and punitive damages that are hard to square
with fundamental precepts of the American judicial system. The ATRA also
opposes the contingency fee, which in essence permits injured persons to obtain
legal representation that they could otherwise not afford and advocates the
"English Rule" that losing parties should pay the winner's counsel fees-a rule
that would disproportionately favor those with wealth and the ability to spread
the risk of litigation outcomes, i.e., commercial defendants, at the expense of
individual plaintiffs. See generally The Legal Underground, ATRA's "Judicial
Hellholes 2004": Don't Be A Mindless Dupe, http://www.legalunderground.coml
2004/12/atras-judicial_.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2008) (reporting distortions in
ATRA claims); Joan Claybrook, Why the "Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths"
Report is Fundamentally Flawed, PUBLIC CITIZEN 8, http://www.citizen.org/
documents/ACF2FB.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2008) (finding statistics in an
ATRA report untrustworthy and finding the ATRA to be more of a lobbying
group for businesses facing litigation than a neutral investigator). The ATRA
would probably make the same criticism of Public Citizen, a generally liberal
group founded by noted activist Ralph Nader. See generally Elizabeth G.
Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates and Bad Social Science:
Lessons from West Virginia, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1097 (2008).
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cozy relationships to campaign-contributing plaintiff
counsel.365 Further, Mississippi's real life seemed to have
imitated John Grisham's art66 when prominent plaintiffs'
lawyer Richard Scruggs was convicted of attempting to
bribe a judge.367 Less notoriously, Arkansas and South
Carolina have also been dogged by a perception that being
part of the relevant good-old-boy network and having close
ties to judges is good for litigation results.368 In particular,
the rural areas of these southern states are considered
areas in which favored lawyers friendly with the local bench
do particularly well.
4. Mischief in States Where The Status of the Duty to Sit
is Unclear. Even in states not within the hard core of
remaining duty to sit jurisdictions have produced some
startlingly inappropriate participation by jurists whose
impartiality was at least subject to question. Most famous,
perhaps is West Virginia's Caperton v. Massey, upon which
the U.S. Supreme Court has granted review in response to
the losing side's claim of lack of due process when the
pivotal vote in the case was cast by a Justice who had
received more then $3 million from the prevailing litigant
and another supportive Justice had been
369 hosted on an
expensive vacation with the winning party.
In addition, one can find in other states with post-1974
duty to sit precedent no shortage of cases in which judges
continue to preside in cases that raise serious questions as

365. A famous example from a state with mixed signals on the duty to sit is
Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil, Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987), in which Pennzoil
prevailed with counsel Joseph Jamail, who had contributed more than $10,000
to the campaigns of the trial judge presiding over the case, which involved a $4
billion award. Id. at 784, 842, 866; see also Stuart Taylor, Jr., Texaco Set Back
by Supreme Court in Pennzoil Case, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 1987, at Al (reporting
that the initial jury verdict was near $10 billion).
366. Grisham's novels frequently involve at least the aroma of corruption or
favoritism in a southern state such as Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, or the
Florida panhandle. See., e.g., JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008); JOHN GRISHAM,
THE PARTNER (1997); JOHN GRISHAM, THE RUNAWAY JuRY (1996).
367. See Bloomberg News, Scruggs's Son Sentenced in Bribery Case, N.Y.
TIMES, July 3, 2008, at C10.
368. See James H. Ritchie, Jr., The JudicialMerit Selection Commission, 18
S.C. LAw. 27, 27 (2006).
369. See supra text accompanying notes 182-84 (discussing Caperton v.
Massey).
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to their impartiality 7 ° or state disqualification doctrine that
appears to misread the ABA standards supposedly adopted
" ' Despite this, it generally seems that in
by the states.37
states that have clearly followed the ABA and federal model
abolishing the pernicious version of the duty to sit, recusal
practice appears to require disqualification more frequently
in cases that present doubts about the judge's impartiality
even if the case is not a compelling one of bias. 7 The same
370. On Alaska, see, for example, Pride v. Harris, 882 P.2d 381, 382-83, 385
(Alaska 1994) (finding no "appearance of partiality" where the judge presided
over auto accident case involving a party that had been the losing litigant before
the judge in contested child custody battle, during which the judge arguably had
made adverse assessments of the litigant's character and credibility); Blake v.
Gilbert, 702 P.2d 631, 633, 640-41 (Alaska 1985) (holding that a judge was not
required to recuse himself in case where the judge's nephew was a business
partner of a civil defendant accused of breach of fiduciary duty and tortious
interference).
On Connecticut, see, for example, State v. Webb, 680 A.2d 147, 185-86 (Conn.
1996) (finding that recusal was not required where the judge presided over a
prior criminal trial involving the same defendant); State v. Bunker, 874 A.2d
301, 313 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that disqualification was not required
where the judge had personally prosecuted the defendant's unrelated probation
violation ten years earlier and had been a supervisor in prosecution office at
time of the defendant's other prior convictions).
371. See, e.g., Rodvik v. Rodvik, 151 P.3d 338, 352 (Alaska 2006) (holding
that refusal to recuse is an "abuse of discretion only when it is 'plain that a fairminded person could not rationally come to [the same] conclusion [as the judge]
on the basis of the known facts"'; one litigant had been a prominent public critic
of the judge prior to the case); Jourdan v. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp., 42 P.3d
1072, 1081-83 (Alaska 2002) (finding that a judge's appointment by governor
who was a friend of a litigant was insufficient to require recusal because there
was no showing of '%ias;" whether there was a reasonable question as to
impartiality was not addressed); Feichtinger v. State, 779 P.2d 344, 348 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a sitting judge assigned to a case must continue to
preside over the matter unless there is "good cause" for disqualificationterminology suggesting a case must raise more than a reasonable question as to
impartiality).
372. States that have abolished the duty to sit clearly:
District of Columbia. See, e.g., Gillum v. United States, 613 A.2d 366, 369-70
(D.C. 1992) (per curiam) (requiring recusal of judge after a "heated" exchange
between the judge and counsel during the trial); Turman v. United States, 555
A.2d 1037, 1038 (D.C. 1989) (per curiam) (requiring recusal when the judge
stated that because a witness was credible in prior trial he believed her to be
credible in the instant case).
Georgia. See, e.g., In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge No. 97-61, 499 S.E.2d
319, 319-20 (Ga. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that a municipal court judge, who
was the son of the mayor, be removed from the bench because of the appearance
of impropriety, despite no instances of improper behavior by the judge);
Strayhorn v. Staley, 339 S.E.2d 740 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (finding that a judge
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should have recused herself in a contempt proceeding regarding remarks of
counsel which may have been directed at her). However, a number of Georgia
cases appear to be resistant to recusal despite not invoking the duty to sit. See,
e.g., Robertson v. State, 484 S.E.2d 18, 20 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that
where a a trial judge was unaware that her husband was representing the
victim of a criminal defendant in related potential civil action, the judge was not
required to recuse herself from trial).
Iowa. See, e.g., Bride v. Heckart, 556 N.W.2d 449, 455 (Iowa 1996) (finding
that a district court judge's failure to disclose that he had recently been
represented by the defense counsel's law firm deprived the plaintiff of the
opportunity to make a timely request for disqualification); Blum v. State, 510
N.W. 2d 175, 179-80 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the judge's remarks
"create[d] a palpable atmosphere of hostility during the hearing" on the
plaintiffs motions to withdraw his guilty plea, and that the judge should have
recused himself "because of the allegation of judicial intimidation and his
personal knowledge regarding [the plaintiffs] claims of juror and judicial
misconduct").
Kansas. But see State v. Logan, 678 P.2d 181, 183 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding that the defendant's right to fair trial was not denied due to the fact
that the judge had a son who was an assistant district attorney at the time of
the prosecution, but stating that it would be "appropriate" for the judge to
recuse himself from future cases "which the district attorney's office is
prosecuting while his son is employed on its staff'; but note that this is refusal
to disturb a sentence and not a disqualification decision at the outset of trial
and may have been the result of the court affirming on the implicit ground that
any error was harmless).
Maine. See, e.g., Gavin v. Kennedy, No. Civ. A. CV-04-018, 2004 WL
1434496, at *1-*2 (Me. Super. Ct. 2004) (no damages awarded to party alleging
judicial bias in case where judge in fact recused on the basis of weak argument
for disqualification).
Massachusetts. See, e.g., Furtado v. Furtado, 402 N.E. 2d 1024, 1036 (Mass.
1980) (noting that "contempt charges should be heard by a judge other than the
trial judge 'whenever the nature of the alleged contemptuous conduct is .
likely to affect the trial judge's impartiality').
Michigan. See, e.g., Citizens Protecting Michigan's Constitution v. Secretary
of State, 755 N.W. 2d 147 (Mich. 2008) (Cavanagh, J., mem.) (stating that
although he has "more than a de minimis interest"' in the outcome of the case,
he will participate because of the "rule of necessity," and that "this Court's
traditional disqualification procedure leaves such a determination solely to the
challenged justice"); Grievance Admin. v. Fieger, 729 N.W. 2d 451 (Mich. 2006)
(contentious cases in which Court divides sharply over alleged judicial bias
toward flamboyant, controversial attorney Geoffrey Fieger); Ypsilanti Charter
Twp. v. Kircher, 281 Mich. App. 251. 264 n.3 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (noting that
the circuit court judge recused himself from a case despite no showing of bias or
prejudice "in order to avoid the appearance of bias or impropriety"); Peterson v.
Orban, No. 286081 2008 WL 5158890, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam)
(noting that the judge recused himself due to his wife's acquaintance with the
defendant's wife).
Minnesota. See, e.g., In re Estate of Goyette, 376 N.W. 2d 438, 442 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1985) (stating that the former trial judge's removal of himself from the
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probate proceedings was not an abuse of discretion). But see Oslin v. State, 543
N.W. 2d 408, 417 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that a judge who initially
recused himself from a matter could later decide to sit where he never explained
basis for original disqualification and record did not reflect any personal interest
in case).
Missouri. See, e.g., Moore v. Moore, 134 S.W.3d 110, 114-15 (Mo. Ct. App.
2004) (holding that the family court commissioner abused his discretion in
failing to sustain a motion to recuse himself from future proceedings in the case
because of improper ex parte contact) (noting that "litigants ... are entitled to a
trial which is not only fair and impartial, but which also 'appears' fair and
impartial") (; State ex. rel. Thexton v. Killebrew, 25 S.W.3d 167, 171 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000) (stating that "[t]he crucial need for public confidence in the judicial
system requires [courts] to liberally apply the law in favor of disqualification" of
a trial judge); State v. Hornbuckle, 746 S.W.2d 580, 585 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(noting that "[w]hen the offense charged is committed against the person or
property of the judge, or some person 'near of kin' to [the judge] by blood or
marriage" disqualification is required).
Montana. See, e.g., Shultz v. Hooks, 867 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Mont. 1994)
(holding that a judge was disqualified from presiding over a malpractice action
where he had represented plaintiff in an underlying matter because although
the underlying suit was technically a separate action from the malpractice suit,
the legal representation in the underlying suit gave rise to the malpractice
claim); Schellin v. N. Chinook Irrigation Ass'n, 848 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Mont.
1993) (holding that where a trial judge is a participant in settlement
negotiations that fail to resolve a case, the judge must sustain motions to
disqualify himself from presiding over the ensuing trial).
Nebraska. See, e.g., Metcalf v. Metcalf, 757 N.W.2d 124, 126 (Neb. Ct. App.
2008) (stating that the trial judge recused himself from an alimony modification
case because he had heard the plaintiffs previous modification complaint).
New Jersey. See, e.g., State v. Taimanglo, 957 A.2d 699, 702, 706 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2008) (noting that after the defendant stated that he had rented a
hotdog cart to the judge ten years earlier, but had not been paid, the judge,
although he had not recognized the defendant, "decided to recuse himself, and
he had the right to do so whether required or not"); Rivers v. Cox-Rivers, 788
A.2d 320, 322 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2002) (requiring recusal where a judge
represented a party fourteen years earlier even though the judge had no
recollection of the representation) ("Except when required by the rule of
necessity, where a judge has previously represented one of the parties in a
matter before him against the other, any judicial action taken is a nullity,
whether the conflict comes to light during the proceedings before an order
enters or reasonably soon following the conclusion of the matter after an order
has been entered.") (footnote omitted).
North Carolina.See, e.g., Jones v. Dalton, 667 S.E.2d 720 N.C. 2008) (mem.)
(stating that a Supreme Court Justice voluntarily recused himself because his
brother is an associate in a large law firm that was representing litigant,
despite the fact that the judge's brother was not involved in the case and that
both the Chair and the Executive Director of Judicial Standards Commission
advised the judge that disqualification was unnecessary in the absence of a
personal appearance in the case by the judge's brother); In re Badgett, 666
S.E.2d 743, 747, 749 (N.C. 2008) (holding that a trial judge be removed from the
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bench for life due to his misconduct in a single case, which violated the
professional rules requiring judges to "'ensure the integrity and independence of
the judiciary,'.....
act in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity
and impartially of the judiciary,"' and demonstrate patience with and extend
courtesy to everyone with whom the judge deals with in his professional
capacity) (quoting the N.C. Code Jud. Conduct Canons 1, 2(A), & 3(A) (3)).; In re
Braswell, 600 S.E.2d 849, 850 (N.C. 2004) (ordering the censure of a trial judge
for failure to recuse in case where the plaintiff was an adverse party to the
judge in a separate lawsuit); In re Bissell, 429 S.E.2d 731, 731-32, 735 (N.C.
1993) (per curiam) (censuring a trial judge for barring an attorney from sessions
of court because he had initiated an preliminary investigation against her
instead of recusing herself from the cases in which the attorney served as
counsel).
Ohio. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Squire, 876 N.E.2d 933, 952 (Ohio
2007) (suspending a judge for two years for repeated violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility, including
engaging one attorney in a conversation about case without presence of other
attorney in violation of judicial code); Disciplinary Counsel v. Medley, 819
N.E.2d 273, 281 (Ohio 2004) (suspending a judge for eighteen months for ex
parte communications, prejudging issues, and misrepresenting facts in a journal
entry of case); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Karto, 760 N.E.2d 412, 419 (Ohio
2002) (finding that a judge who ultimately recused himself from a juvenile
delinquency case should have recused himself earlier based on evidence of bias,
including the judge's instruction to the prosecutor to bring felony charges
against the juveniles); In re Disqualification of O'Neill, 688 N.E.2d 516, 517
(Ohio 1997) (finding all judges of Franklin County were disqualified from
hearing a case because the former assistant prosecutor, who then became a
judge, was likely to be called as witness); Taylor v. Carr, 572 N.E.2d 805, 805
(Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a judge retains discretion to recuse when
judge's bailiff is related to a litigant, though there is no technically mandated
disqualification).
Pennsylvania.See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 393 A.2d 386, 394 (Pa.
1978) (finding that where record reveals ongoing bitter controversy between
judge and defendant, recusal required in summary contempt proceeding);
Commonwealth v. Druce, 796 A.2d 321, 327 (Pa. Super 2002) (stating that
disqualification is required whenever "significant minority" of laypersons could
reasonably question court's impartiality). But see Commonwealth v. Perry, 364
A.2d 312, 317-18 (Pa. 1976) (finding that judge's acquaintance with murder
victim and mourner at funeral was an insufficient basis for recusal);
Commonwealth v. Druce, 848 A.2d 104, 111 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2004) (finding that
judge violated canon of judicial conduct barring pretrial statement but was
nonetheless not required to recuse himself).
Rhode Island. See, e.g., Cardinale v. Cardinale, 889 A.2d 210, 215 (R.I. 2006)
(noting that the judge initially did not recuse due to comments made during
early stages of trial but recused after obtaining advice from chief judge).
South Dakota. See, e.g., State v. McCrary, 676 N.W.2d 116, 125 (S.D. 2004)
(sentencing judge's ex parte contact with defendant's therapist constituted
reversible error when judge inquired about therapist's opinion regarding
molestation by defendant and imposed sentence). But see State v. Robideau, 262
N.W.2d 52, 54 (S.D. 1978) (finding that the trial judge not required to recuse
where wife was the first cousin of prosecutor).
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appears to hold true in states where the status of the duty
to sit is less clear, including both the states that most likely
do not follow the
74 duty to sit... and those that still may follow
the duty to sit.
Tennessee. See, e.g., State v. West, No. M2007-02732-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL
4467154, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 22, 2008) (discussing judge's recusal due
to professional relationship with court clerk); Leeper v. Leeper, No. E200702229-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 3820768, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2008)
(discussing judge's recusal due to manifested feelings of frustration with
litigant).
Virginia. See, e.g., In re Moseley, 643 S.E.2d 190, 192 (Va. 2007) (noting that
judge recused self in response to disqualification motion); Alexander v. Flowers,
658 S.E.2d 355, 360 (Va. Ct. App. 2008) (ordering a judge to recuse for relying
on "relapse rates" of cocaine addicts). But see Commonwealth v. Jackson, 590
S.E.2d 518, 519-20 (Va. 2004) (finding that a judge was not required to recuse
due to prior service as attorney for commonwealth in trial where probation
imposed that was now subject of subsequent trial).
373. States that most likely have no duty to sit:
Arizona. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 814 P.2d 773, 776 (Ariz. 1992) (finding
that judge should not preside over cases involving a hospital because judge sat
on hospital's board) State v. Superior Court, 748 P.2d 1184, 1186 (Ariz. 1987)
(discussing question as to judge's impartiality due to ties to prosecution of case
prior to appointment to bench); State v. Quick, 868 P.2d 327, 328 (Ariz. App.
1993) (stating that judge must recuse self where he was a member of
prosecutor's staff while case was pending). See also Op. Ariz. Att'y Gen. 180-139
(1980) (conflict of interest requiring disqualification exists where town
magistrate married to town chief of police).
Florida.See, e.g., Maharaj v. State, 684 So. 2d 726, 728 (Fla. 1996) (reversing
decision of judge who supervised the assistant state attorneys who prosecuted
defendant); State v. Calloway, 937 So. 2d 139, 143 (Fla. App. 2006)
(disqualifying a judge for improper ex parte communication with defense
counsel); Pearson v. Pearson, 870 So. 2d 248, 249-50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(finding that a judge's ex parte contacts with husband during hearing on
contempt motion created reasonable question as to impartiality requiring
recusal); Goines v. State, 708 So. 2d 656, 658-59 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(finding that the trial judge is required to recuse if he had any prior involvement
with pending criminal matter); Duest v. Goldstein, 654 So. 2d 1004, 1004-05
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding disqualification of original sentencing judge
was required after reversal and remand due to judge's connections to
prosecution team); see also Stevens v. Americana Healthcare Corp. of Naples,
919 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (finding that judge has duty to
disclose information that litigants or counsel might consider relevant to issue of
disqualification); Perlow v. Berg-Perlow, 875 So. 2d 383, 389-90 (Fla. 2004),
review denied, 969 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 2004) (finding judge's verbatim adoption of
one party's twenty-five-page proposed final divorce judgment created
appearance of partiality requiring reversal); Wilson v. Armstrong, 686 So. 2d
647, 648-49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (noting that a rule against ex parte
contacts applies to discussions about cases with other judges except as expressly
authorized by law).
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Hawaii. See, e.g., State v. Kakugawa, No. 26503, 2006 WL 1737932, at *4
(Haw. June 26, 2006) (finding no error where judge did not recuse over
comments made during pretrial conference where there was no finding of bias or
prejudice against defendant); State v. Stanley, 129 P.3d 1144, 1153 (Haw. Ct.
App. 2005) (explaining that judge was required to recuse after party offered gift,
despite refusing gift and consent of both parties to judge's continued
participation in case). This contrasts with the more restrictive attitude toward
recusal that prevailed in the days when the pernicious version of the duty to sit
held sway. See, e.g., Notley v. Brown, 17 Haw. 393, 393 (Haw. 1906) (finding
that a supreme court justice was not disqualified even though he had been
counsel to party in case and actively involved in case).
Idaho. See, e.g., State v. Suiter, 67 P.3d 1274, 1276-77 (Idaho Ct. App. 2003)
(noting that the trial judge recused after party accused judge of making obscene
gesture toward party).
Illinois. See, e.g., Barth v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 886 N.E.2d 976, 983
(Ill. 2008) (finding trial judge not required to recuse from case where the judge
was insured by the party in the case because the economic interest was too
attenuated; test is whether reasonable person might question judge's ability to
be impartial); In re Moses W., 842 N.E.2d 783, 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (finding
that recusal was required where judge had private communication with juvenile
regarding compliance with placement rules at issue in proceeding before the
judge); People v. Vasquez, 718 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (remanding
because judge should have recused in post-conviction matter where he had
participated in original proceeding leading to conviction). See also People v.
Buck, 838 N.E.2d 187, 194 (Ill App. Ct. 2007) (requiring recusal if situation
creates appearance of impropriety).
New Hampshire. See, e.g., Blaisdell v. City of Rochester, 609 A.2d 388, 388
(N.H. 1992) (holding that judge's failure to make adequate disclosure to parties
about basis for possible disqualification results in disqualification). But see
Lorenz v. New Hampshire Admin. Office of Courts, 858 A.2d 546, 549 (N.H.
2004) (invoking "rule of necessity" to reject recusal motion brought by court
reporters against the Administrative Office of the Courts).
New York. See, e.g., In re Murphy, 626 N.E.2d 48, (N.Y. 1993) (finding an
appearance of impropriety by not recusing from matter involving party from
whom judge had previously borrowed money and failing to disclose relevant
information results in removal of judge); Murray v. Murray, 424 N.Y.S.2d 50, 51
(N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (requiring recusal where appearance of improper judicial
interest emerges, integrity of court system requires judge's recusal). But see
Spremo v. Babchik, 589 N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1022 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (finding judge
has "obligation" not to recuse unless personally satisfied that judge cannot be
impartial), aff'd as modified 628 N.Y.S.2d 167 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995), appeal
denied, 658 N.E.2d 221 (N.Y. 1995).
Washington. See, e.g., State v. Graham, 960 P.2d 457, 461 (Wash. 1998)
(requiring recusal by part-time judge when defendant was accused against
property of one of judge's clients); Sherman v. State, 905 P.2d 355 (Wash. 1995)
(requiring recusal when judge directed extern to make improper ex parte
contact with doctors charged with monitoring defendant's chemical dependency);
Kauzlarich v. Yarbrough, 20 P.3d 946, 957-58 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (finding
that judge originally assigned to defamation case did not abuse discretion in
recusing sua sponte because of concern that court personnel could be witnesses
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in case), rev. denied, 29 P.3d 718, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1090 (2001) (concluding
that trial judge did not recuse too readily or violate judicial responsibilities). But
see Smith v. Behr Process Corp., 54 P.3d 665 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (holding
that judge was not required to recuse in consumer class action against wood
stain manufacturer where he had eaten dinner at home of class member prior to
lawsuit).
Wisconsin. See, e.g., Racine County v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers Dist. 10, 2008 WI 70, 310 Wis.2d 508, 751 N.W.2d 312 (finding
appointment powers proper grounds for recusal because party was involved in
post over which judges exercised appointment influence).
374. States that may still have duty to sit:
Alaska. As reflected in note 190 supra, Alaska, like any state, has cases
rejecting disqualification in cases that would make some reasonable observers
uncomfortable. But the state also has more than its share of examples of
effective or even aggressive disqualification. See, e.g., Keller v. State, 84 P.3d
1010 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004) (finding recusal by three judges in trial where
father of defendant was court bailiff constituted good cause); Ivan v. State, Nos.
A-6548, 4055, 1999 WL 331668, at *2 (Alaska Ct. App. May 26, 1999) (referring
decision to another judge for review to avoid appearance of impropriety).
California.See, e.g., Christie v. City of El Centro, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, (Cal.
Ct. App. 2006) (disqualifying judge for ex parte communications with initial
judge in case); Betsworth v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 664,
665 (Cal. App. 1994) (holding that judge should not preside if "so personally
embroiled" in matter that impartiality is affected). California precedent reflects
sensitivity to impartiality issues even well before the 1970s changes in the ABA
Code and the federal disqualification statute. See, e.g., Austin v. Lambert, 77
P.2d 849, 851 (Cal. 1938) (commenting that disinterest and impartiality of
judges are indispensible to proper administration of justice); Wickoff v. James,
324 P.2d 661, 665 (Cal. App. 1958) (commenting that judge should not preside
unless "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent").
Colorado. See, e.g., In re Estate of Elliott, 993 P.2d 474, 481 (Colo. 2000)
(finding that when there is an appearance of partiality, it is incumbent on judge
to recuse); People v. Dist. Court, 560 P.2d 828, 831 (Colo. 1977) (holding that
"[clourts must meticulously avoid any appearance of partiality" to gain
confidence of litigants and public).
Connecticut. As reflected in note 203, supra, Connecticut has rejected
disqualification in cases that would make some reasonable observers
uncomfortable. But the state also has more than its share of examples of
effective or even aggressive disqualification. See, e.g., Statewide Grievance
Comm. v. Burton, No. DBDCV0303351055S, 2008 WL 2895951, at *12 n.26
(Conn. Super. Ct., July 2, 2008) (discussing judge's recusal to avoid any
allegations of bias after yelling at party, despite overwhelming evidence that
judge was not in fact biased or prejudiced in decisionmaking).
Delaware. See, e.g., Nellius v. Stiftel, 402 A.2d 359, 361-62 (Del. 1978)
(holding that in cases in which litigant's right to fair trial conflicts with
decisions of interested judges, litigant right prevails).
Indiana. See, e.g., In re Edwards, 694 N.E.2d 701, 712 (Ind. 1998)
(disqualifying judge in child support proceeding where he had current and
ongoing sexual relationship with mother and was financially supporting her);
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State v. Morgan County Court, 451 N.E.2d 316, 317 (Ind. 1983) (finding that
judge may not preside in case where he had role as counsel prior to becoming
judge); Calvert v.State, 498 N.E.2d 105 (Ind.Ct.App. 1986) (requiring judge to
recuse because he had been involved in prior prosecution of defendant). But see
Harden v. State, 538 N.E.2d 244 (Ind.Ct. App. 1989) (holding judge's prior
representation of defendant in unrelated criminal matter did not require
recusal).
Kentucky. See, e.g., Dean v. Bondurant, 193 S.W.3d 744 (Ky. 2006) (holding
Chief Justice of Supreme Court disqualified in case where "many" of the
attorneys involved in the case had provided "numerous" campaign contributions,
but campaign contributions alone are not per se ground for recusal).
Louisiana. See, e.g. In re Alford, 977 So.2d 811 (La. 2008) (judge's improper
ex parte contacts required recusal); In re Fuselier, 837 So.2d 1257 (La. 2003)
(judge engaged in improper ex parte communications related to fixing traffic
tickets and similar favors). Even during the heyday of the duty to sit, Louisiana
had some strong precedent favoring recusal. See, e.g., State v. Doucet, 5 So. 2d
894 (La. 1942) (judge recused in case involving alleged embezzlement of public
funds because of judge's political connections to those accusing the defendant).
But see In re Cooks, 694 So.2d 892 (La. 1997) (finding judge's conversations with
attorney friend regarding newspaper accounts of case was insufficient ex parte
contact to require recusal); Bergeron v. Illinois Central Gulf R. Co., 402 So.2d
184, 190 (La. App. 1981) (Lear, J., concurring) (noting duty to sit in Louisiana
that has never been officially disavowed).
Maryland. See, e.g., In re Turney, 533 A.2d 916, 916, 920 (Md. Ct. App. 1987)
(censuring judge for failing to recuse in case involving fake drivers license
procured by stepson for friend; judge's failure in a particular case to avoid the
appearance of impropriety warrants censure; "Courts, be they high or low,
should and must like Caesar's wife, be above suspicion. Any other standard is
one which undermines the trust and confidence of the average citizen in his
government."). See also MD. CODE ANN. [Code of Judicial Conduct] R. 16-813,
Canon 3(D)(1) (cmt) (West 2008) ("By decisional law, the rule of necessity may
override the rule of recusal. For example, a judge might be required to
participate in judicial review of a judicial salary statute or might be the only
judge available in a matter requiring immediate judicial action, such as a
hearing on probable cause or a temporary restraining order. When the rule of
necessity does override the rule of recusal, the judge must disclose on the record
the basis for possible recusal and, if practicable, use reasonable efforts to
transfer the matter promptly to another judge.").
New Mexico. See, e.g., Martinez v. Carmona, 624 P.2d 54, 55 (N.M. Ct. App.
1980) (finding after recusal, judge disqualified from subsequent proceedings); In
re Klecan, 603 P.2d 1094 (N.M. 1979) (holding that because judge declared
mistrial and held attorney in contempt, he had become so personally embroiled
in case as to warrant recusal); Doe v. State, 570 P.2d 589, 591 (N.M. 1977)
(judges "should avoid any hint of impropriety" in making recusal decisions).
North Dakota. See, e.g., In re Application of Graves for Admission to Bar, 677
N.W.2d 215, 216 (N.D. 2004) (involving state board; board members held to
impartiality standard of judges; chair required to recuse in matter where
husband had conducted business dealings with stepfather of person under board
investigation); Grey Bear v. North Dakota Dept. of Human Servs., 651 N.W.2d
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The duty to sit is not the root of all non-disqualification
evil. But it clearly fosters the wrong incentives, making
courts unduly resistant to recusal. At the margin, it
611, 614 (N.D. 2002) (discussing trial judge's recusal after becoming irritated
with legal tactics of litigant).
Oklahoma. See, e.g., Miller Dollarhide, P.C. v. Tal, 2007 OK 58,
17, 163
P.3d 548, 554 (judge recused because of constant tension with defendant,
specifically stating that "error, if any, should be made in favor of
disqualification."); Okla. Jud. Ethics Op. No. 2000-1, 2000 OK. JUD. ETH. 1, 10
P.3d 893 (judge has duty to make full disclosure of facts that might support
motion for recusal); State v. Childers, 105 P.2d 762, 764 (Okla. 1940) (judge
should recuse where "any substantial ground" for disqualification). But see
Sandefur v. Vanderslice, 151 P.2d 430 (Okla. 1944) (judge initially correctly
recused in quiet title action because of interest in real estate involved but then
permitted to hear remainder of case after resolution of title question).
Texas. See, e.g., In re Chacon, 138 S.W.3d 86 (Tex. 2004) (finding that justice
of peace removed from bench willfully and persistently allowed improper
relationship to influence discharge of duties, including reduction in bail for
county commissioner's relative); In re Thoma, 873 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. 1994)
(holding that judge's two ex parte contacts were improper and resulting waiver
of penalties was a willful violation of judicial code); In re K.E.M., 89 S.W.3d 814
(Tex. App. 2002) (holding judge disqualified in juvenile's habeas corpus petition
because of having been county attorney when case was investigated and
prosecuted); Monroe v. Blackmon, 946 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex. App. 1997) (recusal
required where judge represented by a party's counsel in another pending
matter). But see Kirby v. Chapman, 917 S.W.2d 902, 908 (Tex. App. 1996) (judge
not disqualified in child custody case involving ex-husband brother of state
senator who supported judge's appointment to the bench; citing duty to sit).
Utah. See, e.g., Reg'l Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah
1992) (holding that judge was disqualified where party represented by law firm
in which brother-in-law and father-in-law were partners; announcing broad rule
of disqualification based on financial interest in such situations but relaxed rule
where financial benefit is indirect and based only on increase in law firm's
reputation). But see In re Inquiry Concerning Judge, 2003 UT 35, 15, 81 P.3d
758, 761 (holding recusal of justice not required where son-in-law attorney in
law firm retained by judge under investigation in pending proceeding); In re
Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1155 (Utah 1997) (finding no reasonable
inference of bias created where judge hears case in which former law firm
represents party); Am. Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Sys. Commc'n Corp., 939 P.2d 185
(Utah 1997) (same).
Vermont. See, e.g., State v. Hunt, 527 A.2d 223, 223-24 (Vt. 1987) (recusing
from case in which defendant's attorney would be witness in proceedings
involving them, but citing duty to sit in what appears to be benign form and
citing Rehnquist memorandum in Laird v. Tatum).
West Virginia. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text regarding
Caperton v. Massey and West Virginia approach to disqualification.
Wyoming. See, e.g., Farman v. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 841 P.2d 99, 100
(Wyo. 1992) (finding affidavit of bias insufficient and citing duty to sit, but
apparently in benign form).
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probably has a hand in erroneous recusal decisions even
when not expressed in the errant opinion. In states like
Alabama and Nevada, where the duty is sit is repeatedly
endorsed and purportedly revered, there seem an inordinate
number of incorrect or problematic instances of failure to
recuse.

III. THE NEW OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY THE NEW ABA
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

In 2007, the ABA completed its fourth major effort
codifying judicial ethics. Following the 1922 Canons, the
1972 Model Code and the 1990 Model Code, it approved the
2007 Model Code. Substantively, the 2007 Code continues
the bulk of the 1990 Code but helpfully reorganizes the
material in a format similar to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. In addition, the 2007 Code revises
certain language in the 1990 Code both for clarity and with
some modest change in emphasis or application.3" The 2007
Code stakes some significant new substantive ground in
that it expands the prior prohibition against judicial
manifestation of bias to add "gender, ethnicity, marital
status, and political affiliation" to the list and formally bars
"harassment" by judges.376 New Rule 2.9(B) requires the
judge to notify the parties if a judge inadvertently receives
an unauthorized ex parte communication bearing upon the
3 7 New commentary to Rule 2.9
substance of a matter.""

375. For example, Rule 1.3 of the 2007 Code forbids judges to "abuse the
prestige of the judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the
judge or others," while Canon 2B of the 1990 Code stated that a judge "shall not
lend the prestige of office" to these types of interests. New commentary to Rule
2.6(B) of the 2007 Code (formerly Canon 3B(8) of the 1990 Code) continues to
permit judges to encourage settlement but warns that the judge should "not act
in a manner that coerces any party into settlement" and commentary lists six
factors the judge may consider in shaping his or her approach to settlement.
Rule 2.9(A) (2) of the 2007 Code continues, as did Canon3B(7) of the 1990 Code
to permit court-appointed experts but now also requires "advance notice to the
parties" as well as " reasonable opportunity to object and respond to the notice
and to the advice received. See STEPHEN GILLERS AND ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION
OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 690-91 (2008).

376. This is in Rule 2.3(B) of the 2007 Code, formerly Canon 3(B)(5) of the
1990 Code. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 30, at 690.
377. The Rule is aimed at things like a fax or email accidently sent to the
judge. In addition, Comment 4 to Rule 2.9 relaxes the rule against ex parte
contact for specialized courts such as drug or mental health courts where the
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permits a judge to "consult ethics advisory committees,
outside counsel, or legal experts concerning the judge's
compliance" with the Code and new Rule 2.10(E) permits a
judge to respond to media reports alleging improper
conduct." Regarding disqualification, Rule 2.11 differs from
its predecessor Canon 3E of the 1990 Code in that it extends
the disqualification rules applicable to family members to
include a "domestic partner." " Judges also under the 2007
Code are required to "resign immediately
from
discriminatory organizations while the 1990 Code permitted
them to remain members for up to a year during which they
could work to change the rules of the organization.3 "'
Among the organizational or cosmetic changes is new
Rule 2.7, which restates the 1990 Code's provision
concerning judicial "Responsibility to Decide." New Rule
2.11 restates the Code's grounds for disqualification. As
discussed above, the 2007 Code, like its 1972 and 1990
predecessors, provides a sound set of criteria for
disqualification and eliminates the pernicious version of the
duty to sit. Unfortunately, however, it fails to do so in a
purpose is often therapy as much or more than disputes resolution,
adjudication, or punishment. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 30, at 691.
378. But the newly codified right of a judge to respond to charges remains
subject to Rule 2.10(A), Canon 3B(9) of the 1990 Code, which states that a
judge's public comments may not be of a type that could "reasonably be expected
to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or impending in
any court.. ." See GILLERS & SIMON, supranote 30, at 691.
379. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 30, at 691. The Terminology section of
the 2007 Code defines a domestic partner as "a person with whom another
person maintains a household and an intimate relationship, other than a person
to whom he or she is legally married." In addition, a new Comment 2 to Rule
2.11 makes the judge's "obligation not to hear or decide matters in which
disqualification is required" applicable "regardless of whether a motion to
disqualify is filed." See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 30, at 691.
380. See Model Rule 3.6. In addition, Comments to Rule 3.6 create
exceptions for religious organizations and for "national or state military
service." In other words, the ABA was willing to bend its forceful policy of
nondiscrimination as a concession to the power and popularity of the military
and various religions that discriminate on grounds of sexual preference. See also
GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 30, at 689-92 summarizing changes in the 2007
Code. Perhaps the most important development not touched on in text is Rule
4.1 and commentary, which attempts to provide a roadmap for what judges
campaigning for the office can or cannot say in the aftermath of Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), which invalidated state law
prohibiting a judge from "announcing" his position on a contested legal issue
pending before the courts.
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manner clear enough to extinguish the continued use of the
pernicious version of the duty to sit concept while retaining
the benign notion that judges should of course not shirk
from cases that are difficult, time-consuming, or
" '
uncomfortable.38
As per past practice, after the ABA has promulgated
a new or revised model set of rules for judicial or legal
ethics, the various states review the ABA product to
determine whether the new ABA model will be adopted in
the respective states. Typically this is done through a
commission appointed by the state supreme courts. The
state commissions review the ABA model and approve,
reject or modify as desired, making recommendations to the
state supreme court, which adopts as seen fit. In general,
states are receptive to codifying as law the ABA models,
which normally become law in the states in substantially
the form promulgated by the ABA. Usually this is done
within a few years after issuance of the model by the ABA.
Regarding the 1983 introduction of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, the process took somewhat longer
because the 1983 Model Rules were a significant departure
from the 1970 Code of Professional Responsibilty. However,
eventually the Model Rules became the norm in nearly all
states.
Currently, this typical traditional process is
underway regarding the 2007 Model Judicial Code. As of
April 15, 2009, six states have adopted the 2007 Code with
few revisions. Approximately 20 additional states have
judicial code revision commissions in fairly advanced states
of completion. The remainder of the states appear to be in
the early process of constituting commissions and beginning
to review the ABA model. Once a commission or other
advisory body is formed, the process moves fairly swiftly
and is likely to result in the state's essential adoption of the
ABA model within a year. Consequently, the bulk of states
will soon be reviewing and probably adopt the 2007 Judicial
Code, including Rules 2.7 and 2.11 and commentary by
2010.
This presents the legal profession with a prime
opportunity to clarify the duty to sit, clearly extinguishing
the pernicious version resistant to recusal while preserving
381. See supra Part I.A., discussing tension between concept of judicial
responsibility and disqualification norms.
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the benign concept that judges not avoid hard or risky
cases. For example, as discussed below, the Judicial Code
Revision Commission in Nevada, perhaps the most hard
core of duty to sit states, has added commentary clarifying
the relationship between Rule 2.7 and Rule 2.11. If the
state's Supreme Court concurs, Nevada will have made a
major pivot from being the state most overtly wedded to the
pernicious version of the duty to sit to being the first state
with a Judicial Code clarifying that the concept of judicial
responsibility does not counsel against recusal in close cases
and that there should in fact be a preference for
disqualification in such instances. Other states, even those
with minimal duty to sit precedent, should follow suit so
that the pernicious version of the concept is permanently
excised from the judicial lexicon. The ABA should consider
similar clarification. It disapproved the pernicious version of
the duty to sit more than thirty-five years ago, but the Code
continues not to sufficiently separate the benign and
pernicious versions of the concept.
When enacting their respective version of the 2007 ABA
Code, states should specifically disavow the traditional
pernicious version of the duty to sit in the Commentary to
the new Code. The current language in ABA Model Rule 2.7
about "responsibility" to perform judicial duties is strong
enough as a means of encouraging judges not to duck tough
cases but avoids the potentially misleading rhetoric of a
duty to sit. The Commentary could also specifically state
that in close cases, the ordinarily preferable practice is to
resolve the matter in favor of disqualification unless there
are strong extenuating circumstances such as disrupting
resolution of a matter needing immediate decision, a
shortage of judges or the like. Following is some suggested
language:
Some prior cases 38 have recognized or referred to a "duty to sit."
Properly understood, the term "duty to sit" means only that judges
should not disqualify themselves without a valid reason that is at
least colorably correct as a matter of fact and law. Recognition of a
"duty to sit" should not be construed to suggest that judges should
refuse to disqualify themselves in apt circumstances or that close
cases should routinely be resolved against disqualification. On the
contrary, close questions should ordinarily be resolved in favor of

382. And in the case of Nevada, commentary to the 1990 Code as well.
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disqualification in order to preserve public confidence in the
judicial system.

Although there is some relationship between the duty to
sit and the rule of necessity, the concepts are quite distinct.
The rule of necessity makes sense in that it posits that
judges must be able to hear the case even if it tangentially
affects the bench because the system demands that courts
be available to make decisions. For example, judges are not
disqualified from hearing matters that generally affect
taxes, ballot issues, and the like simply because they are
taxpayers or voters. The alleged self-interest is too
attenuated and the consequences of disqualification too
severe in that if one judge is disqualified, all are
disqualified and the case cannot be adjudicated.
CONCLUSION

The duty to sit is an outdated, problematic doctrine
unhelpful to twenty-first century questions of disqualification.
Although supposedly buried more than three decades ago,
the pernicious version of the doctrine continues to exert
undue negative influence from beyond the grave. The ABA
should clarify that Rule 2.7 of the 2007 Model Code
regarding a judge's responsibilities embraces only a benign
version of the duty to sit concept while states should seize
upon the opportunity presented by their consideration of the
2007 ABA Judicial Code to firmly reject the pernicious duty
to sit concept as a restriction on disqualification procedure.
The ABA, the states, the judiciary and the legal profession
should affirmatively declare that close questions be decided
in favor of recusal. The parties' and society's right to a
judiciary above suspicion outweighs any misplaced notion
that there somehow is shame or sloth in stepping aside from
cases in which the judge's impartiality may be suspect.

